Political history of Iran 1951-2021

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In the Name of God

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Preface

The content of this book narrates, in a historical context, the political developments from the year 1951 to 2021, providing a portrayal of the political transformations in Iran over seven decades. It encompasses events, situations, and political changes in various periods, both before and after the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The narrative reflects the impactful experiences of the author during his lifetime. The aim is to illustrate and compare political changes and present information about the political dimensions of different eras, as well as the reasons and the manner in which the Islamic Revolution in Iran took shape. The author, having been actively involved in the political and social developments of Iran throughout his academic and professional life, expresses how these events influenced his life profoundly.

The purpose of writing this book is to enlighten the youth and enthusiasts about the history of this ancient land. The author's efforts are directed towards depicting the overall political landscape of Iran over the past seven decades. The goal is not to criticize any particular organization or group but to present a summary of the political events and realities for the youth and history

enthusiasts. The author is confident that the historical accounts and political information are conveyed with accuracy and integrity. The author has drawn upon references from political and historical books and numerous widely circulated Iranian newspapers in documenting the historical developments. It is worth noting that this writing aims primarily to recount a brief overview of the political events and historical transformations in Iran. Any shortcomings in these writings are acknowledged in advance, and the author apologizes to the esteemed readers.

The author dedicates this book to friends and enthusiasts.

Kavos Navidan

Part 1

Political Developments before the Islamic Revolution

Introduction

The beginning of World War I led to further deterioration of the political and internal situation in Iran. On one side, the Russians and the British, and on the other side, the Germans and the Ottomans, dragged their conflict into Iran despite Iran's declaration of neutrality. Various movements within the country rose against the ineffective government. Their efforts, however, remained fruitless in the face of the impotent Iranian parliament. After the downfall of the corrupt and decadent 137-year Qajar rule, and the inherent

inefficiency of the parliament, along with the instability of legal governments, a bloodless coup took place in 1921. Led by Seyyed Ziauddin, a journalist and adventurous politician, Reza Khan, a Cossack officer with ambitions, was encouraged to pave the way for the overthrow of the Qajar dynasty and the establishment of his own rule. Reza Shah Pahlavi came to power in 1925, creating a smooth path for himself. Reza Shah did not eliminate the symbolic and ceremonial framework of a parliamentary government, but his 20-year rule was not significantly different from the autocratic rule of the pre-constitutional era. Although his regime was characterized by oppression and despotism, it was, in some aspects, modern and progressive. Despite the tyranny, Reza Shah's government gradually established the necessary structural prerequisites for a functional governance during his rule. During this period, modernization and progressivism were to some extent achieved, leading to the elimination of feudalism and the end of the power of local rulers. The central government became relatively dominant, bringing an end to the rule of local khans. The laws of judiciary, assets, and other ministries in Iran were somewhat reformed during this period. Additionally, the number of non-religious educational institutions increased, and urbanization rapidly developed. Infrastructure projects, including

roads, railways, and other means of communication, were initiated, and several factories were established. The modernization efforts of this government were accompanied by the suppression of political progress and all manifestations of democratic ideals. It was believed that the country's renovation could only be achieved through autarky and the suppression of democratic institutions. Self-sufficiency in managing the country's affairs, along with the use of force and pressure to obtain obedience from subordinates, coupled with shortcomings and neglect in the formation and encouragement of legitimate political parties, led to destructive consequences.

Reza Shah Pahlavi failed to establish a credible and non-personal government structure. His autocratic rule came to an end in September 1941, as a result of the occupation of Iran by the United Kingdom and the former Soviet Union. The political power, which had been concentrated in the hands of the monarch until then, decentralized among various institutions. The political order shifted, and the legitimacy of the regime was achieved by depersonalizing and restricting the political use of power. Although the continuation of the Pahlavi monarchy faced strong opposition, the new regime attempted to distinguish itself by adopting the

label of constitutionalism and tolerating criticism of the past, or even engaging in self-criticism, to separate itself from the previous era. Since the fall of Reza Shah Pahlavi, many who had served him joined the ranks of his critics. The ruling elites quickly adapted to the new circumstances, declared their own ideals, and legitimized their new positions. however, not all elites of the post-Reza Shah era were former loyalists. Rather, they were influential figures who had previously withdrawn from political activities. Political power in the post-Reza Shah era was in the hands of the ruling elites, including **Mohammad Reza Shah**, who, at the same time, saw the former embassies of the UK, the USSR, and the United States gradually gaining a position where they could effectively influence the events in Iran. The distribution of political power suggested that the legislative, executive, and judicial branches needed to rejuvenate and assert their designated powers according to the constitution. However, in practice, numerous obstacles hindered such a transformation. Regarding the Parliament, the first issue pertained to its legal regulations and bylaws, followed by its position within the framework of the country's political system. Concerning the monarchy and the executive branch, there was a disparity between their real share of power and their legal and formal authorities. The general

political composition of the ruling elites, who managed and controlled the functioning of government institutions, significantly influenced and was closely connected to the parliamentary arrangements, ultimately impacting the fate of constitutionalism. The following factors were part of the political composition of that era:

Parliament (Major Features of the Law):

According to the spirit of the Iranian Constitution, the Parliament was considered the foundation of constitutionalism. The Constitution, reflecting the anti-oppression spirit and the influence of the constitutional laws of Belgium and France, was drafted in a way to legally prevent the emergence of dictatorship. Therefore, principles or provisions were included in the Constitution that allowed for its easy dissolution and the direct dismissal of the Parliament by the Shah. As a result, the Parliament held a stable position. The fact that Reza Shah easily disregarded the Constitution preserved the appearance of parliamentary arrangements and ensured that the legal power of the Parliament remained untouched. The primary goal of granting the Parliament more power than legally mandated was to restrain excesses of authority and enable the Parliament not only

to oversee the executive branch but also to control all government affairs. It was believed that a strong Parliament would serve as a center of national cohesion and loyalty, easily resisting internal and external pressures. Despite its power, the Parliament's effectiveness was hampered in practice, leading to the government's inefficiency. Several features of the Parliament, either derived from the Constitution or the parliamentary system, defined its actual performance. One notable feature was the possibility of repeated impeachment of the government by the representatives, regardless of the Parliament's agenda. Impeachment could be initiated by a representative or a group of representatives against any minister or a group of ministers, including the Prime Minister. In this case, within a month, the accused had to appear in the Parliament to respond to the impeachment and request a vote of confidence. If the vote of confidence was not obtained, the government's tenure would come to an end. Impeachment was a double-edged sword that could be wielded against governments for the slightest pretext, making it a powerful tool for holding them accountable.

Impeachment, in essence, served as a means to prevent misconduct, terminate incompetence, address mismanagement, and halt actions that were being taken

without thorough parliamentary scrutiny. It could both prevent government initiatives and act as a deterrent against any arbitrary actions taken by the government. Another significant factor influencing the Parliament's performance was the quorum principle. Discussions and negotiations could only take place when at least two-thirds of the representatives present in Tehran were in attendance, with three-fourths of this number required for voting. The purpose of the quorum regulations was to prevent the swift approval of hasty bills without sufficient support and to provide minority representatives with the opportunity to prevent the imposition of cabinets by the majority. After the fall of Reza Shah, the Parliament, which had served him for over a year and a half, was not dissolved, leading to a contradictory situation in its continued operation. Some representatives attempted to address this situation by demonstrating a strong commitment to public interests and a willingness to reflect it, compensating for the paradoxical nature of the Parliament. During the post-Reza Shah era, representatives rarely succeeded in behaving according to their proclaimed stance as "guardians of national interests." Intense factionalism, short-term perspectives, local biases, and the representatives' limited understanding of their social responsibilities, often prioritizing personal interests over

public objectives, were major factors contributing to the lack of meaningful content in parliamentary arrangements. Like other ruling elites, representatives, before making specific decisions, considered immediate and future personal interests, as well as the interests of their families, friends, or affiliated groups, while assessing the potential benefits and losses of their actions. Other factors also limited the actions and inactions of most representatives, effectively constraining a significant number of the ruling elites. Many representatives were considered weak, compliant, and unproductive, lacking the ability to resist various temptations and easily succumbing to the influence of skillful manipulators. A considerable portion of the ruling elites was composed of courtiers, and some were associated with friends and affiliates of foreign embassies. While not necessarily aligned with both English and American embassy affiliates, friends and followers of the Russian embassy had hostilities with both groups. Distrust and suspicion between the groups of followers and affiliates were not confined to negative beliefs, and members of each group often harbored negative feelings regarding the nature and level of loyalty or allegiance of the other group to their patron. Such a situation intensified factionalism and provided each group of followers with the opportunity to limit the

opportunities of other groups, creating a scenario where each group could potentially restrict the possibilities for the others.

Cabinet:

Following the fall of Reza Shah, factors emerged that rendered the cabinets vulnerable, lacking sufficient capability to confront the prevailing social and political issues. These factors included a particular distribution and redistribution of political power, the legal position of the parliament against the cabinet, and the power positions of the court and foreign embassies. After the occupation of Iran by the Allies, governments were formed for several years primarily as a result of pragmatic coalitions among factions. However, these coalitions would break apart, leading to the formation of opposing alliances. The Prime Minister appointed through a coalition of factions had no choice but to allocate several ministerial positions to each faction and promise them various services. Most cabinets lacked internal coordination and rarely benefited from a spirit of collaboration. The common method for allocating ministerial positions and other important roles was in a way that fueled animosity among different groups and individuals inside and outside the parliament. Few

cabinets were formed without direct or indirect representation from the court of the Shah. Since the year 1948 onwards, the court of the Shah increasingly played a leading role in forming governments, entrusting ministerial positions to its various nominees. The court's position in this regard utilized a mix of influences or existing apathy among the majority of representatives, along with exerting direct or indirect pressure, attracting the attention of leaders of major factions, and disseminating deceptive or exaggerated stories about internal and external threats. When the parliament played a major role in overseeing governments, the cabinet, backed by the certainty that its tenure would not be long-lasting, hesitated to support it. Additionally, other claimants against the cabinets were foreign embassies. The embassies of England, the United States, and for a while, the Soviet Union, each had their own priorities and desires, often conflicting with one another. In the absence of continuous internal support, governments were vulnerable to these pressures, often striving to secure support from these embassies to compensate for the lack of sufficient backing domestically. In the post-Reza Shah era, opposition to dictatorship was a common slogan, but the meaning of this term varied depending on who used it and in what context. For the court of Shah, dictatorship meant having

a strong and independent executive power separate from the court, whereas, for the parliament, dictatorship referred to a governmental dictatorship that did not submit to the parliament and, consequently, the court and its allies inside and outside the parliament sought to undermine such a strong government. They stirred up anti-dictatorship sentiments and launched attacks through the media, thus replacing real issues with unreal topics and imaginary threats. Nevertheless, during the first Pahlavi era, which began after World War I, Reza Shah initiated fundamental actions. One of these measures was centralizing power and putting an end to the political and military influence of tribes, landlords, and feudalists. As a result, a series of battles and military operations in Khorasan, forest uprisings, the rebellions of Sarmako Kurds, Shahsavan groups, Lur rebels, and Sheikh Khazali's group, along with other intrusive groups, were tactfully managed, establishing a more secure environment for social and economic reforms than ever before. One of these social reforms was unveiling women and the construction of the Tehran-North railway.

Monarchy:

Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi ascended to the throne at the age of 22, succeeding his father. He had been raised under the close supervision of his father in the royal court, spending five years in Switzerland. The environment in which he was raised had a significant impact on his personality and outlook. According to Marvin Zonis, "Mohammad Reza Shah was a young man filled with doubt, insecurity, and fear of his own weaknesses." This state of mind was a result of a sickly weakness, compulsory separation from parents, a strict, powerful and conqueror father, an ambitious atmosphere, and a royal court full of the thoughtful flatterers. He himself claimed, "The Western democratic environment had shaped my personality to an extent that my father's influence was only secondary." Education in a private and limited school abroad could not provide a serious understanding of Western democratic values. Nevertheless, he demonstrated a genuine interest in democracy, and his accession to the throne was portrayed as the dawn of a new era of parliamentary government, closely adhering to the constitution. Expectations were high for the young Mohammad Reza Shah to commit to the constitution. He often spoke openly about his democratic beliefs. The Shah's formal

duties included appointing the prime minister, usually after the majority of the parliament voted in his favor. He had to sign decrees that ministers had previously endorsed. He could grant amnesty to criminals, dispatch diplomatic missions abroad, receive foreign ministers, and consult formally with government officials in the parliament. The Shah had numerous other responsibilities, such as issuing election decrees and formally inaugurating the parliament. His most important role, which went beyond the formalities according to the constitution, was the overall command of the armed forces, constituting a significant part of his influence. The monarchy maintained its position as the highest authority for granting support, as well as preserving its status and position. The Shah, along with his family and entourage, was structurally situated in a position that enabled him to control categorizations based on support and dependence, as well as the flow of political rewards, preventing anyone from becoming an effective competitor. He could also exert overall, even if negative, supervision over the distribution of resources, positions of power, and privileges. The non-religious nature of the monarchy, in other words, resulted from an institutional and structural connection that was intricately linked with the military organizations of the country. Both Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and the

army had a profound attachment to each other since the Shah had founded, nurtured, and honored the Iranian army. In order to ensure his control over the military and considering the emerging needs, Mohammad Reza Shah resorted to the tactic of alternately appointing senior officers as heads of the general staff. These officers had deep enmity towards each other. The army's duty was not merely limited to maintaining order and law; it was seen as a strategic tool under the sovereignty for confronting enemies, defeating and punishing them, which was highly valued. Rebellions and uprisings, according to the court's desire, were quickly suppressed. Matters were arranged in such a way that any successful performance was attributed to the young Shah, while any failure was placed on the government. Nevertheless, the institutional capability of sovereignty derived not only from the unique nature of relations between the royal court and the military elite but also from the excellent position of the Shah in relation to all ruling elites. The essence of factionalism and sectarian politics in Iran, like in other regions, was to achieve the greatest success and the least failure, favoring certain groups over others, and forming coalitions and classifications in a way that the efforts of one group against others remained ineffective. This situation, coupled with the institutional lack of coordination, led to a relentless deadlock in the

parliamentary system in Iran. Despite their tensions and rivalries, the ruling elites socially constituted a cohesive group, and familial bonds, closeness, and friendship were elements contributing to this “social cohesion” in the political game. Another factor that aided the social cohesion of the ruling elites was their privileged position in society, which also legitimized their actions. Although the ruling elites were considered socially as a cohesive group, they lacked a shared moral cohesion, meaning they did not have “common thoughts” or “common ethical values,” and they were not aware of a “collective solidarity.” These deficiencies were due to both their scattered nature and local or group tendencies. This situation existed because, under normal circumstances, the existing methods of power distribution and parliamentary arrangements did not allow absolute dominance of one group over others. Like any other society, Iran was divided into social classes, each with its own norms, and the upper class had a particular language and way of thinking. However, the class-based meaning system mainly helped to delineate the boundaries between classes rather than fostering internal cohesion within a class. The ruling elites were a scattered, self-serving, and parasitic group that was ineffective in carrying out their social duties toward the effective functioning of parliamentary institutions.

Chapter 1

Political developments of Pahlavi II

Policies of Mossadegh's government (1951-1952):

At the time of the resignation of Ala, the former Prime Minister of Iran, it seemed that behind-the-scenes activities of Seyyed Zia had been assured as the new Prime Minister. In fact, Seyyed Zia was engaged in negotiations with the Shah, waiting for the approval of the parliament and the royal decree for his appointment. At the suggestion of Jamal Emami, a parliament member, Mosaddegh, by accepting Zia's premiership, surprised everyone. He had rejected such proposals before, but Mosaddegh and his supporters believed that Zia's premiership would be a disaster. Therefore,

Mosaddegh accepted the proposal with the condition that his appointment be approved by the parliament. Thus, the traditional "Vote of Confidence" in the parliament was revitalized, and out of a total of 90 representatives present in the National Consultative Assembly, 79 expressed their willingness in favor of Mosaddegh. In the Senate session, out of a total of 43 senators, 29 expressed their willingness, and subsequently, the royal decree appointing Mosaddegh as the Prime Minister was issued on April 29, 1951. However, Mosaddegh's foreign and domestic opponents could now console themselves with the hope that he would fail in resolving the oil issue and would be forced to leave the political scene. Nevertheless, Mosaddegh was determined to address the nationalization of oil issue and conditioned his acceptance of premiership on the approval of a 9-article bill, which the parliament, ignoring British threats, approved unanimously in an intense session on April 28, 1951. This decision was immediately communicated to the Shah for endorsement. The nationalization of oil and Mosaddegh's premiership had become inseparable and irreversible. As soon as Mosaddegh secured the parliament's approval for the nationalization of oil law, he introduced his cabinet to the parliament. His government's program included two main articles:

"Implementing the nationalization of oil and using its revenues to improve the country's economy" and "Reforming the parliamentary and municipal election laws." The selection of his collaborators was based on expediency, and he managed to gain the cooperation of several members of the standing parliament and respected members of the ruling class. Mosaddegh's leadership, of course, threatened the traditional arrangements of factional politics and upset the balance of power in political games, frightening elements supporting the British. It seemed that Mosaddegh had no doubt that the serious task he had undertaken might put his life at risk, but he was determined to fulfill his duties at any cost. After taking office as Prime Minister, Mosaddegh announced in a speech that he had been threatened by the Islamic Fedaian) devotees of Islam group and, therefore, would remain in parliament until the fate of the oil issue was uncertain. At this point, Ashtiani immediately threatened to impeach Mosaddegh. In reality, Mosaddegh, after a short stay in parliament, moved to his home and conducted all government affairs from there. Mosaddegh's fear of endangering his life was not exaggerated, as the Islamic Fedaian group had expectations that he couldn't fulfill. Their demands included enforcing the hijab for women nationwide, expelling female employees from

government offices, prohibiting the consumption of alcoholic beverages, and mandatory prayer for government employees. In Mosaddegh's view, nationalizing the oil industry in Iran was not only the realization of the Iranians' national aspirations but also a revival of the Iranian nation and its moral purification.

The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was practically perceived as a state within the state by Mosaddegh, a symbol of imperialism and injustice, enjoying higher revenues than the Iranian government's earnings. According to Mosaddegh, the oil company had been a covert and insidious tool for British interference in Iran's internal affairs for fifty years, leading to the moral decay of Iranian politicians, corruption, government dependence, and the impoverishment of the people. While acknowledging the importance of oil revenue for the country's economic prosperity, Mosaddegh believed that it was better for Iran to be poor and independent, if necessary, rather than enduring the survival of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and remaining under British domination. The trajectory of the nationalization of oil was from the outset a movement towards the culmination of continuous conflict and contradiction between a rising nationalism and a declining empire. In such a complex environment of conflicting

interpretations and claims, negotiations regarding the nationalization of oil began. Mosaddegh's government advocated for the complete acceptance of the nationalization law, while the British were only willing to accept a form of nationalization that allowed them to maintain control, especially overseeing the oil production process, in line with the pre-nationalization arrangements. Shortly after Mosaddegh assumed leadership, amid pressure and threats from the British government, a delegation led by Jackson, consisting of managers from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, initiated negotiations with Mosaddegh but failed to achieve the desired results. Mosaddegh insisted that the 9-article law was irreversible and, in an attempt to strengthen his position, resorted to the old tactic of seeking approval from the parliament. On the morning of the June 21,1951, Mosaddegh's opponents, encouraged by the Shah and Seyed Zia, managed to prevent the convening of a session by breaking the quorum. However, later that day, the parliament, with unanimous votes, expressed confidence in Mosaddegh and thus endorsed his oil policy. Following Jackson's departure, Avril Harriman from the United States government arrived in Tehran to mediate and reconcile logic and emotions. His arrival coincided with massive demonstrations in Tehran commemorating the fifth anniversary of the strikes

organized by organizations affiliated with the Tude Party. This movement considered itself a rival to the national movement and viewed Mosaddegh as the facilitator of American imperialism in the country. Harriman's visit raised hopes and paved the way for the mission of Lord Richard Stokes, the "British Royal Envoy," who entered Tehran in mid-August,1951 After intricate negotiations, it became clear that the British were unwilling to offer more than a 50-50 split of their profits from operations in Iran. The Americans supported this stance. When Stokes suggested that a British manager should oversee the entire oil production process, the negotiations faced a setback, as this demand was a clear violation of the nationalization law. However, before leaving the Iran, Stokes advised the Iranian Shah that the only effective solution would be the establishment of a strong government coupled with military rule and the imprisonment of corrupt individuals for at least two years or more. After that, Mosaddegh submitted a comprehensive report of the negotiations to the parliament, both the Senate and the National Consultative Assembly expressed their confidence in him. The Senate, with a majority of 33 votes out of 36 present senators, and the National Consultative Assembly, with a majority of 72 votes out of 82 present representatives, gave him their votes of

confidence. Opponents of Mosaddegh were upset about the failure of the negotiations. In addition to vocal dissent against the government, they concentrated their efforts on various tactics and tricks, especially trying to prevent the convening of parliamentary sessions and publishing articles in newspapers, aiming to discourage the British and Americans from negotiating with Mosaddegh. Advertising and pressure from Mosaddegh's opponents had solidified their views. On 5th September of the same year, (1951) Mosaddegh announced in a speech in the Senate that if he did not receive an acceptable proposal from the British, he would expel the British employees of the oil company. The next day, the British Foreign Office responded by stating that the British government no longer considered the negotiations "suspended" but deemed them "terminated." A few days later, Mosaddegh reiterated his Senate speech in the National Consultative Assembly but did not request a vote of confidence because he was aware of the extensive activities of the minority supported by foreign backing. He also suggested presenting the "case's conclusion" through representative Harriman to the British government but failed to win his cooperation. Mosaddegh's proposal for accepting a non-British national for the technical management of the extraction and refining facilities was

also rejected. Meanwhile, the implementation of the nationalization law quickly gained momentum. The task of taking over the former company had been entrusted to two committees: the Mixed Commission on Oil and the Temporary Board of Directors of the National Iranian Oil Company. The latter was very keen on retaining British employees, but they refused to work under the new conditions. On the September 25, 1951, Mosaddegh requested their departure within a week, and on the 2nd October 1951, they left Iran. The British government always considered resorting to military operations and was well aware that the Iranians' victory would have significant effects on Britain's prestige and its oil interests in other areas.

Additionally, it was the year of elections in the United Kingdom. Therefore, the ruling party, the labour party, was inclined to give a lesson to Iranians after the threat of expelling British employees. The occupation of oil fields was practically impossible, so the British government had drawn up a plan to seize Abadan with the code name "Operation Piracy." However, due to the negative consequences of inaction following the victory of the labour party and the belligerent comments of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Herbert Morrison and Prime Minister Clement Attlee, who were not in favor of

military action, the British cabinet overall leaned towards restraint. The British had not succeeded in garnering American cooperation regarding military action, as there was no overt communist threat. Multiple factors contributed to the victory of the self-centered approach over war-mongering, including the negative international repercussions of military action, provocation of the Soviets, putting the lives of British citizens in Iran at risk, and various military, logistical, and technical challenges that made success unlikely. Therefore, military action was abandoned, but other pressures, such as practical economic blockade to prevent the purchase and sale of oil, were increasingly implemented in a timely manner. The British were determined to destroy the Iranian movement by any means. After Mosaddegh took control of affairs, Robin Zaehner, an amazing adventurer disguised as an Oxford professor, was sent to Tehran to coordinate anti-Mosaddegh activities. Zaehner had previously resided in Tehran as a press attaché at the British Embassy and came to Tehran in 1951, serving as a liaison officer for the embassy. He taught Persian language at the University of Oxford and returned to Oxford in 1952 to take up the position of teaching Eastern religions and ethics. Mossadegh's opponents were mostly comprised of conservative elements who lacked popular support and

credibility. They were directly or indirectly associated with the British Embassy. Some were merely opportunists, while others shared views similar to the British perspective on Iran's interests. In essence, they believed in the simplicity of the idea that victory over Britain could be achieved, establishing complete control over Iran's oil. They believed that Mossadegh's assumption of British influence in Iranian politics made him a partner in this belief. The true leader of Mossadegh's opponents was Jamal Emami, who had previously been a member of the Oil Commission in the Parliament and had invited Mossadegh to take on a leadership role. (Emami was born in a clerical family in Azerbaijan and was a pro-Western conservative and an anti-communist, contrary to the beliefs of many, He considered repression, not reforms, as the most effective means to prevent communism. Emami had extensive connections and often met with the Ashraf Pahlavi Palace. Through intermediaries like Petroos Abkar and Abolqasem Fuladavand, he secretly communicated with the British Embassy.) The opposition minority group led by Jamal Emami, aside from obstructing Mossadegh's entry into the parliament by preventing the attainment of the quorum, utilized various pretexts to attack Mossadegh. Their behavior was contradictory. On one hand, they blamed Mossadegh for not accepting British

proposals, and on the other hand, they accused him of conspiring secretly with the British, claiming he had formed a coalition with the Tude Party. They alleged that he had suppressed them and accused him of collaborating with the Tude Party. After Stokes left Tehran, they resorted to an effective tactic of sit-ins in the parliament, citing the excuse of insecurity. The parliamentary minority opposing Mossadegh was only a part of a broader spectrum of opponents, mainly consisting of politicians who leaked news to the British Embassy or recommended to the embassy on how to deal with Mossadegh. However, the Iranian with the most influence over the British Embassy's politics was Seyyed Zia. He was considered the ideal candidate for the prime minister post from an early age and was a committed friend and close advisor to the embassy. Encouraged by the Shah in September 1951, he revived his National Will Party. His goal was to redirect traditional urban sectors from the National Front, with the help of individuals like Gezelbash, one of the leaders of the Workers' Union, to secure support frequently requested by Mossadegh's parliamentary opponents. Despite this, the British perceived the benefits of Seyyed Zia's premiership as greater than any potential risks. Finally, the Shah of Iran recognized the risks of open opposition to Mossadegh and support for Seyyed Zia. Despite seeming to agree

with the appointment of Seyyed Zia, in one instance, the Shah told him that he couldn't tell the people he made him the prime minister "because London wanted it." Furthermore, the British insistence on Seyyed Zia exacerbated the Shah's mistrust towards a man who not only enjoyed complete British support but also had a history of aversion to the Pahlavi dynasty. The Shah, Sometimes, claimed to support Mossadegh, while at other times, he expressed his preference for Ghavam. In reality, he inclined towards Ghavam as Mossadegh's successor. Occasionally, he pretended to be unaware of the British intentions and claimed to be uninformed. In other instances, he alleged secret collusion between Mossadegh and the British. He tried to justify inaction or restraint from action by stating uncertainty about the cooperation of parliamentary representatives. The Shah and his advisors had no favorable opinion of Mossadegh and his ideals, but they believed that the strategy of inaction and restraint from action, while strictly adhering to constitutional principles, was the safest means to preserve the throne and avoid risky endeavors. The Shah was deeply concerned about the possibility of British military intervention, which his role as the overall commander of the armed forces obliged him to act upon. The views of the Shah and other incompatible and

opposing factors convinced Seyyed Zia to remove himself from the list of Mossadegh's immediate successors.

This move ultimately benefited Ghavam (former Prime Minister) as he was not easily perceived as an English puppet. He could capitalize on this perception to build credibility for himself, emphasizing that he was the one who, through the passage of the Nationalization of Oil law on October 22, 1947, laid the groundwork for the nationalization of oil. Despite all these attributes, Mossadegh's position was by no means weakened. He skillfully utilized his popularity to the fullest and, with the help of Ayatollah Kashani and others, neutralized opposition efforts within the parliament by orchestrating demonstrations outside of it. After the failure of Stokes' mission, the British government complained to the United Nations Security Council. This provided Mossadegh with an opportunity to prove Iran's legitimacy and expose the British propaganda, enhancing his global visibility. The minority faction knew that Mossadegh would not return empty-handed from the United Nations, and the one-month delay for the 17th parliamentary elections would give them an opportunity to pave the way for his downfall. Mossadegh returned to Iran on November 23, 1951, after a 49-days absence, and successfully initiated a visit to Egypt aimed

at establishing a connection between the anti-imperialist struggles of Iranians and Egyptians. The United Nations Security Council deferred its decision on the oil dispute until the International Court of Justice in The Hague issued its ruling. In Mossadegh's and his supporters' view, this decision was nothing less than victory Mossadegh cleverly secured a vote of confidence from the parliament by annulling the related postponement proposal due to his activities in the United Nations. The minority had no option against such a maneuver, and apart from 16 abstentions, they couldn't do much. While 90 representatives voted in favor of Mossadegh, the Senate also unanimously expressed confidence in him. One factor that contributed to Mossadegh's success against his opponents was the position of the Senate. Any opposition regarding appointed senators was automatically attributed to the Shah, and the newly elected senators were not yet thinking about future elections. Mossadegh's recent victory in the parliament indicated that he would face minimal obstacles in maintaining the position of prime minister and conducting parliamentary elections. However, the National Front exerted pressure on the Shah to adhere to the constitutional rules and curb royal court interventions. In late November 1951, Ayatollah Kashani sent a message to the Shah, threatening to expose the

royal court's support for Ghavam. The Shah denied such support and had to reassure Ayatollah Kashani that Mossadegh still enjoyed his confidence. In early December of the same year, Ghavam had lost all his hopes for future leadership and sought to leave the country to go to Switzerland for treatment.

Despite Ghavam's efforts, he had not succeeded in gaining favorable attention from the Americans. The British believed that Dr. Mossadegh's continuous gentleness towards the Tude Party was pushing the country towards chaos. Therefore, the British government deemed it necessary for Mossadegh to be replaced, a decision they believed the Shah should make. Ghavam's activities, reported by the British embassy to London, included a detailed plan for overthrowing Mossadegh's government and preparing a list of his cabinet members. Although these activities raised high hopes, they did not yield significant results. However, other opponents of Mossadegh did not miss any opportunity to weaken the government. One such opportunity arose on December 6, 1951, when Tehran University students, protesting the expulsion and detention of some of their colleagues, ignored police warnings and broke the police cordon around the university. They marched towards Baharestan Square

(Parliament place), and a considerable number of police and military personnel confronted them, resulting in violence and bloodshed. Later on the same day, a right-wing demonstration took place, accompanied by looting, plundering, and burning the offices of leftist and anti-government newspapers. Although the Tude Party had been declared illegal, Mossadegh did not face significant difficulties in preventing its activities. However, sometimes, tactically, he highlighted the threat of communism to gain American support. The Americans viewed Mossadegh and his movement as a barrier against communism, while the British believed that his continued leadership would inevitably lead to the seizure of power by the communists. Mossadegh's policy toward the Tude Party was characterized by a constant oscillation between tolerance and occasional repression, marked by reluctance and periodic decisiveness. The events of December 6, 1951, not only exposed to everyone's attention, the government's relations with the Tude Party but also encouraged Mossadegh's parliamentary opponents. Two days later, fifteen members of the minority faction in the parliament once again staged a sit-in, gradually joined by a fifty-member group of journalists. The parliament became a base for attacking the Prime Minister. These tactics reached a turning point on December 11 of the same year. At that

time, Mossadegh found himself in the midst of insults and accusations from the spectators in the parliament. However, he continued his speech, attributing the failure of the oil negotiations to various factors. The behavior of the government's opponents in the parliament naturally provoked the National Front's reaction, On December 13, 1951 with the help of Ayatollah Kashani, successful demonstrations were held to protest the events of two days earlier. The police also managed to forcefully expel 45 clergy who had taken refuge in Sepahsalar Mosque to incite opposition to the government.

Mossadegh aimed to curb the influence and activities of the royal court against his government. The continuous financial and moral support from Queen Mother to the opponents was attacked, and Mossadegh threatened to resign if she did not leave the country. Both Alaa, the former Prime Minister, and the Shah himself found themselves compelled to persuade him to stay in his position. It was also revealed that Mossadegh had threatened to resign if the royal court did not stop its provocations against the government, and he promised to disclose the reasons for such an action to the public. As Mossadegh continued to face challenges, both from internal and external forces, his opponents seized the opportunity. Since the opponents of Mossadegh never

reached a consensus on their policies and tactics, they faced successive failures and now were on the verge of complete disintegration. Mossadegh held two winning cards: one explicitly announcing that he would personally go to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, and the other closing the British consulates in provincial capitals, a move that had been extensively advertised. On January 21, 1952, the day when the motion of censure was supposed to be raised, the latter action was implemented.

In such circumstances, casting a vote of no confidence in Mossadegh required a certain level of courage that most of his opponents lacked. On the other hand, for Mossadegh's supporters, it was a simple task to prevent the attainment of the quorum in the parliament, as many of them had left the capital to participate in electoral campaigns. As expected, the motion of censure was not raised due to the failure to reach the required number of representatives, and the parliament became ineffective one month before its legal term expired on February 18, 1952. Representatives who had attempted to impeach the government, filed a complaint with the Shah, but as they did not reach a quorum, the government continued with the electoral process. Mossadegh struggled to control the behavior of the royal court, the military, and local elites.

The inevitable instances of electoral irregularities were exploited by the government's opponents, including unsuccessful candidates. On the other hand, conflicts and disagreements regarding the distribution of parliamentary seats and tensions among the leaders of the National Front escalated. As expected, those who had succeeded in being elected perceived their support for Mossadegh as unrewarded and joined the ranks of his opponents. The Tude Party capitalized on this situation to gain more propaganda leverage against Mossadegh. Finally, interventions from the royal court, electoral disorder, and violent confrontations in some areas led to the suspension of elections until Mossadegh's return from The Hague. When the Sixteenth Parliament proved to be ineffective in fulfilling its duties, the opponents realized the importance of the Senate. As journalists, who had specialized in the topic, moved their focus to the Senate, it became a major tool for opposing Mossadegh, and the primary hope for his removal. They perceived the Senate as a significant means of countering Mossadegh and hoped it would play a vital role in his dismissal. They were concerned that Mossadegh's victory in neutralizing the minority in the National Consultative Assembly would pose a serious threat, fearing that Mossadegh might have effective control over the Seventeenth Parliament.

In early March1952, ninety representatives of Tehran's guilds filed a complaint with the Senate protesting the government's fiscal policies. They threatened to stage a sit-in if their complaints were not addressed properly. This allowed the Senate to assert more confidence and declare that its duty was to address the injustices committed by the government. However, Mossadegh remained steadfast and unyielding. When three senators, acting on behalf of all members, met with Mossadegh and requested him to clarify his plans for resolving the existing issues, Mossadegh reminded them that his consistent goal was to uproot colonialism and imperialism from the country. He emphasized that the Senate had to choose between freedom and independence or a return to the previous state of affairs and the dominance of the exploitative British oil company. In late March 1952, following violent clashes between Tude Party youth and Pan-Iranianism (extremist nationalists who supported Mossadegh), the government declared martial law in Tehran for the first time since its inception. This required immediate approval from the Senate. The Senate, with a weak majority of 24 votes in favor out of 47 present senators, granted approval for the military government. This retreat was another setback for Mossadegh's opponents. Anti-Mossadegh activities continued through various

means, including media warfare, Tude Party demonstrations, intrigues involving dissatisfied members of the ruling elites and the British Embassy, and the ongoing threats from the Islamic Fedayeen. Despite the threats from Ayatollah Kashani, who was no longer able to control them effectively, the Islamic Fedayeen persisted in their efforts while Mossadegh remained practically under house arrest. On 10th of February, 1953, a young member affiliated with the Islamic Fedayeen attempted to assassinate Fatemi, injuring him. Mossadegh was deprived of his loyal friend and advisor for several months. Among Mossadegh's supporters, there were some clerics, although a larger number opposed him. Some religious families, like the Behbahani family, were actively against Mossadegh. Several famous preachers, including Sheikh Mohammad Taqi Falsafi, used their pulpits to preach against the government. During this period, Mossadegh still enjoyed public support, but there was division and diminishing enthusiasm among some of his followers. Efforts by the National Front's opponents proved ineffective. According to Zanir, the discord among National Front members depended on factors controlled and directed by the Rashidian brothers (the three Rashidian brothers were politically active, had connections with the British, and were close to Seyyed Zia, and they assisted in

establishing the National Will Party). Rashidian brothers played a decisive role in coordinating destabilizing activities against Mossadegh's government.

Mossadegh faced growing financial and economic difficulties. In December 1951, he turned to the National Loan program to seek support from the people. However, as expected, the wealthy people did not show much interest. Negotiations with representatives of the National Bank failed, and Mossadegh, due to their insistence on returning British experts, their reluctance to accept the management of the oil industry by the Iranian government, and their inflexibility regarding the oil price, rejected their proposals. Subsequently, despite criticism from some of his supporters and opposition from the Shah, Mossadegh initiated the implementation of the "Economy Without Oil" policy. The obstacles imposed by the British in the way of selling Iranian oil, along with persistent accusations that Mossadegh had conspired with the British or surrendered to the Americans, left him no choice but to run the country without oil revenue and resort to austerity measures. The British continued to promote the idea of non-negotiation with Mossadegh, confident that Iran would eventually succumb in the Hague court. They hoped that Mossadegh's visible and covert financial and economic

troubles would force him to surrender. Despite the alarming economic and financial situation, Mossadegh was not willing to compromise on the principles of governance, national sovereignty, and political impartiality in Iran, which were the guiding principles of his foreign policy. The financial aid from the United States, which amounted to 23 million dollars and was paid in accordance with the Point Four Program in November 1951, was desperately needed. However, Mossadegh and his supporters were dissatisfied with the reference to "backward countries" in the allocation of this financial assistance. The mentioned financial aid became suspended in early January 1952 when Mossadegh refused to accept any commitment in defense of the free world against its continuation. In this situation, there were threats that this action might lead to the expulsion of American advisors.

Ultimately, under the insistence of the Shah, Mossadegh agreed to continue accepting American aid in early May 1952 without accepting any specific conditions. While this was considered a victory for Mossadegh, it also marked a failure for his opponents. Despite maneuvers to delay its opening, the Seventeenth Parliament was officially inaugurated on April 26, 1952. Two days later, despite the recommendations of some of

his advisors, Mossadegh sent a letter to the elected representatives and asked them to reject the credentials of those who had been fraudulently elected and lacked any "national standing" and to arrange for proper elections. In referring to those who do not have a national standing, Mossadegh meant one person above all, that is, Imam Juma, who was elected from the Kurdish and Sunni city of Mahabad with the support of the Shah. However, despite this, the majority of the representatives not only approved the credentials of the Imam Juma but also actively participated in his election as the speaker of the parliament.

In early-July 1952, it seemed that confidence in the Shah's role had increased, and the return of Ashraf Pahlavi to the country appeared to be indicative and reinforcing of that trend. Meanwhile, developments such as the dark financial report of Mohammad Ali Varesteh, the Minister of Treasury, provided a justification for the Shah's actions. Moreover, Mossadegh's determination to go to the Hague tribunal on May 27, 1952 provided new grounds for royal intrigues, of which the Prime Minister was fully aware. With the return of Ghavam from Europe in early May 1952, the activities of other candidates came under scrutiny, and a comprehensive struggle in favor of Ghavam resumed. Efforts were made to bring Ghavam

back into the spotlight for the British and to attract support from the Americans. When Mossadegh returned from the Hague court, the Shah made a partial retreat, withdrawal was followed by his support for the Imam Jome (Friday prayer leader), indicating that he had finally acted against Mossadegh. However, he was still indecisive about his successor. In this situation, in early -July 1952, staunch opponents of Mossadegh, with the backing and support of the British and American embassies, became confident enough to engage in a full confrontation with Mossadegh and his supporters. After Mossadegh's return from The Hague on the June 23, 1952, he faced various parliamentary maneuvers that disrupted the proceedings. His opponents in the parliament prevented its formal inauguration. In response, Mossadegh declared to the Shah that if the parliament did not begin its work by the July 7, 1952, he would personally relinquish the position of prime minister. As part of parliamentary tradition, he submitted a ceremonial resignation to the Shah and, through a radio message to the nation, strongly criticized his opponents.

Meanwhile, the activities in favor of Ghavam, especially from the Imam Jome (Friday prayer leader), had reached a stage where, according to a report received

by the British Embassy, Seyyed Zia also recommended Ghavam to the Shah. The Shah eventually agreed to appoint Ghavam, contingent on obtaining a "vote of confidence" from both houses of parliament. The Imam Jume believed that this work can be arranged. However, in the session on the July 5, 1952, due to the lack of explicit instructions from the Shah, 52 out of 63 representatives present voted for Mossadegh's "vote of confidence," and 10 abstained. It was a major victory for the National Front, but Mossadegh also needed the Senate's approval. There, an active nucleus of opposition had planned various potential confrontations against Mossadegh's maneuvers. Senators intended to refrain from giving a "vote of confidence" to Mossadegh and declared that they would not vote until they had reviewed his agenda. Mossadegh insisted that he would not accept leadership without prior approval and the endorsement of both houses. The Shah, deeply concerned about the possibility of a constitutional crisis, found himself compelled to encourage the senators to vote for Mossadegh. Although senators were initially reluctant, after the Shah's recommendation, 14 out of 36 senators present, voted in favor of Mossadegh, while 19 senators abstained. The Senate's position did not assure Mossadegh, but a delegation of senators convinced him to accept the leadership. The next day on July 9, 1952,

Mossadegh was formally appointed as prime minister again by the Shah, and two days later, the Senate was adjourned for the summer recess.

The opponents of Mossadegh expected that the International Court of Justice's ruling, which was supposed to be issued soon against Iran, would assist their anti-Mossadegh actions. The Shah still hoped that Mossadegh's removal could be arranged through the parliament. Through the intermediary of "Behboudi," one of the senators, a message was sent to the Imam Jome and "Hekmat" stating that representatives should strive not to give a vote of confidence to Mossadegh until the judgment of the Hague Court is announced. Despite all this, Mossadegh's bitter enemies, especially the Imam Jome, who had failed in his plans regarding Ghavam's premiership, were not only determined to intensify their parliamentary activities against Mossadegh but also seemed ready to use any means to overthrow him. Meanwhile, Mossadegh contemplated removing the Imam Jome from the presidency of the parliament. Therefore, he requested that the six-month powers be delegated to the person of the Imam Jome. This request was brought up in a private session of the National Consultative Assembly on July 12, 1952. Although it was reported, that was approved there, but sparked heated

debates and intense discussions among the representatives. Mossadegh without waiting for the official decision of the parliament on the issue of delegated powers, he introduced his cabinet to the Shah and demanded the confirmation of the Ministry of War and the authority to appoint the Chief of Staff of the Army and commanders of the three armed forces. After a heated argument, shah rejected Mossadegh's requests, Mossadegh immediately submit his resignation. He blamed the Shah and declared that, under the current circumstances, it is impossible to lead the struggle that the Iranian people have embarked upon to a victorious conclusion. This time, the Shah accepted Mossadegh's resignation without considering its consequences, bringing an end to Mossadegh's first term as prime minister on July 15, 1952. Mossadegh's resignation stemmed from the recognition that, given the relentless enmity, tricks, and undermining tactics of parliamentary and non-parliamentary opponents, his effective leadership would be impossible to continue.

Uprising of 20th July 1952

Immediately after Mossadegh's resignation was announced, the National Consultative Assembly, in a hastily convened session without observing the quorum

requirement, expressed its inclination with 40 votes out of 42 present representatives and formally appointed Ghavam as the Prime Minister on the same day. Previously, the Shah had bestowed the title "Janab Ashraf" upon him two years before. Despite the loyalty of a relatively large number of representatives to Mossadegh, Ghavam could not achieve anything by being present in the parliament. He hoped that the support of the embassies of England and the United States would be sufficient to persuade the Shah to dissolve the parliament, especially since the Shah's abstention from this action was seen as Mossadegh's return and a significant reduction in the unprecedented prestige and power of the Shah himself. Ghavam was well aware that the Shah was reluctant to entrust him with leadership. On the eve of his appointment as prime minister, he admitted that he had no trust in the Shah and expected his activities among the members of the parliament to provoke the Shah's counteractivity. Despite all this, the Shah, with no particular feeling towards Ghavam could not accept the risk of dissolving the parliament. As soon as Ghavam was appointed as prime minister, hoping to demonstrate a reassuring image of himself, he displayed his indifference and arrogance with his peculiar patience and unwarranted optimism, as reflected in the famous statement on 20th July 1952. In this statement, he

emphasized and promised to resolve the oil issue, establish discipline and security, and separate politics from religion. He actually condemned "deception in political affairs and hypocrisy in religious matters" and attacked those who, under the pretext of "fighting against the red extremists and the resurgence of black reaction," threatened to "establish revolutionary courts and condemn hundreds of criminals from every class to a dark fate through dry and merciless legal judgments." The publication of this statement was a thoughtless and reckless move, proving to be highly destructive and damaging to Ghavam's position. While Ghavam, without explicit support from the Shah and with the presence of the parliament, could not hope to align his words with his actions, the dissolution of the parliament had become more necessary. However, the Shah remained committed, and the Friday Prayer Leader and Hikmat were trying to encourage Ghavam to continue his work without dissolving the parliament. By doing so, they reflected the Shah's opinion. Some of Ghavam's friends pressured him to form his cabinet as soon as possible, but Ghavam, with the presence of the parliament, saw the situation practically suspended and adjective. This created confusion, turmoil, and a lack of coordinated activities among his associates.

He also persuaded the Shah that nothing would progress without dissolving the parliament. Against the growing opposition, Ghavam could no longer remain idle. In an attempt to silence Ayatollah Kashani, who played a crucial role in stirring public sentiments against him, although there was no hope for reconciliation and cooperation, and Kashani's previous contact with Ghavam had not yielded positive results, Ghavam took the initiative and issued an order against Ayatollah Kashani without the Shah's approval and in secrecy. However, this action remained fruitless before it could be implemented. The report of this action by the BBC caused significant damage to Ghavam, as it was perceived as "an illustration of what the British government wants Ghavam to do." Consequently, it became much more difficult for Ghavam to take action against Ayatollah Kashani. While this setback had made Ghavam despondent, meanwhile, Ayatollah Kashani got courage and asked the army not to obey the government’s order. He labeled the National Front, led by Ghavam as an instrument of England and accused him of intending to restore the British-backed regime. Supporters of Mossadegh's activities to remove Ghavam reached their peak on July 20, 1952. In response to the call of Mossadegh's loyal representatives, people poured into the streets, leading to strikes, demonstrations, riots,

and bloody clashes with the police and the military, resulting in heavy casualties. Mossadegh's supporters prevailed over the traditional elite opponents and the government's coercive tools.

The events of July 20, 1952, had strong anti-monarchy dimensions and intensified the Shah's deepest fears. It also confirmed the validity of the opinions of some of his advisers who believed that the removal of Mossadegh would lead to such severe disorder. While the Shah was fully aware of the details of this event, Ghavam was almost uninformed. Ghavam had been waiting since 9 a.m. on July 20, 1952, for permission to meet with the Shah to officially dissolve the parliament. However, the Shah was busy negotiating with representatives of the National Front. When Ghavam finally met with the Shah at five in the afternoon, his resignation had already been announced on the radio, which was under the control of Mossadegh's supporters. At that time, Tehran was under the control of Mossadegh's supporters, military forces had retreated to their barracks, and even a single guard for guiding vehicles was not seen. Ghavam's embarrassing failure was a direct result of his miscalculations, the inability of his foreign and domestic supporters to understand the Shah's position, and, more importantly, the intensity of the political situation and

the power of the popular movement, of which Mossadegh was considered the embodiment of it.

Mossadegh's Second Government (July 1952- August 1953)

During the days leading up to the events of July 20, 1952, Mossadegh had enclosed himself to his home and was not in contact with his supporters. He made no attempt to return to power. He interpreted the events of 20th July, 1952, as a national uprising officially recognized by the National Consultative Assembly, and the nation's demand for his reinstatement as Prime Minister. This transformation provided him with a source of legitimacy, empowered him, instilled confidence in himself, and once again confirmed his goals. After the National Consultative Assembly and the Senate gave him a vote of confidence with 62 out of 64 votes and 33 out of 42 votes, respectively, coinciding with the International Court of Justice's ruling on its lack of jurisdiction in the Iran-UK oil dispute, it was a fortunate coincidence for Mossadegh and his supporters. The Mossadegh cabinet, along with a 9-point reform program, was approved by the parliament. The cabinet's program included: electoral law reform for the National Consultative Assembly and municipal elections, financial reforms and budget adjustments, economic

reforms, monetary and banking law reforms, exploitation of the country's oil mines, preparation and drafting of the constitution of the National Iranian Oil Company, administrative and employment law reforms, creation of local councils in provinces for social reforms, judicial reforms, press law reforms, and reforms in cultural, health, and communication affairs. Mossadegh's powers were increased with the approval of the National Consultative Assembly, and with some difficulty, the Senate also approved it. Consequently, the authority of his cabinet increased. Mossadegh personally took charge of the Ministry of War, renamed it the Ministry of National Defense, essentially placing the army officially and effectively under the government's control for the first time in Iran's constitutional history. Mossadegh's success in regaining what had been lost just a few days earlier, seriously damaged the prestige of the shah and the royal court. As a result, the Queen Mother and Ashraf Pahlavi (the Shah's sister), and other members of the royal family were forced to leave the country. Other opponents were not spared from the consequences. Ghavam (the former Prime Minister) went into hiding, the Imam Jome (Friday prayer leader) resigned, and Homan, deputy an active anti-Mossadegh figure, was sidelined. In the intense emotional atmosphere of July 20, 1952, a few supporters of

Ayatollah Kashani (former Friday prayer leader) exerted pressure on Mossadegh, urging him to take revenge. However, Mossadegh was more interested in utilizing the new power, especially his expanded authorities, to implement his reform program. To achieve this goal, commissions were established to review and implement the proposed measures promptly. In this context, no detail in his program was overlooked, and Mossadegh was determined to use the new powers for the timely execution of his reform program, considering the available resources and circumstances. A crucial point not initially included in the government's program was land reform policies, which were announced in October 1952 through a resolution. The government also implemented several other reform measures, including the approval of a land cultivation tax law and a review of the income tax law established in July 1949. Additionally, a comprehensive law on social insurance for workers was approved on February 9, 1953. Another comprehensive law on the press was also passed, ensuring reasonable freedom for newspapers and handling press crimes through a judicial committee. However, Mossadegh's government did not last long enough to fully implement these laws and other reforms as planned. Many of the initiatives undertaken were not continued after Mossadegh's fall. On the other hand, the

British continued employing their effective tactics of influencing the United States, suggesting that if Mossadegh remained in power, the Communists might likely take control. The British behaved as if they genuinely trusted their repeated predictions about the sudden change in Iran's situation. However, after July 20, 1952, the British found themselves in a situation where they could not impose their conditions on Mossadegh. They concluded that an effective military coup was the solution to bring about his downfall. The traces of the idea of a military coup against Mossadegh can be observed from the early days of his administration.

A Brief Biography of Mossadegh

Mohammad Mossadegh was born in June, 1882 in Tehran, Iran. After completing his education during his youth, he took on the role of overseeing affairs in Khorasan province. At the age of 25, he was elected as a representative to the Parliament from Isfahan, but due to his young age, he could not undertake the responsibilities. In year1909, Mossadegh went to France for studies in financial sciences. In year1913, he received his Doctorate in Law from Switzerland. A year later, he returned to Iran, engaged in teaching at the School of

Political Sciences, and later appointed as the Deputy Minister of Finance. After another trip to Europe and a short stay in Switzerland in 1920, he returned to Iran. Before reaching Tehran, he became the governor of Fars province. However, following the coup in February 22, 1921, during the premiership of Seyed Zia, he resigned from the position of the governor of Fars. since June,1921 - January 1922, he served as the Minister of Finance in the Ghavam's cabinet. Later, he became the governor of Azerbaijan and in year 1923, took charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet of Mushir al-Doleh as Prime Minister. In late 1923, he was elected as a representative to the Fifth Parliament and, along with other representatives, opposed the transfer of power from the Qajar dynasty to the Pahlavi dynasty. He was re-elected in the Sixth Parliament and faced restrictions on his political activities by Reza Shah. In July 1940, he was exiled to Birjand city. As a result of Mohammad Reza's mediation, in December 1940, he was transferred to his private estate in Ahmadabad, and only after the invasion of the Allies into Iran, he was allowed to change his location freely. Mossadegh was elected as a representative in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Parliaments in the period after the September 1941 invasion. Before taking office as Prime Minister in

May1951, he served as a representative in the Sixteenth Parliament for one year.

Coup, on August 18, 1953

The "BEDAMN" network operation began in 1948 to counter the former Soviet influence and the Tude Party in Iran. BEDAMN was a political and propaganda activity program, with two Iranians which, were at the head of the network, these two Iranians are known by the nicknames "Nern" and "Sili". The apparent budget for BEDAMN operations was equivalent to one million dollars annually. The propaganda section of BEDAMN involved publishing anti-communist articles and cartoons in Iranian newspapers, producing and distributing books and pamphlets against the former Soviet Union and the Tude Party in Iran, spreading rumors in this regard, and similar actions. The political section of BEDAMN included direct attacks on Soviet allies in Iran and "black operations," aiming to incite Iranians against the Tude Party. Black operations targeted actions such as hiring street thugs to disrupt Tude Party gatherings and providing financial support to extremist anti-communist organizations like SUMKA and Pan-IRANIST, who were actively engaged in street clashes with Tude Party supporters in Tehran. These

individuals encouraged the masses to engage in extremist and unlawful activities. The political branch of the BEDAMN network also targeted mosques and social figures associated with the Tude Party, considering them as part of the organization. Additionally, BEDAMN sought to weaken the National Front of Iran and took actions to separate Ayatollah Kashani and his followers from the National Front. Activities were carried out through advertising, often using colloquial and informal language. In these advertisements, Mohammad Mossadegh was portrayed as a corrupt and unethical person who exploited Ayatollah Kashani, and efforts were made to encourage hardworking and Pan- IRANIST parties to take a stance against Mossadegh. In these organizations, initiatives were taken to create divisions. &

The coup plan in February 1953 was organized in meetings between high-ranking officials of the intelligence services of Britain and the United States. It was finally approved by the U.S. government on June 24, 1953. In this plan, it was stipulated that the resources of the BEDAMN network in the field of advertising and political operations would be immediately employed against Mossadegh. Since this time, the United States, through the BEDAMN network, extensively worked to

undermine Mossadegh's position. CIA operatives describe these actions as "a coordinated plan for destabilization and a full-scale effort." In 15th - 25th February 1953, the sudden publication of six new anti-Mossadegh newspapers began in Tehran. The BEDAMN network actively participated in the coup operation, including distributing images of the Shah's decree on the removal of Mossadegh and the appointment of Zahedi on August 15, 1953, through "Nern" and "Sili." On the same day, "Nern" and "Sili" hired a large crowd, and on August 16, 1953, they poured people into the central streets of Tehran, shouting slogans against the Tude Party and they carried emblems in rejection of the Shah. This crowd, known as the "Alternative Masses," instigated fear of Tude Party dominance and rallied support for Zahedi, who had been paid $50,000 by a CIA officer to "Nern" and "Sili the day before. The real members of the Tude Party quickly joined the crowds. The assembly, consisting of genuine and hired masses, attacked the tomb of Reza Shah and pulled down statues of the Shah and his father in the streets of Tehran. These demonstrations continued until the next day and led to Henderson (Louis Henderson, was American ambassador in Tehran at that time), requesting Mossadegh to quell the riots using the police force. At Henderson's request, Mossadegh made a decision that

would seal his fate. One of the political activists was the first person to present a detailed plan for Mossadegh's ousting through a coup to the British, and the first officer who suggested it was General Zahedi, who was serving as the Minister of Interior at the time. Zahedi, who had resigned from the Ministry of Interior and joined Mossadegh's opponents in mid July 1952, was the most hopeful candidate to lead the coup. Even before the unsuccessful premiership of Ghavam, the British considered Zahedi as his successor if the Shah did not appoint him as Prime Minister. They had proposed him to the Shah even before Ghavam's resignation. Now, Zahedi's prospects had significantly improved. Zahedi was eager to become an "Iranian noble" and intensified his efforts to garner support from both Mossadegh's domestic opponents and foreign powers, repeatedly emphasizing to the British and Americans that any move they perceived as readiness for negotiations with Mossadegh would thwart his plans. However, Zahedi's activities were not hidden from Mossadegh's eyes. After the events of July 20, 1952, the Senate was forced to backtrack and gave a vote of confidence to

Mossadegh

Mossadegh, in his memoirs, denied any role in the dissolution of the Senate. However, according to, one of English advisor Mossadegh tried to encourage the Shah to take such action, but the Shah refused. Ebrahim Hakimi (the former prime minister and president of the Senate at the time) warned the Shah that dissolving the Senate would be tantamount to signing the death warrant for the monarchy. Ultimately, the National Consultative Assembly, in a preemptive and courageous move, passed a law changing the fifth principle of the constitution and reducing the Senate's term to two years, effectively dissolving it. In reaction to this, on October 21, 1952, one day before the National Consultative Assembly approved the law dissolving the Senate, diplomatic relations with Britain were finally severed. Moreover, the Iranian government had refrained from accepting the appointment of Robert Hankey as Sheberd's successor (English advisor). It insisted that no diplomat who had previously served in the British colonies should be sent to Iran. The severance of diplomatic relations, marking a turning point in the long history of Iran-UK relations, was directly linked to the failure of the negotiations between Iran and Britain over the oil issue. After the unsuccessful attempts of the International Bank, the

negotiations were resumed. Mossadegh's views on resolving the oil issue had certainly become more challenging after returning to power with public support. In the end, Truman) president of the US at the time) and Churchil (British Prime Minister at the time (sent a joint message to Mossadegh and suggested that the issue of compensation for the nationalization of oil be referred to arbitration. Mossadegh and his advisors perceived this proposal as a kind of retreat compared to previous offers. They accused the British government of resorting to deceptive tactics and attempting to revive the 1933 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Agreement. Mossadegh believed that the gap between the two parties regarding the compensation issue, which had become the main point of contention, was unbridgeable. Following his usual practice, Mossadegh made the National Consultative Assembly and the Senate aware of these events and argued that Iran could no longer remain silent in the face of British pressures. He contended that his government would only pay compensation for the assets of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company at the time of nationalization. This viewpoint received unanimous approval from the National Consultative Assembly and the Senate, empowering Mossadegh to reject the proposals of Britain and the United States and sever diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom. Public

opinion also supported Mossadegh's stance, demanding the rejection of the proposals. The severance of relations with the United Kingdom had a reverse effect on Iran's relations with the United States. Truman and Churchill's message dealt a severe blow to the wishful thinking of a segment of Iranians who did not believe that there were still significant differences between the policies of the United States and Britain regarding Iran. In reality, the British had always sought to establish a united Anglo-American front against Mossadegh.

According to British officials, by demonstrating Mossadegh's failure to achieve positive results regarding the oil issue and the inconclusive outcome of the negotiations, not only with the British but also with the Americans, his shaky current position will be exposed. Mossadegh himself had acknowledged the long-standing collaboration between Britain and the United States for some time. He considered the existence of the British embassy in Tehran only beneficial to his opponents, especially since the likelihood of a coup following the Free Officers coup in July 1952 appeared more probable for Egypt. Furthermore, the gradual reduction of resident British diplomats in Tehran had given rise to the idea that the British might take the initiative in severing diplomatic relations themselves, and Mossadegh could

not allow that to happen. In the view of Mossadegh's supporters, cutting ties with Britain was a logical consequence of his anti-imperialist stance and his pursuit of that position. However, from Britain's perspective, this move was just another step in delivering Iran to the Communists, and another indication of Mossadegh's contempt for them. The severance of diplomatic relations between Iran and Britain was an inevitable result of the inflexible stance on the oil issue from both sides. The closure of the British embassy in Tehran had created conflicting sentiments among Mossadegh's opponents. On the one hand, they had lost direct support from the embassy, and on the other hand, it had become clear that any agreement with Mossadegh was impossible. Shah was very disturbed and worried about the severance of Iran-UK relations. Rumors circulated that he had threatened to resign. Middleton (British advisor) reported that, he had heard from "reliable sources that Queen Soraya at the time insisted that, the Shah do this," while others were encouraging the Shah to keep the throne. During the period following the events of July 30, 1952, the Shah's stance outwardly displayed something more than tolerance and submission to the unfolding events. Mossadegh had assigned a role to him that precisely aligned with the interpretation of the anti-monarchy opposition to the

constitutional law. The dissemination of rumors about the Shah's resignation was likely just a tactical measure. Although some believed that Mossadegh personally influenced him to adopt such a decision, officially, Mossadegh was in charge of the Ministry of Defense. However, his efforts to control and reform the military were not necessarily limited. He refrained from instigating the Shah and the military, creating unrest among Americans who were concerned about weakening the army. Mossadegh had a commitment to preserving an efficient military to ensure internal security and had no inclination to threaten the collective and organizational interests of military leaders. The official position and status of Ayatollah Kashani as the head of the parliament added complexity to Mossadegh's actions, making part of his efforts chaotic and imaginary, or at least appear to be extremely cumbersome. For instance, he undermined the government's efforts by attacking American policies in Iran, creating the impression that he had good relations with Americans. Despite Mossadegh's explicit disapproval, he sent representatives to the Vienna Peace Conference, even though Mossadegh considered such an action inconsistent with neutrality. On the other hand, Mossadegh had maintained a close working relationship with Ayatollah Borujerdi, the country's highest religious

authority, enhancing his ability to confront Ayatollah Kashani. He (Mossadegh) recognized insulting Ayatollah Borujerdi as a punishable offense by passing a resolution, while Ayatollah Kashani had no special immunity in this regard. This move, deeply angered Ayatollah Kashani, who did not hide his bitterness. In addition, Mossadegh ordered that Kashani's recommendations not be implemented. The difference between Mossadegh and Ayatollah Kashani inevitably affected the composition of groups affiliated with the National Front.

The Iran Party re-emerged as a major supporter of the government after a long eclipse. The Third Force Party, led by Makki, which had been formed in October 1952 by branching off from Labor Party, became the largest political organization supporting the government. The dispute within the National Front was not limited to Mossadegh and Ayatollah Kashani. Makki, the first representative of Tehran, believed that he was the sole champion of nationalizing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, but his role was unrecognized. As a result, he built opposition to the cabinet and the extension of Mossadegh's powers. After Mossadegh successfully acquired powers, Makki's position against the parliament, which was still the main source of support

and difficulty, strengthened further. Representatives who had united in support of Mossadegh and opposition to Ghavam formed the National Movement faction, consisting of 34 members, which became a parliamentary base for the government. The first difficulty in the government-parliament relations arose over the extension of the military government, which was announced in April 1952 and was supposed to end on August 11, 1952. The opposition of the parliamentarians forced the government to withdraw the extension bill. However, shortly thereafter, violent street clashes occurred between members of the Tude Party on one side and Pan-Iranists and the Labor Party led by Baghaei and the small fascist party of Sumka on the other hand, leading to the redeclaration of martial law. During the summer recess of the parliament, which coincided with the month of Muharram (August 10 to October 6, 1952), Hasanali Rashid, a representative of the clergy in the parliament, began criticizing the government in his speeches. Mossadegh and his colleagues, facing the possibility of sabotage or disruptive operations by the Tude Party, elements and English spies, and others in government organizations and industrial centers, were convinced of the need for a broader order and law. Therefore, they approved a 9-article law called "Social Security," which was supposed to be implemented

experimentally for three months in a timely manner. The aim of this new law was to increase security and reduce the possibility of provocation, disturbance, and other activities against public order. Political, differences had become so deep that every new issue and problem turned into a crisis. The next crisis revolved around the proposed Election Law of the government, which was published on December 16, 1952. According to this law, elections for the remaining seats in the seventeenth parliament were supposed to take place. There was concern that the increase in the number of representatives, as predicted by the law, and the increase in the two-thirds quorum would practically paralyze the parliament for a while. Moreover, it would diminish the effectiveness of the small but noisy minority. In response to this, Mossadegh vehemently criticized the signatories of the plan in a radio speech, directly addressing the people. This tactic proved effective, and the parliament, with a unanimous vote of confidence, supported Mossadegh. Immediately after this victory, Mossadegh requested an extension of his powers for another twelve months. MakKi (one of representatives) in protest, resigned from the parliament, comparing Mossadegh to Hitler, and other representatives expressed their opposition. Mossadegh, during a meeting with the representatives of the National Movement faction,

justified his position by stating that, this was the only solution to the oil issue and facilitating the swift approval of laws. He argued that the Iranian parliament, based on partisan principles, does not operate in an orderly manner, and he emphasized that he would not be deprived of his powers. Mossadegh accepted the proposal of one of his supporters, suggesting that he submit his bills to the parliament within three months of their publication. The majority of the decisive members of the National Movement faction then agreed to the extension of his powers. However, this did not bring an end to the disputes. The crisis in Mossadegh's and Ayatollah Kashani's relations had repercussions throughout the political arena.

In late February 1953, seventeen members of the Iran Party separated from it. According to the head of the central committee of the party, Ayatollah Kashani, he was the cause of this separation because his associates within the party were attacking party leaders as agents of the United States. The visible disagreement between Mossadegh and Ayatollah Kashani led to a split in the National Front faction, with Makki and Baghaei (representatives) publicly leaving, along with several others from the National Movement faction. This had a significant impact, and many who had supported

Mossadegh in the nationalization of the oil industry were now openly against him, leading to the ultimate collapse of the National Fron. Mossadegh was always angered by the intrigues of the royal court. The royal court gradually re-emerged as a major source of inspiration and support for the opponents of the government. For a long time, Mossadegh had been suspicious, to the extent that he provided financial assistance to opposition groups against the government. He was also dissatisfied with the lack of government control over the extravagant expenditures of the royal court. Mossadegh felt that he could no longer tolerate this situation and threatened to resign if the Shah did not abandon his intrigues and wrongful actions. He warned that he would disclose the reasons for his resignation to the public. The Shah, through his royal court minister named Alaa, sent a message to Mossadegh, and Mossadegh, in turn, handed him a long list of his grievances. Mossadegh demanded that the Shah refrain from meeting with government opponents and relinquish control over the custodianship of Astan Quds Razavi, as well as the right to allocate the revenues of Astan Quds and royal properties. The Shah hoped to appease Mossadegh without taking a step that would weaken his own position. Therefore, Alaa (royal Court Minister) told Mossadegh that the Shah was willing to leave the country. However, Mossadegh did not

approve such an action, and the crisis continued. This situation was welcomed by the opponents, and Ayatollah Kashani seemed pleased during a meeting with Alaa, telling him that if Mossadegh attacked the Shah in the parliament, the parliament would unanimously support the Shah, and Zahedi and Saleh would be named as his successors. Some parliamentarians intervened to mediate, seemingly calming the crisis. Alaa, relieved, informed Henderson that "the disagreement have temporarily been resolved, and Mossadegh has been persuaded not to follow up his complaints." Additionally, some parliamentarians proposed that the Shah take steps to improve his relationship with the Prime Minister, encourage the army to identify Mossadegh as its commander, or refrain from meeting with government opponents, or suspend the plan to divide royal properties. The Shah resisted the last point but showed some willingness to negotiate with Mossadegh. During this period, the possibility of reconciliation between the Shah and Mossadegh alarmed the government's opponents. However, it became evident that the "reconciliation" was illusory. Neither Mossadegh's meeting with the Shah on February 23, 1953, nor his subsequent negotiations with Alaa resulted in any tangible agreement. Shah, which was encouraged by the behavior of Mossadegh's former supporters,

insisted on leaving the country for two months. Mossadegh eventually agreed to this request, and preliminary arrangements for his departure were made. On February 27, 1953, Mossadegh went to the palace to bid farewell to the Shah, there he realized that he had been deceived. The Shah had asked Mossadegh to keep the details of his trip confidential, but the Shah himself had arranged for the information to be leaked. As a result, Ayatollah Kashani published two open letters, publicly asking the Shah to cancel his trip. He urged people, along with Ayatollah Behbahani, to prevent the Shah's departure. Feeling threatened by pro-Shah demonstrations, Mossadegh left the palace through a back door, suspecting a plot against him. He returned home, but soon had to flee in his pajamas as a crowd approached. During these events, retired officers played a significant role in the February 27, 1953 protests. Trucks from the Air Force transported villagers from the outskirts of Tehran, areas where royal properties had been distributed, into the city. Uniformed officers, including several army commanders, made efforts to incite emotions during the demonstrations, claiming that Mossadegh had forced the Shah to leave the country with the intention of overthrowing him.

The small, pro-monarchy party, Arya, which received financial support from the royal court, led the demonstrators. This group included right-wing factions, mercenaries, and professional thugs. It also involved the Rashidian brothers, who distributed funds which they had received from the British. The Americans and British did not deny that the protests were orchestrated. Mossadegh's pressure on the Shah provided an opportunity for Ayatollah Kashani to regain his lost ground. In fact, the monarchist demonstrations on February 27, 1953, was a quasi-coup attempt to overthrow the government. Just a few days before, Ardeshir Zahedi had informed the U.S. Embassy that his father, General Zahedi, might become the prime minister soon. Whether Mossadegh was aware of this plot or not, he issued an arrest warrant for General Zahedi. Meanwhile, Mossadegh's supporters managed to prevail over the pro-monarchy demonstrators, and the government once again consolidated its power. Mossadegh, was shaken by the forced departure from his home, initially went to the military headquarters and then to the National Consultative Assembly (the Parliament) and with anger and emotion, he recounted to the representatives the events that had happened before, and granted the representatives a 48-hour deadline to find a new prime minister. Mossadegh

threatened to reveal the truth to the public, asserting, "I am the prime minister of the nation, not the prime minister of the parliament and the Shah." He also hinted at the possibility of resorting to a referendum. Mossadegh, sensing the somewhat unfriendly atmosphere in the parliament, returned to his home encouraged by some representatives. He did not insist on a vote of confidence, as it seemed that the crisis was subsiding, and opposition to the government had temporarily receded. While Mossadegh displayed a degree of self-restraint, he took measures to strengthen his position. He appointed General Riahi, who had connections with the Iran Party, as the head of the military headquarters. He ordered several individuals identified as main culprits in the events of February 27, 1953, to be arrested. However, it soon became apparent that the opponents, particularly led by Ayatollah Kashani in the parliament, would do whatever it takes to prevent the consolidation of Mossadegh's power. Despite Mossadegh's efforts, it was clear that his parliamentary opponents, especially Ayatollah Kashani, would use all available means to hinder the strengthening of his position. This fierce struggle became the main issue in the government's confrontation. So that in the days after the 27th February 1953 crisis, Ayatollah Kashani, who was devastated, had to once again publicly declare his

support for Mossadegh and deny any connection with the Shah's court. Yet, using his position as the head of the parliament, he resumed his activities against the government. His attempts to undermine the government were not limited to paralyzing quasi-parliamentary activities. In late April 1953, the newly appointed and new police chief, Mahmoud Afshar- Tous, was abducted and brutally murdered. It appeared that the kidnapping of Afshar-Tous, orchestrated by some supporters of General Zahedi and elements associated with British intelligence, was intended to be followed by a series of sabotage operations. Initially, the abductors aimed to obtain information from Afshar-Tous, weaken the government's resolve, and possibly carry out a campaign against it. However, Afshar-Tous's defiant and boldly behavior, including resisting torture and verbally challenging the Shah, led his captors to resort to killing him. The motive behind the murder of Afshar-Tous, orchestrated by some elements among the supporters of General Zahedi, as well as agents and spies associated with the British, was initially thought to be part of a series of destructive operations. The primary objective of the abductors was to gather information from Afshar-Tous, undermine the spirit of the government, and create chaos. However, Afshar Tous 's brave conduct during captivity, which included resisting torture and defying

his captors by insulting the Shah, eventually led to his murder. Following this assassination, General Zahedi, who had recently been released after a short period of detention related to the events of 27th of February11953, was summoned to the military governor's office. However, he managed to evade arrest by seeking refuge in the parliament. Ayatollah Kashani personally ordered that Zahedi be well-received. Despite the severe blow the murder of Afshar-Tous dealt to the government, the massive participation of people in his funeral ceremony indicated a condemnation of the murderers and a sign of continued support for Mossadegh. The allegations of collusion and conspiracy with the killers made any reconciliation increasingly difficult. Mossadegh, who had previously established rules for the behavior of the minority, was now facing the opposition's use of these tactics against him. When they resorted to parliamentary disorder, Mossadegh skillfully used it against them, condemning them for their disruptive behavior and labeling himself as the inventor of this condemned tactic. Additionally, opponents often pointed to Mossadegh's previous opposition to military rule, complete control, and weakening of the parliament. They exploited Mossadegh's consistent opposition to the threshold limit, which he had always opposed, to the fullest extent. In the past, no one had praised Mossadegh's reliance on

parliamentary power, but now he believed that a national referendum was the only solution. Mossadegh's supporters hoped that by electing Moaezami as the head of the parliament, this move would be avoided. Meanwhile, opponents were confident in Ayatollah Kashani's victory. Therefore, both groups agreed to hold an open session of parliament to elect the head of the parliament. This election took place on the June 30, 1953, and Moaezami won with 41 votes against Ayatollah Kashani's 31 votes. Immediately after Moaezami's victory, one of Baghaei's supporters submitted a motion of censure against the government to diminish the impact of the government's victory and divert attention from it. The motion accused the government of making false claims about Afshar-Tous's murder and torture. This was the second censure motion during Mossadegh's tenure, and it was a move that intensified existing differences. Minority representatives managed to take control of several important parliamentary committees and counter the government by controlling the parliament's presidency. Numerous pieces of evidence suggested that the relationship between the government and the parliament was deteriorating rapidly. Dr. Dr. Sedighi the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, announced that the government was ready to respond to the censure motion and set a date for that

purpose. On the same day this news was announced (8th July, 1953), MaKki and another representative were elected to the Supervisory Board of the Central Bank with a majority of more than 40 votes. This case made Mossadegh face the real problem, as he had ordered the issuance of 3,100 million rials in banknotes in October 1952 to meet the government's needs, based on the recommendations of foreign economic advisors. However, he had kept it secret to prevent the economic consequences of inflation. Of course, this action also arouses the hostility of the opponents. If the issue of publishing additional banknotes became public, it would put the government in a position of defeat and exacerbate financial and economic difficulties. This was a decisive factor in persuading Mossadegh of the necessity of a national referendum.

After the events of late February 1953, most anti-government struggles were carried out in the name of the Shah, and It was with the Shah's support that the approval of the report of the 8-person delegation remained barren. However, Mossadegh succeeded in keeping the Shah and his family away from direct involvement in political matters. Many members of the royal family resided outside of Iran, and the Shah spent most of his time on the shores of the Caspian Sea. He was

unable to accept foreign diplomats without Mossadegh's consent and travel without Mossadegh's approval. Nevertheless, the monarchists had greatly expanded the scope of their activities. Together with former supporters of Mossadegh who had now joined the royalist camp, they portrayed the Shah as an innocent and law-loving king. Numerous unfounded allegations were made about him. Mossadegh, considering these activities and claims, was still able to prevent the revival of the Shah's court as the political focal point. The resignation of Ala, the Minister of the royal Court, on April 24, 1953, and the appointment of Abolghasem Amini as the sponsorship minister of the royal Court brought about another transformation in Mossadegh's favor. This was particularly significant since Ala had claimed in March 1953 that the idea of a royal journey had initially come from three members of the National Front faction, a claim that had sparked intense denials and strained Mossadegh's relations with Ala. On May 8, 1953, Mossadegh achieved a substantial victory by reclaiming royal properties for the government. These properties, which had been transferred to the Shah according to a law passed on July 10, 1949, which On the other hand, the government had agreed to contribute 60 million Rials to the budget of the Imperial Organization and Social Services, which would be spent on welfare affairs

under the supervision of the government. Although it considered a major setback for the Shah, he could see it as a temporary failure, given the intense pressure on the government due to the activities of its opponents and financial and economic difficulties. Mossadegh's most significant setback, known as the main factor accelerating his downfall, was the lack of an agreement with Britain regarding oil. Mossadegh still insisted on the conditions he had set for paying indemnities, while the British demanded compensation for the violation of the agreement and were unwilling to declare their claim amounts in advance.

Although the British had imposed an economic blockade on Iran, the government was able to sell oil to some countries such as Italy and Japan. The British filed complaints in the courts of Venice and Tokyo, but these courts ruled in favor of Iran. While this was a significant achievement, its impact was limited due to the 50% discount that the Iranian government offered in the oil sales price. Mossadegh's policy was based on sustaining until the British conceded or, in essence, he wanted to adopt the same strategy against Britain that they had used against him. In the early stages of Mossadegh's rule, members of the minority had toughened the British position against him, but now they were undermining

him and nurturing the hope of reaching an agreement with the British through his successor. On June 288, 1953, Eisenhower informed Mossadegh that as long as Iran could not find a solution to the oil issue, it could not expect significant financial assistance from the United States. The United States would not buy Iranian oil, and it would not increase its military and technical assistance. Eisenhower's letter dashed all hopes of reaching an agreement on oil. He emphasized that a solution based solely on the loss of material assets, meaning the nationalized company's facilities, would not be a fair resolution. Thus, he rejected the approach supported by the British for compensation in case of termination before the contract deadline. The publication of this letter finally dispelled the myth of continuous American support for Mossadegh. America's position intensified the financial and economic issues of the government, but these issues were not severe enough to overthrow the government. In fact, despite all the difficulties, the government had managed to address some of these issues, especially in the field of foreign trade. At that time, the volume of exports had increased, providing the necessary foreign exchange. To compensate for the loss of oil revenue, the government focused on the development of tobacco and textile industries and continued its efforts to stabilize the

exchange rate. Import restrictions and the devaluation of the rial, despite its inflationary consequences, helped establish domestic industries, making this period known as an "industrial improvement" era. Until this date, Mossadegh, like in previous years, had control over the budget under the influence of the parliament. However, this time, he approved the budget for the year 1953 using the powers granted by the budget law. The traces of Mossadegh's disregard for the national referendum can be traced back at least to the late December 1952, marking the beginning of serious problems between the government and the parliament. However, the use of the national referendum, seen by some as a warning, was not excessive. Gradually, as the government's relations with the parliament deteriorated, many parliament members opposed the tactic, not only from the United Front and Country factions but also from many of Mossadegh's supporters who sought to dissuade him from this path. When it became clear that Mossadegh was not willing to change his stance, members of the National Movement faction submitted their resignations, and some other representatives (approximately 56) also resigned on July 27, 1953. Since the parliament was no longer able to perform its duties, it was hoped that the need for a national referendum would be addressed. But the opposition representatives of the government still enjoy

parliamentary immunity and could continue their opposition. As a result, Mossadegh remained determined to dissolve the parliament and sought to gain a new legitimacy through a public referendum. Contrary to some newspaper claims, Mossadegh could not resort to the Shah for the dissolution of the parliament, and he did not take such action. The holding of the national referendum, portrayed as an unconstitutional move, gave the Shah the opportunity to present himself as a guardian of the constitution. Now, he was more determined than ever, but he needed the certainty of British and American support to finally push through a drastic act. The mysterious return of Ashraf Pahlavi to Tehran aimed to confirm this support and assure the Shah that the actions taken by the Rashidian brothers and other foreign agents were fully endorsed by the British and Americans. Apparently, the Shah agreed to sign two decrees for Mossadegh's dismissal and Zahedi's appointment. Nevertheless, he preferred to be in a situation where, if the coup failed, he could leave the country himself. When the military efforts, especially by the Imperial Guard, failed on August 15, 1953, the Shah hastily left the country to ensure his safety.

At this stage, some officials of the US State Department began expressing doubts about the

possibility of Mossadegh's failure. Zahedi was provided a safe haven as doubts increased, and mercenaries, both hired and non-hired, were mobilized by local agents and some clerics. The highly charged atmosphere and the monarchy-seeking sentiments, fueled by the Shah's escape and the fear of communism and republicanism, were exploited to the fullest extent. As the perpetrators of rioting and incitement, the Rashidian brothers had been sent to Tehran. According to a narration in response to a request from CIA's Chief of Operations in Iran, the Rashidian brothers were tasked with establishing contact with Ayatollah Kashani. Two CIA agents met with Ahmad Aramesh on the morning of August 18, 1953, and handed him $10,000, supposedly to be passed on to Ayatollah Kashani to engage him in anti-Mossadegh mobilization. The use of this money led to a significant drop in the dollar exchange rate in the black market. Instigators of unrest, as part of the operation, engaged in activities such as destroying statues of the Shah and his father, which were later blamed on the Tude Party and Mossadegh's extremist supporters. Three days later, on August 18, 1953, with decisive support from the military, the unsuccessful coup turned into a victory. Mossadegh and his supporters were well aware of the impending coup. In fact, on August 8, 1953, Tude Party newspapers had published

relatively accurate and precise reports on the impending coup. Kianouri, one of the leaders of the Tude Party, claimed to have received details of the coup through the party's military network and had informed Mossadegh. Neutralizing the first coup was possible, but there was no effective means to prevent it from happening again. There was no organization to mobilize the masses and coordinate counteractions. The occurrence of the American coup on August 18, 1953, as evident from confidential documents of that time, involved the active and influential role of the U.S. government in directing the forces opposing the Iranian government towards the overthrow of Mossadegh. For this purpose, with the collaboration of the British government, Mr. Fazlollah Zahedi was selected as the military commander of the coup, and the Shah was persuaded to support him. Then, Kermit Roosevelt, (an American politician), entered Iran on July18, 1953, met with Zahedi in his hiding place, and managed to convince a group of military personnel in Tehran's garrisons to force to go against the government's orders. Furthermore, the CIA decided to implement psychological warfare against Mossadegh. On August 14, 1953, the Shah signed the dismissal of Prime Minister Mossadegh and the appointment of Zahedi, fleeing to Baghdad and later to Rome (Italy) with his second wife, Soraya. Simultaneously, widespread public

protests erupted across Iran. At that time, Dr. Fatemi, the Foreign Minister of Iran, declared that the monarchy should be abolished, and a republican government should be established. The efforts of the coup leaders, combined with the government's negligence, led to preliminary coup actions that allowed the coup plotters to overthrow the national government without facing significant obstacles, establishing a pro-American regime. In this way, with the guidance of the CIA and without military assistance, the coup plotters managed to execute their plans with the help of hired thugs in Tehran, funded by British and American organizations. Simultaneously, military elements of the coup took control of sensitive areas, including the army headquarters, radio station, police and gendarmerie stations, telephone and telegraph centers, as well as Dr. Mossadegh's residence. However, Mossadegh, who had strengthened the defensive arrangements of his residence after the incident on February 27, 1953, had not taken significant additional measures because he was assured by the Chief of Staff that everything was under control. Following the coup, General Zahedi became the Prime Minister, and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi returned to the country. Mossadegh was not oblivious to the danger of the coup and had taken every possible measure to prevent it, including offering a reward for the arrest of

Zahedi. He considered Ayatollah Kashani responsible for assisting in plotting the coup and incapacitating the government to confront it.



Mossadegh was the Prime Minister of Iran from 1951 to 1953

Dr. Mosadegh among the people - March 19, 1953, the anniversary and nationalization day of Iran's oil industry

Chapter 2

The policies of the Amini government

(Forties of the Iranian calendar)

After the approval of the Land Reforms Act and its implementation by the Amini government, a group of Shia clerics and religious authorities, aware of the goals of these plans and the hidden angles of the white revolution of the shah and the people, rose in opposition to the Shah's regime. Following the passing of Ayatollah Boroujerdi in April 1961, who was a major Shia religious authority, Mohammad Reza Shah believed that there was no suitable replacement for Ayatollah Boroujerdi among

the religious authorities. Thinking that this was an opportune time to implement the reforms desired by the United States. in April 1962 Mohammad Reza Shah, accompanied by Asadollah Alam, went to the United States. With the help of British leaders, he managed to convince the U.S. to support Amini's dismissal and became the executor of U.S.-desired reforms in Iran. Consequently, in June-July 1962, Shah dismissed Ali Amini under the pretext of military rank differences and appointed Asadollah Alam, who was close to him, as the Prime Minister.He decided to amend the laws governing the elections of provincial and district councils in the absence of the National Consultative Assembly. Ayatollah Boroujerdi, who was a disciple of prominent religious authorities such as Ayatollah Khorasani, played a crucial role not only in the intellectual transformation in the religious seminaries of Qom but also had a significant impact on safeguarding the Muslim community in Iran from political and social crises during that sensitive period. Many individuals who played a role in the formation of the Islamic Revolution were his disciples. Mohammad Reza Shah, under the guise of approving these bills, pursued specific goals. He aimed to assess the sensitivity of religious scholars and the religious capabilities of the people. He sought to test the clergy and the religious movement, which were always a

barrier against foreign influences in Iran. To achieve this, the country's official media reflected the approval of these bills and related news. The approval of these bills stirred religious scholars and the Muslim population in Iran. At that time, Ayatollah Khomeini, a leading figure in Qom's religious hierarchy, called on members of the seminary to participate in various gatherings and discussions to repeal these bills. He elucidated the colonialist plans and ambitions, emphasizing the responsibility of the clergy in safeguarding Islam and the country's independence. It was decided telegrams would be sent to the Shah, requesting the cancellation of the approved bills. In the aftermath of the persistent efforts of Ayatollah Khomeini, the religious authorities, and other religious scholars, the Shah and the government were ultimately forced to backtrack and cancel the decrees. Some religious scholars considered this measure enough, but it was decided to request the cancellation of the approved bills by sending telegrams to the Shah. Khomeini, with vigilance, elucidated the hidden objectives of the Pahlavi regime and exposed the nature of America's interference in the country's affairs.

Implementation of the provisions of the White Revolution of the royal regime:

The approval of the State and Provincial Associations Resolution was an introduction to implementing a movement aimed at fulfilling America's request to prevent the former Soviet Union's influence in Iran. which was later named the Shah and People's White Revolution. After the cancellation of the resolution, due to pressure from American agents, the Shah himself came forward and announced his intention to implement the Six Principles, also known as the White Revolution. At this time, Ayatollah Khomeini, with aware of the Shah's objectives and the detrimental results of America's interventionist policies, called on the clerics and scholars of Qom to participate in an emergency meeting to discuss the cancellation of the resolutions and requested more information about the national referendum from the Shah., Meanwhile, Ayatollah Kamalvand went to see the Shah as a representative of the authorities of Qom, Shah Instead of answering the questions posed by the authorities and scholars of Qom. During these events the Shah opened a discourse of threats. In this meeting, Mohammad Reza Shah told Ayatollah Kamalvand, "If the sky falls to the ground or the ground rises to the sky, I must implement this program." He, while complaining about the religious

scholars, asked them to be prayerful like the clergy in other Muslim countries, supportive of the Shah. In response, Ayatollah Kamalvand, stated, "The Shieh scholars have never been and will never be agents of governments in their thousand-year history." Following this response, Ayatollah Khomeini and other religious scholars realized that the Shah, with the support of America, was determined to implement this program in any way possible, and Ayatollah Khomeini proclaimed in a speech, "Now, the enemy is the religious scholars themselves, not the government, as he (the Shah) has placed himself at the border between life and death. Following the issuance of a statement by Ayatollah Khomeini and other statements from various religious scholars and authorities denouncing the illegality of the referendum (referendum for all) and declaring it prohibited, the people of Tehran, Qom, and other cities took to the streets. During this time, the students of Tehran University, through a statement, condemned the Shah's regime's anti-Islamic and unlawful actions. The Tehran market closed, and people in the southern parts of Tehran staged protest demonstrations. In response to the unrest, the Shah's regime militarily occupied Tehran, suppressed the people, attacked Tehran University, arrested several combatant Clergy put them in prison. In addition to the opposition from scholars and clergy, the

Freedom Movement group also opposed the Shah's regime by approving the State and Provincial Associations Resolution and organizing a referendum. On the 24th January 1963, the Shah went to Qom to prove, through a speech in the city, that the scholars were not unified in opposition to the Six Principles. However, the scholars in Qom, under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, boycotted the Shah's reception, and the entire city of Qom shut down. Faced with this political movement, the Shah angrily insulted the clergy and Islam. In these circumstances, the elections were invalidated, and despite the opposition, the Shah enforced his statement on the national referendum on 26th January 1963. Following this, the President of the United States and the Queen of England congratulated the Shah on the referendum, and a few days later, the government of Asadollah Alam put the invalidated State and Provincial Associations Resolution into effect as an amendment to the election law. This move faced objections from Ayatollah Khomeini.

The uprising on June 5, 1963

As the approach of Nowruz 1342 (March 20, 1963), Ayatollah Khomeini, in protest against the policies of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's regime, declared a

public mourning. Other scholars and religious authorities also followed him. Subsequently, on the 22nd march, 1963, during the commemoration ceremony of the martyrdom of Imam Sadegh, at Fayziah Qom School in Qom, SAVAK forces and Shah's military commandos, dressed in civilian clothing, attacked, killing or injuring several clerics. The Shah's agents broke the cell doors and tore the Quran and religious books, and even the injured were attacked in Qom hospital simultaneously. This tragedy coincided with security forces' attack on Talebieh School in Tabriz, where they killed or wounded several people. The Shah's regime's goal in these assaults was to instill fear among the people of Iran. On the 3rd of June 1963, Ayatollah Khomeini visited Qom School to address the political issues of the day. One day after his political speech, on the morning of the June 4, 1963, Ayatollah Khomeini was arrested at his home and transferred to Tehran. Simultaneously, several other religious scholars from various cities were also arrested and imprisoned. The news of Ayatollah Khomeini's arrest led to a massive wave of public protests in Qom on the June 5, 1963. Subsequently, protests erupted in Tehran and other cities, including Mashhad, Qazvin, Kashan, Shiraz, Tabriz, and Isfahan. In response, Asadullah Alam, the prime minister at the time, on the Shah's command, ordered a ruthless crackdown on the

people. The demonstrations were widespread in Tehran and Qom, leading to the declaration of martial law by the military government. In these protests, the presence of protesting women in Qom was significant. As clerics moved towards the shrine, military confrontation escalated with the sound of machine gun volleys. Military forces surrounded and brutally suppressed the demonstrators, throwing them to the ground like autumn leaves. Meanwhile, the Tehran bazaar closed, and people took to the streets. Upon hearing the news of Ayatollah Khomeini's arrest, students at the University of Tehran suspended classes and with the slogan of death to the dictator, demanded Ayatollah Khomeini's release, facing the military. The Shah's Imperial Guard entered, and killing of hundreds of people began. The prime minister of that time, about the massacre of people on June 5 of the same year admitted and acknowledging that the Shah not only ordered the shooting but also supported the killing of the people.

Due to the lack of an organized plan, the protests were spontaneous, prompting the government to suppress the demonstrators. After the crackdown and the massacre of people during the June 5, 1963 uprising, a wave of arrests and exile began throughout the country. Supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini were arrested, tortured, and many

were sent to prison or exile. Following the quelling of the June 5, 1963 uprising, executions of leaders of the Fars tribal uprising, who had supported Ayatollah Khomeini and the clergy, commenced. After the arrest of Ayatollah Khomeini, some religious scholars in Tehran and other cities, as well as clerics in Najaf and Karbala, issued statements and telegrams condemning the killing and massacre of mourners and protesters on the 5th and 6th of June of that year. They demanded the unconditional release of Ayatollah Khomeini and other clerics. The Prime Minister of that time had announced that Ayatollah Khomeini would be subjected to a trial in a remote area, but public outrage and protests by the people and clerics intensified. In response to these threats, a coordinated effort was made by a group of prominent religious scholars across the country who migrated to Tehran on June 7, 1963 to express their support for Ayatollah Khomeini. The Shah's regime attempted to prevent the migration of the religious scholars, but a 14-days sit-in and strike, along with their determined efforts, forced the regime to backtrack on the trial. After some time, Ayatollah Khomeini was released from prison and transferred to A house in Qaitariya of Shemiranat, under the supervision of security forces. However, Ayatollah Khomeini's strong and vehement protest against the passage of the Capitulation Bill and

the establishment of a military government in Tehran and Qom led to his re-arrest by SAVAK agents in the middle of the night on the November 4, 1964. He was then taken to Tehran Airport and subsequently deported to Turkey.

Exile of Ayatollah Khomeini, in addition to the reaction of the people marked by protests and strikes, also had international repercussions and there was the reaction of scientific and political personalities and students from abroad. After the exile of Ayatollah Khomeini, Hassan Ali Mansour, who was the Prime Minister at the time, was assassinated by one of the members of the Islamic Coalition on charges of betraying the people in front of the National Consultative Assembly. Following his arrest, along with three others from the same group, they were executed. After the assassination of Hassan Ali Mansour, Shah appointed Hoveyda as the new Prime Minister. With the beginning of the era of consolidating the dictatorship of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in February 1965, the secret of the longevity of the prime minister, Hoveyda which lasted for thirteen years, was his obedient to the Shah. After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, he was sentenced to execution due to his collaboration with the Shah's policies. During the same period, with the rise of

Republicans in the United States and the presidency of Richard Nixon, effectively, America assigned the role of gendarme in the Middle East to the Pahlavi government. Thus, the major powers of England and America handed over their longstanding rivalries for influence and control over Iran to cooperation and collaboration for the distribution of oil, reserves and wealth of Iran and the Middle East. Shah, by expanding political and military ties with America, felt more secure and powerful. After his formal coronation in 1967 Shah initiated apparent reforms and development in the country.

Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi

Ayatollah Khomeini after one year of residing in Turkey, he was exiled to Najaf, Iraq, on the 4th of October, 1965. Shah, by exiling Ayatollah Khomeini, aimed to keep the leadership of the national movement away from Iran to extinguish the flames of awakening in the country. For this purpose, SAVAK (Iran's intelligence agency) made significant efforts to sever the connection between the people and Ayatollah Khomeini and his supporters. They went to great lengths to prevent the printing and distribution of Ayatollah Khomeini's messages. During his exile, Ayatollah Khomeini consistently called on the people to remain steadfast and tried to foster unity among clerics and students in the open struggle against the Shah. In various cities of Iran, prominent clerics served as representatives of Ayatollah Khomeini, not only conducting religious affairs but also keeping the spirit of the movement alive. In this period, political and religious activities began covertly in Iran, and the student movement emerged in year1965, advocating ideals such as social justice, freedom, independence, and progress for the country. since year 1971 onwards, Islamic associations that had initially formed at the University of Tehran expanded to other universities in Iran. Political activities gradually gained momentum, and student groups, through the introduction and distribution of various political,

cultural, historical, and social books, made students across the country aware of the Shah's wrongdoings and servitude.

As political struggles intensified for the overthrow of the Shah and the Pahlavi regime, SAVAK (Iran's intelligence agency), the police, and the gendarmerie mobilized to counter these activities. Simultaneously, provincial governments across Iran began establishing recreational centers known as "khaneh Javanan" or "Kakheh Javanan" (Youth Houses or Youth Palaces). These centers, seemingly created for the entertainment and artistic activities of youth and students, but were, in reality, aimed at identifying politically active students. Opponents of the Pahlavi regime were divided into three groups. The first group consisted of revolutionary Muslims who believed in the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini and saw their struggle as an Islamic duty and religious obligation. The second group comprised leftists who, influenced by Marxist ideas, saw the path to liberation through Marxist theories. According to their perspective, armed struggle and indoctrination, along with launching guerrilla warfare against the Pahlavi government, were their primary objectives. The third group was nationalist, not recognizing the possibility of regime change from the monarchy. They believed in

accepting the principle of monarchy but sought to diminish the Shah's autocracy. Gradually, political tendencies gained prevalence among university students. However, the Shah's regime was not idle during this period. By establishing youth clubs and encouraging students to join these clubs for entertainment purposes, they aimed to divert students from getting involved in political groups. Nevertheless, the primary goal of the Shah's regime was to identify and monitor politically dissenting youth and students. Despite the recreational nature of these clubs, young spies were often embedded within them. If any group of students with opposing political views was discovered, they were arrested, subjected to harassment, and even torture. If it was confirmed that they were members of opposition political groups, they were thrown into political prisons and then subjected to further torture. It's worth mentioning that since the exile of Ayatollah Khomeini, many clerics and young seminary students who opposed the Shah were held in political prisons. Starting from the early 1971, SAVAK employed increasingly brutal methods of torture and routinely executed activists. Many revolutionaries met their martyrdom under the brutal torture methods of SAVAK.

Chapter 3

The political crisis of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi

In December 1977, U.S. President Carter visited Tehran. The Shah, elated by Carter's praise and the support of the United States and Western countries for his government, instructed the publication of a strongly-worded article against Ayatollah Khomeini one week after Carter's visit. This infamous article, titled "Iran and Red and Black Colonialism," was published in a newspaper called "Ettelaat" in December 1977.The publication of this insulting article in Ettelaat immediately provoked a strong reaction from seminary students, clergy, and the people of Qom. The protests on the January 9, 1978 culminated in a military attack on

the demonstrators. The security forces killed several people, injured many others, and arrested and exiled numerous religious scholars. Despite the crackdown, the scope of protests continued to escalate. On February 18, 1978, in Tabriz, people organized ceremonies for the martyrs of Qom. The military forces intervened, shooting at the crowds. Similar military interventions were declared in Yazd, Isfahan, and Shahreza. The events of December 1977 and the subsequent crackdowns marked a turning point, leading to increased public dissent. On February 18, 1978, massive demonstrations took place in Tabriz, and the military forces of the Pahlavi regime were deployed. This escalated the situation, leading to further protests in other cities. The incidents in Tabriz were part of the larger unrest that ultimately paved the way for the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Following the tragedy and the fire at the Rex Cinema in Abadan, the Amuzgar, the prime minister at the time was forced to resigned and in his place Sharif Emami was assigned as the prime minister with the slogan of national reconciliation, However, his attempts to change the policies of the Pahlavi regime were unsuccessful in quelling the expanding public protests. Widespread demonstrations in Tehran, held on the September,4,1978 after the Eide - Fitr prayers, intensified the people's discontent with the Shah, the government, and the United States. Three days

later, approximately five hundred thousand people in Tehran took to the streets, chanting slogans such as "Death to the Shah," "America, go home," "Hussain is our Lord, Khomeini is our leader," and also slogans promoting "Independence, Freedom, Islamic Republic." It was decided that the next day, protests would be held in a square called Jaleh (now known as Martyrs' Square). However, on the eve of the scheduled protests, when people were asleep in Tehran and eleven other cities across Iran, martial law was declared. On the morning of the 8th September 1978, thousands gathered in Jaleh Square, and in Tehran alone, people assembled in the streets. The military and commandos were unable to disperse the crowds, and later in the day, they resorted to shooting at the people with tank machine guns and using helicopters to disperse them, employing tear gas and other riot control measures. Following the ruthless massacre of the Iranian people, Carter expressed support for the Shah of Iran and his efforts to restore order. However, within the White House, there were serious disagreements on how to deal with the Islamic Revolution in Iran. These differences of opinion contributed to the confusion in Carter and the Shah's handling of suppressing the people and the Islamic Revolution. With the increasing popular protests in Iran at the same year, the Iraqi government, in coordination

with the United States, took secretive actions to expel Ayatollah Khomeini. In response, Ayatollah Khomeini went to Kuwait on the 5th of October, 1978, But the Kuwaiti government did not allow Ayatollah Khomeini to enter. Meanwhile, Iraq also refused to allow Ayatollah Khomeini to return. As a result, Ayatollah Khomeini and his companions went to France on the 7th of October, 1978. However, when the President of France learned about the unexpected arrival of Ayatollah Khomeini, he inquired about the Shah's opinion. Subsequently, Ayatollah Khomeini was granted permission to stay in France. The Shah and the United States hoped that Ayatollah Khomeini's departure from Iran would lead to his separation from the revolutionary movement. However, the improved conditions for student contacts in France, under the leadership of the revolution, facilitated easier communication and increased messaging from that point onward. On November 4, 1978, a large gathering of students and protesters at the University of Tehran faced brutal repression by military and security forces, resulting in casualties. The broadcast of scenes from this incident on Iranian television stirred public emotions. Simultaneously, protests erupted among Iranian students residing in European and American countries. Additionally, Iranian Islamic students in Pune, India, organized extensive

demonstrations in front of the Iranian consulate in Bombay. Following the student protests in Tehran and other cities, as well as actions by student associations abroad, Sharif Emami was removed from the position of prime minister, and Major General Azhari was appointed in his place. However, on the same day, there were even more intense demonstrations in Tehran, during which, part of the British Embassy in Tehran was set on fire. On the 6th of November, at the same year, Mohammad Reza Shah acknowledged the message of the Iranian people's revolution. He admitted to errors, corruption, and oppression against the Iranian people and He swore an oath that they would not be repeated. In an attempt to ease dissatisfaction and restore calm, General Azhari initially detained a group of leaders, including Amir Abbas Hoveida, the former prime minister, and Nasiri, the head of SAVAK. However, Ayatollah Khomeini had previously warned the people that these actions were superficial and deceptive. another important passage and fate-changing episode in the Islamic Revolution of Iran was the demonstrations and historical march on the day of Ashura in 1978. Ayatollah Khomeini invited the people to participate in this significant event, and on the first night of Muharram, people took to the streets. However, the Shah's regime responded by shooting at the mourning people, leading to ruthless massacres in

the southern parts of Tehran and other cities across the country. This brutal crackdown provided the grounds for a massive Ashura procession, and an astonishing number of people, with remarkable order and coordination, marched towards Azadi Square. Approximately 4 to 5 million people in Tehran alone, and over 16 million people nationwide, participated in the demonstrations on that day, out of an estimated total population of 36 million in Iran at that time. The magnitude, scope, discipline, and coherence of the demonstrations intensified the Shah's fear. The statement of this Ashura procession was read by Ayatollah Beheshti, emphasizing the overthrow of the monarchy, Ayatollah Khomeini's return to the country, the establishment of the Islamic Republic, and the call for the Iranian army to join the people. In these circumstances, the General Azhari stepped down from the position of prime minister, and Shapour Bakhtiar, a member of the National Front, was appointed as the new prime minister. During this time, differences of opinion among American policymakers had worsened the situation for both Carter and the Shah of Iran. The National Security Council of the United States was considering a coup and instigating bloodshed in Iran. The US department of State and the CIA were contemplating deceiving the Iranian people by replacing

Bakhtiar instead of the Shah, riding the wave of the revolution. As all options and supports for the Shah's retention in the country and closure of all the ways and handcuffs to keep the Shah in the country, the United States aimed to preserve the structure of the Iranian army. In pursuit of this goal, General Huyser, Deputy Commander of U.S. Forces in Europe, was sent to Iran in December 1978. General Huyser's mission was to coordinate with the leaders of the army to support the Bakhtiar's government and, if necessary, execute a military coup against the revolution, while safeguarding the strategic centers of interest for the United States. At this critical juncture, the efforts of American officials to overcome popular protests and create divisions among revolutionary forces did not succeed. The people continued to demand the overthrow of the Shah's monarchy and the establishment of an Islamic Republic. On January 16, 1979, Mohammad Reza Shah and his wife Farah Pahlavi fled from Iran after the establishment of the Council of Monarchy. Although initially, the Shah was supposed to go to the United States, Carter, through diplomatic maneuvers, sent him to Egypt. When the news of the Shah's escape was announced through radio and television, celebrations erupted across the country, marking the joyous occasion for the Iranian people. With the Shah's escape from Iran, protests continued in

various cities, and in some places, agents of the Shah's regime opened fire on the people. In the midst of these events, Ayatollah Khomeini, from France, issued a statement urging the military personnel to abandon their posts and leave the army. Following this declaration, the exodus of officers and soldiers from military garrisons gained momentum. On the January 19, 1979, coinciding with the fortieth day after the martyrdom of Seyed Shohada (Imam Hussein), people once again expressed their resentment and disgust towards the Pahlavi regime through massive demonstrations, reiterating their demand for independence, freedom, and the establishment of an Islamic Republic. During this time, Ayatollah Khomeini announced that he would soon return to Iran. Simultaneously, with the resignation of Seyed Jalal al-din Tehrani from the presidency of the Council of Monarchy, the Shah's regime practically fell apart. Despite concerns about potential harm to Ayatollah Khomeini's life, he returned to Iran on February 1, 1979, amidst an unprecedented historical welcome. In his speech at Beheshte Zahra (the cemetery) in Tehran on that day, while offering condolences to the families of the martyrs, Ayatollah Khomeini criticized the illegitimacy of the Pahlavi regime. Following the recommendation of the Revolutionary Council, Mehdi Bazargan was proposed as the Prime Minister of the

interim government, and on the February 5, 1979, he was officially announced to the public. After hearing this news, Bakhtiar, the last government of the Shah's regime, on the same day, canceled the delivery of military equipment that had previously been purchased from the United States, with a value of about seven billion dollars. This treacherous move led to the entire amount of this contract, which had previously been paid to the United States, all this amount went to the pocket of the US government. After the fall of the Pahlavi regime, Shapour Bakhtiar, after a period of disappearance in Tehran, fled abroad with the support of mysterious individuals and settled in Paris. At the same time, in Tehran, clashes began between military forces, and many soldiers who were forced to shoot at the people either they pointed their weapons at their commanders or ran away from the field. Ayatollah Khomeini declared on the same day that the announcement of military commanders was against Sharia, and the people should not pay attention to it in any way. Consequently, with the issuance of a new declaration, Ayatollah Khomeini on February 10, 1979, the people supported the air force, which the Imperial Guard had attacked, and in a short time, with the extensive participation of people across the country, sensitive military and urban centers came under the control of the people, and one after another, the regime's

bases collapsed. It should be known that the officers of the Air Force in Tehran, who were opponents of the Shah's regime, achieved victory over the Imperial Guard forces in Jaleh Square (Maidan-e Shahada) in Tehran through intense confrontation and clashes, sacrificing their lives. Simultaneously, outside the country, Islamic student associations took similar actions to seize embassies or consulates. For example, in the city of Pune in India, an Islamic student association issued a statement, and a group of Iranian students, along with the Islamic student association, left Pune for Mumbai at night which unexpectedly headed. In an unplanned move, they surrounded the Iranian consulate in Bombay, led by an individual named "(Q)," and some individuals, under his supervision, entered the Iranian consulate, taking consulate staff hostage with fake guns. After a week, upon receiving news from Iran and following orders, they expelled the consulate staff and closed the Iranian consulate in Bombay for a while. In Iran, with the observation of the fall of sensitive centers, the Council of Commanders of the Army declared its neutrality through a statement. Finally, on February 11, 1979 the Shah's regime completely collapsed. Upon hearing the sound of the revolution on the radio, people celebrated the unimaginable joy and the inevitable end of the Pahlavi monarchy on that day. Engineer Mehdi Bazargan,

appointed as the temporary prime minister by Ayatollah Khomeini on February 4, 1979, commenced his duties by establishing the prime minister's office. Ayatollah Khomeini issued a decree specifying four tasks for the interim government:

1. Administration of the country

2. Implementation of a referendum on determining the country's political system

3. Formation of an elected parliament for drafting and approving the constitution

4. Holding elections for the parliament (based on the new constitution)

On February 14, 1979, Engineer Bazargan introduced his cabinet, consisting mostly of members and supporters of the Freedom Movement and the National Front.

Overview of the Biography of Engineer Mehdi Bazargan: (Engineer Mehdi Bazargan was born in 1907 in Tabriz, Iran. After completing his primary and secondary education in Tehran, he went to France to continue his studies. Following his education in the field of thermodynamics engineering, he returned to Iran and engaged in teaching. He began his political activities in the National Front and, after the coup on August 18,

1953, he became one of the founders of the National Resistance Movement. Due to his active involvement, he was arrested in 1955 and imprisoned. In year 1961, along with Dr. Sahabi and Ayatollah Taleghani, Bazargan established the Freedom Movement of Iran. In January 1963, during the revolutionary days of (June 5 1963), he was also arrested along with other leaders of the freedom movement again. Engineer Bazargan spent time in prison until 1967 when he was released. In 1969, he founded the organization called "Hoveyda Must Go," advocating for the departure of Prime Minister Hoveyda. Ayatollah Khomeini appointed Engineer Bazargan as the Prime Minister of the Interim Government in February 1979. However, he resigned from his position in November 1979 in protest against the U.S. Embassy takeover. Engineer Mehdi Bazargan passed away in January 20, 1995)

It should be noted that the leaders of the United States and the United Kingdom played a significant role in the removal of Mohammad Reza Shah of Iran. According to information from declassified CIA documents, around the mid- Decade 1970s when the Shah of Iran was the head of OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) and, due to increasing global oil prices, the leaders of the United States and

Europe decided to remove him to prevent the rise in oil prices in the Middle East. According to reports, in the year 1977, when the Shah of Iran raised concerns about the rising global oil prices, the leaders of the United States and Europe allegedly decided to take action to overthrow him. According to one account, during an official political banquet, the Shah of Iran was subjected to a biological assassination attempt (resulting in cancer). Subsequently, during the years 1977 and 1978, they conducted extensive global propaganda against him, and Ayatollah Khomeini in Europe especially in France was supported. so that after fleeing Iran in January 1979, the Shah of Iran traveled through several South American countries. Eventually, with the support of Anwar Sadat, the President of Egypt, he found refuge and received medical treatment in Cairo. Unfortunately, he passed away in 1979 while enduring significant discomfort and depression, following his hospitalization in Cairo. In his book "Answer to History," the Shah of Iran explains the reasons for leaving Iran following the 1979 Revolution as follows: "I did not want my name in history to be recorded as a king who preserved his throne through the massacre of the people." He goes on to say, "The Americans and Europeans had decided to increase prices and remove me from power, and resistance was futile. Because I could not go to war with the United

States and the West without the support of my people." Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar, the last Prime Minister of the Pahlavi regime in France, received full support from Western intelligence services. He initiated activities with significant financial support from Zionist circles against the nascent Islamic Republic. One of the most notable of these activities was the unsuccessful Nojeh coup plot and the plan for the disintegration of Khuzestan province. According to this plan, the Iraqi army was supposed to quickly occupy Khuzestan, and Bakhtiar would declare his "free government" in that region. Shapour Bakhtiar continued his treacherous operations against the independence and aspirations of the Iranian people and the territorial integrity of Iran for about 12 years. Eventually, on August 6, 1991 he was assassinated in his residence on the outskirts of France.

Ayatollah Khomeini

Part 2

Political Developments After The Islamic Revolution

Chapter 4

Changes in the Political System of the Islamic Revolution

Following the complete fall of the Shah's regime and the victory of the Islamic Revolution, upon hearing the voice of the revolution from the radio on February 11, 1979, the Iranian people celebrated the end of the Pahlavi monarchy. In the midst of these events, Engineer Mehdi Bazargan was appointed as the interim Prime Minister by Ayatollah Khomeini. After the establishment of the

Islamic Republic as the political system of the country on April 1, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini, through an order, called for elections to form the "Council of Experts" and the drafting and approval of the constitution. The Council of Experts was formed in August 1979 with the election of seventy-two representatives by the people. This Council, based on the previous constitution of the country, Islamic and jurisprudential principles, and considering the opinions of representatives from various political and intellectual groups, began the process of drafting the constitution of the Islamic Republic. Despite increased opposition, particularly regarding the principles related to the "Guardianship of the Jurist (Velayat-e Faqih)," Ayatollah Khomeini and revolutionary groups defended this principle vigorously. Subsequently based on the new constitution, the Guardian Council was formed in March 1980. The Guardian Council's role includes ensuring the conformity and non-conflict of the decisions made by the Islamic Consultative Assembly (parliament) with Islamic principles and the constitution, as well as overseeing the elections for the leadership, the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and the presidential elections, safeguarding the people's votes. Immediately after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, with foresight, established revolutionary institutions one after another.

The Committee for the Islamic Revolution was formed to establish order and security. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Mobilization of the Oppressed (Basij) were created to defend the country. Additionally, the Imam's Relief Committee was established in order to eliminate deprivation and poverty in rural areas, and villages, also the Reconstruction Jihad was initiated for development purposes. The Imam's Relief Committee focused on aiding the underprivileged and promoting literacy to reduce the high illiteracy rate in Iran. Following the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the United States, having lost one of its secure bases in the Middle East, perceived the Islamic Revolution as its biggest threat. In response, the U.S. formulated strategies to destroy the Islamic Republic. These strategies included supporting opposition forces, creating political turmoil, eliminating and assassinating religious thinkers and Khomeini's followers, who are the main pillars of the Islamic revolution were considered and creating opposing political methods, supporting Savakis, creating chaos in the provinces. then attacking the city of Tabas, imposing economic sanctions, launching a propaganda war, spreading rumors against the revolutionary government, designing coup attempts, and waging an eight-year imposed war, all aimed at weakening and overthrowing the Islamic government in

Iran. During this period, various political groups in Iran became the most effective tools for the United States, seizing the opportunity to advance their own agendas. These groups went to extremes in their activities, positioning themselves as the rightful heirs of the Islamic Revolution. By adopting various policies, including publishing magazines, issuing statements, distributing posters, and creating different newspapers, they sought to undermine the achievements of the Islamic Revolution. These groups also established operational headquarters and teams in universities, schools, streets, and squares, aiming to attract the youth and create a crisis in the country. They advocated for three main changes in the course of the Islamic Revolution: 1- Change in the Composition of the Revolutionary Council. 2- Arming their Groups. 3-Disbanding the Army. The primary groups involved included the Muslim People's Party in East Azerbaijan, province, the Democratic Party in Kurdistan, the Arab People's Party in Khuzestan, and similar organizations in Baluchistan and Turkmen Sahra. In the summer of 1979, coinciding with the election of the Assembly of Experts, the Muslim People's Party initiated attacks on official military centers, threatening to boycott the elections and subsequently protesting the election results, leading to ongoing unrest and upheaval.

The Muslim people of East Azerbaijan passionately engaged in the fight, and they decisively dealt with the activities of this group. In this movement, it was later heard that a significant number of supporters of this party in Tabriz were arrested and subsequently executed. Another hostile aspiration was in Kurdistan, where the most prominent and significant political movement leading to regional turmoil was initiated by Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan. This crisis had its roots in Marxist movements dating back to the 1941, and with the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the Democratic Party resumed its political activities. They received support from both internal and external communists. In parallel with the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, other parties and groups were formed in Kurdistan, all advocating for autonomy and then the independence of Kurdistan. It's essential to note that, on the other hand, Western countries (especially the United States) and the Eastern Bloc (former Soviet Union), along with their regional allies like the Ba'ath regime in Iraq, provided financial aid and weapons to fuel these uprisings. Their main objective was to instigate aspirations that would encompass regions from Azerbaijan in northwest Iran to Khuzestan and even central and eastern border areas. Since the majority of the people and religious scholars in Kurdistan, whether Shia or Sunni, were supporters of the

Islamic Revolution and defenders of Iran's territorial integrity, separatist intrigues in the country could not lead anywhere. The turmoil in Turkmen Sahra also began in the April 1979 and continued until the winter of the same year. This chaos started with the abuse of religious and ethnic differences from the poor governance of the Pahlavi regime and its misguided policies in the region, particularly regarding agricultural land ownership, which were perceived negatively by these groups. This turmoil created conditions in the region where Fedaiyan Khalq, a communist organization aligned with the Soviet Union, formed the Turkmen People's Headquarters. They seized land and property in this region without authorization. However, the intelligent response of the local population and the presence of Islamic Revolutionary forces neutralized this aspiration. Concurrently with this upheaval, another group named the Arab People in Khuzestan, with the support of certain Arab countries, especially Iraq, engaged in conflict with Islamic Revolutionary forces. In Sistan and Baluchestan, a group named Baluch People initiated separatist movements. The common aspects of these groups, mostly leftist, Marxist in nature, were their reliance on one or more foreign or international powers, and the exploitation of religious and ethnic differences towards fostering division and discord in Iran. With the

establishment of the interim government, led by Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, the hope of the United States to preserve its interests in the Middle East increased. This government had a liberal policy, and due to the revolutionary atmosphere in the country and the removal of barriers, particularly the iron grip on political activities, especially young Politicians who wanted a revolutionary approach to obstacles, a considerable amount of energy entered the country's political scene. During this period, just one day after the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, several commanders of the army and SAVAK were executed, marking the beginning of the wave of arrests of individuals and officials associated with the former Shah's regime. Three days later, on February 14, 1979, Fedaiyan Khalq militants stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Still, with the intervention of Deputy Prime Minister Ebrahim Yazdi, they were expelled from the embassy with the involvement of the police force. Despite these developments, Engineer Bazargan, in two separate initiatives, signed contracts for the construction of two nuclear power plants in Bushehr. The first contract was with the German company Siemens, and afterwards, he canceled a $9 billion arms purchase contract from the United States. In October 1979, the condition of the deposed Shah of Iran worsened due to cancer and he

passed away on July 27, 1980 in Cairo, Egypt, but the United States asked the temporary government of Iran to remain silent about the Shah's trip to America. However, Engineer Bazargan and Ebrahim Yazdi secretly met with Brzezinski on the sidelines of the United Nations summit to negotiate the Shah's situation and Iran's blocked assets in America. Due to the covert meeting between Engineer Bazargan and Brzezinski, the advisor to the National Security of Carter's administration, who was directly involved in the massacre of the Iranian people during the Shah's era, faced strong objections from political groups and revolutionaries. Moreover, concerns about the interventionist policies of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran led to the seizure of the U.S embassy by a group of angry and revolutionary students on November 4, 1979. U.S embassy staff members were taken hostage by these students, who later became famous as the “Followers of the Imam's Line”. The choice of seizing the U.S. Embassy on the November 4, 1979, was symbolic because it coincided with the anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeini's exile to Turkey in 1964. (Among the political and Imam's Line students involved in the seizure of the U.S. Embassy, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad should be mentioned. who became the President of Iran in year 2005. Some of these political and Imam's Line students joined the ranks of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard

Corps (IRGC), and others took part in the Iran-Iraq War, becoming martyrs. Some notable individuals including Mr. Engineer Dadman, Mr. Engineer Bitaaraf, and Ms. Ebtakar, who served as the head of the Environmental Protection Organization in Mr. Khatami's government. Additionally, Mr. Kamal Tabrizi, a graduate of the Faculty of Arts and Directing, later became active in the field of directing). During the 444 days of detention of employees and diplomats of the U.S. Embassy, tensions escalated, prompting U.S. President Carter to consider all options, from economic sanctions to military intervention. However, all these options ultimately faced failure. In this situation, Engineer Bazargan was compelled to resign from his position. Consequently, Ayatollah Khomeini entrusted the administration of the country to the Revolutionary Council after accepting Bazargan's resignation. Following Bazargan's resignation, in the first term of the presidency in February 1980, Ayatollah Khomeini was hospitalized due to a heart condition. Banisadr's presidency was confirmed in the presence of members of the Revolutionary Council and other officials of the country. After taking the oath of allegiance to the Constitution, Banisadr assumed the role of the representative of the Supreme Leader for the overall command of the armed

forces. This period marked a significant transition in the political leadership of Iran after the Islamic Revolution.

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, with the proposal of Ayatollah Beheshti for organizing national structures and solidarity, the Islamic Republican Party was founded. The members of this party assumed the leadership of some of the vital institutions of the country. From the beginning, they faced opposition and enmity from anti-revolutionary forces. Bani Sadr founded the newspaper named as "Enqelab-e Eslami" in the same year, gathering a group around himself and openly expressing animosity towards the Islamic Republican Party. Later, this opposition entered a new phase because parliamentary elections were held in March 1980. The Islamic Republican Party and forces supporting Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution managed to secure a decisive majority in the seats of the parliament. As a result, power positions were divided between the two groups, leading to overt competition during the process of selecting the Prime Minister and members of the cabinet. The fundamental roots of the disputes were related to the differences between the fundamentalist and revolutionary forces and the liberals. Therefore, the political currents were divided into two main sides. Opposition forces to this

movement included liberal and leftist factions, which gradually began their activities with the support of Bani Sadr, engaging in propaganda, agitation, and disruption in the country. Western media also supported Bani Sadr by creating a poisonous advertising atmosphere. During this time, Bani Sadr and his supporters initiated extensive propaganda campaigns to manipulate public opinion and influence the parliament. However, due to the steadfastness of the parliament members, Bani Sadr was ultimately forced to introduce Mohammad Ali Rajai, who was also trusted by the parliament, and with the decisive vote of the representatives, Mohammad Ali Rajai became the prime minister. In this crisis-ridden period, most of universities became hotbeds of political debates and conflicts, as political and revolutionary student groups had turned classrooms in universities and even high schools into their group offices. Additionally, they maintained weapons, equipment, and military gear in classrooms. For this reason, in May 1980, the Revolutionary Council, at the suggestion of Muslim students, declared the closure of universities. On September 22, 1980, a more severe crisis than internal disputes emerged: the Imposed War (Iran-Iraq War) began with Iraq's invasion of Iran. While people were engaged in their normal lives, Iraqi military aircraft suddenly appeared in the sky over several Iranian cities,

including Tehran. They began bombing areas of cities, especially the airports of provincial capitals. Thus, the official commencement of the Iraq-Iran War was declared. Shortly afterward, Iraqi ground forces also launched a comprehensive military attack on the western and southern borders of Iran. This occurred at a time when, due to internal differences following the Islamic Revolution, the people and officials of Iran were not adequately prepared to confront the Iraqi invasion. Saddam Hussein's Iraqi army, after crossing international borders and penetrating Iranian territory, advanced up to 60 kilometers deep, attacking cities and villages in the southern and western regions of Iran without any defense. This demonstrated that Saddam's main objective was not resolving border disputes but rather, he had been assigned a mission by all of Iran's enemies to bring down the Islamic Revolution. From the outset, the attack included artillery, missiles, and aircraft targeting cities and defenseless villages, leading to numerous human tragedies, all while the international community largely remained silent. Nevertheless, Ayatollah Khomeini, through issuing a declaration, clarified the duty of "Sacred Defense" (Defa'-e Moqaddas) and called upon everyone to stand against the invaders. Despite the occurrence of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the weakening of the army and armed

forces, and the internal crises, the Iraqi Ba'athist regime believed that the circumstances were favorable for invading Iran. Due to the Islamic Revolution and the country's lack of readiness to face external war, the Ba'athist leaders thought that through a comprehensive attack on Iran, they could achieve their predetermined objectives in the shortest possible time. As internal differences in the country reached a point where the possibility of further reforms was no longer viable, Ayatollah Khomeini, on the June 9, 1981, removed Bani Sadr from the leadership of the armed forces through a decree. Also, due to Bani Sadr's mismanagement and a lack of a sense of responsibility in the critical and dangerous conditions of the country, the majority of the parliament voted to declare Bani Sadr incompetent. Bani Sadr fled the country shortly afterward, escaping abroad via air travel. During this period, the targeted assassinations of top figures in the country began, and these physical assassinations occurred in two stages. In the first stage, in late April, 1979, General Qarani, the first chief of the Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic's army, was martyred. Later, on May 2 of the same year, Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari, the head of the Islamic Revolution Council, was also martyred. Motahhari was one of the intellectual and cultural architects of the Islamic Revolution. Shortly afterward, Ayatollah Qazi

Tabatabai was martyred in Tabriz, and in late November 1979, Dr. Mohammad Mofatteh, a professor of theology at the University of Tehran and another prominent revolutionary religious scholar, was also martyred. These assassinations were carried out by the Forqan group, and with the arrest of the key members of this group in late December 1979, this phase of assassinations came to an end. The second phase of assassinations, with broader dimensions, took place, and many of these targeted killings were carried out by the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO). Within a short period, several of the most prominent national figures were martyred, and after the removal of Bani Sadr from the presidency, this phase began. (It's worth noting that members of the MKO were stationed in a military base called Ashraf in Iraq and received financial support, equipment, and military weapons from Saddam Hussein's government, the former president of Iraq.) Their first major operation in the second phase occurred on June 26, 1981, targeting Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei, who was severely injured. The day after, on June 27, 1981, due to a bomb explosion at the office of the Islamic Republic Party, more than seventy Parliament representatives, ministers, and government officials of the Islamic Revolution who had played an influential role in drafting the constitution and guiding the revolution were

martyred. During this period, Dr. Mohammad Beheshti, the head of the Supreme Judicial Council, was at the forefront. This act alone could have led to the downfall of the Islamic Republic system, but the leadership and the prominent role of the revolutionary people were the two main factors that preserved the system in the vortex of this horrific event. Subsequently, after each assassination, another one took place. Despite these terrorist acts, the people and government officials continued to be present on the scene with patience, resilience, and courage. Following a bombing at the location of the government's meetings on August 29, 1981, Mr. Mohammad Ali Rajaei, the President, and Dr. Mohammad Javad Bahonar, the Prime Minister at that time, were martyred. During this time, Bani Sadr, who was residing outside the country, asked the personnel of the Iranian army to join fugitive officers abroad. The successive assassinations by the hypocritical group not only targeted high-ranking personalities in the country but also, within a month, they attacked and targeted 370 men, women, and even children. The terrorists of the hypocritical group even carried out bomb explosions and assassinations in mosques, religious centers, and Friday prayer congregations. One of these bombings occurred at the shrine of Imam Reza (AS) in Mashhad, where a considerable number of pilgrims lost their lives. In these

assassinations, notable figures such as Ayatollah Dastgheib in Shiraz, Ayatollah Madani in Tabriz, Ayatollah Sadooqi in Yazd, Ayatollah Ashrafi Isfahani in Kermanshah, and Hojatoleslam Hashemi Nejad in Mashhad were among the martyrs. These actions by the hypocrites and military invasions took place when the Iraqi army had launched a military offensive in the southern regions of Iran, invading cities in the southern part of Khuzestan province. They had occupied cities like Abadan and Khorramshahr, conducting continuous attacks, causing massacres of innocent people, and leaving others displaced from their cities.

In summary, the enemies of the Islamic Revolution, with the support of the United States, pursued the following goals through such assassinations to overthrow the Islamic Revolution:

1. Strengthening and encouraging anti-revolutionary groups to create political and social turmoil.

2. Creating provincial disturbances in the form of ethnic movements.

3. Generating discord within the key pillars of the system.

4. Assassinating prominent figures of the revolution.

5. Creating propaganda and psychological warfare, fostering internal and mental conflicts, and instilling fear among the people.

6. Preparing the ground for a military attack by the United States on Iran.

During this period, after the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, American leaders decided to carry out retaliatory operations under the pretext of rescuing hostages. This operation, involving 90 American commandos, eight naval helicopters, and six aircraft, was meticulously planned in the United States months in advance and executed after extensive testing. During the execution of these operations, the weather conditions predicted by the U.S. meteorology in the Iranian desert were moonlit. The attackers entered Iranian airspace and landed in the Tabas desert in the darkness of the night. According to the plan, helicopters and planes were supposed to refuel for the next phase of the operation. However, one of the helicopters experienced a technical failure, and the American team leader decided to report the situation to the White House. Unfortunately, before they could do so, a sandstorm began, bewildering them. Due to a collision between an aircraft and a helicopter, both were destroyed, and eight of the invaders perished in the ensuing fire. The rest of them immediately left the

area. Until Khorramshahr city was liberated from the occupation of the Iraqi army by the People's Mobilization Forces on May 24, 1982.Throughout the eight-year Iran-Iraq War, in addition to the army, air force, and navy, the Revolutionary Guard forces and Basij played a significant role in the Holy Defense. During this period, many female Basij members actively participated in mosques, collecting supplies, and serving in field hospitals behind the war front, additionally all government offices, Basij forces, and even students in schools and universities across all provinces contributed to the defense of the homeland during this imposed war. They provided services in various ways. Furthermore, bazaars and merchants daily supplied significant amounts of essential goods to meet the needs of the combatants. Some people, institutions, and factories also contributed financial assistance directly to the collection centers. In the years following 1982, after the liberation of Abadan and Khorramshahr, the war continued on the land, sea, and air borders. Periodically, fighters and military personnel from both sides were taken as prisoners of war and transferred to prisoner of war camps. The erosion war persisted until year 1988.

One of the significant military operations during the 1980s in Iran, and one of the most obvious war

operations against Iraq was the renowned operation known as Karbala-3, which took place on the September 2, 1986 against Iraq. The idea for conducting military operations during this period was proposed by the commanders of the Ground Forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Following the unsuccessful preliminary military operation called Valfajr, designed to defend against Iraq's aggression in the Persian Gulf. This caused the army and brigade commanders to train their units for sea operations. For this purpose, carrying out military operations, planning an attack on Iraq's Al- Amiyah Wharf, In the Persian Gulf, the approval and implementation of this mission was entrusted to the naval forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. One of the experienced units of the IRGC from the 14th division of Imam Hossein (AS) army was assigned to carry out this operation. The operation commenced at 1:30 AM on Tuesday, September 2, 1986, under the sacred code. The primary objectives of the operation were the occupation and destruction of the two Iraqi oil terminals, Al-'Amiyah and Al-Bakr. In addition to these main objectives, other goals included gaining control of Iraq's platforms before the war and completing the Valfajr-8 operation by disabling the enemy's most vital naval base, and shortening the enemy's reach from the northern Persian

Gulf and creating a secure and safe maritime environment for shipping, as well as demonstrating the powerful presence of the IRGC naval forces in the Persian Gulf, were also among the aims. These two Iraqi oil terminals were major export points for Iraq's oil. Large ships would dock next to these terminals for loading, and due to their geographical location, nearly one-third of Iraq's oil exports were shipped from these facilities. It is worth noting that during the imposed war, Iran faced severe restrictions on its oil production, significantly reducing the possibility of oil exports. The political significance of Karbala-3 Operation was that the occupation of these two terminals aimed to establish control over the northern Persian Gulf, and also the operation coincided with the convening of the Summit of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) leaders in Harare, Zimbabwe. Therefore, before categorizing this operation as a military one, it should be acknowledged as both a political and military endeavor. During this time, Saddam Hussein, the president of Iraq, at that time became increasingly concerned as he confronted the resilient resistance of the Iranian people and the victories of Iran on the war fronts. In response, he committed new atrocities, targeting defenseless Iranian cities with missile attacks. This missile assault on Iranian cities aimed to break the spirit of resistance among the

Iranian people and marked a new phase in Saddam Hussein's ruthless tactics. The first impact of an enemy missile on Tehran was on February 28, 1988, marked the beginning of a new phase in Saddam Hussein's attacks on defenseless people and non-military areas in Iran. In reports, it is mentioned that during these attacks, the city of Dezful in Khuzestan Province was struck by more than 200 giant missiles from Iraq. In addition to missile attacks, Dezful city experienced over 500 bombardments by enemy aircraft, rockets, and artillery. Despite these assaults, the people of Dezful courageously stood against Iraq's aggression. Furthermore, in the border provinces of Ilam, Kermanshah, Kurdistan, East Azerbaijan, and West Azerbaijan, people also faced missile attacks and aerial bombardments during the eight years of the Iran-Iraq War. Throughout the defense era, the people of these provinces, with bravery and sacrifice, protected their homeland. Moreover, during the psychological warfare, the Ba'athist regime in Iraq falsely claimed the use of chemical weapons in major Iranian cities, attempting to diminish Iran's central defense capabilities and the power of the Islamic Republic. Iraq deployed long-range missiles to destroy many Iranian cities during the cities' war, and they also used chemical gases on the war fronts. At this time, the United States openly supported Saddam Hussein's forces, dispatching and

stationing naval fleets in the Persian Gulf. One of the reckless actions of the U.S. government was targeting an Iranian passenger plane in July 1988. In the political and international arena, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran gradually exposed the aggressiveness of the ruling government in Iraq to the world. In July 1988, Iran, for the first time after seven years of the imposed war, made two demands in a resolution named 598 of the United Nations: "Withdrawal to international borders after the ceasefire and identifying the aggressor in the war." This resolution received attention from the United Nations, and as a result, Iran accepted it. Negotiations between Iran and Iraq began at the foreign ministers' level, and it took about two years. Ultimately, due to the resilience of the Iranian negotiating team in defending Iran's rights in the Arvand Rud (Shatt al-Arab) and emphasizing the implementation of the 1975 border agreement, the negotiations concluded with Iran's victory. At that time, the President of Iraq, by sending a letter to the President of Iran, affirmed the validity of the 1975 Algiers's Agreement and the TALOQ Line in the Arvand Rud (Shatt al-Arab) River as the maritime border between the two countries. Then, from August 1988, the exchange of prisoners of war between both countries began in accordance with the provisions of UN Security Council

Resolution 598. This process took about two to three years. needs to know that, In the same year (1988), the U.S. Navy, stationed in the Persian Gulf to safeguard the region, which was engaged in the military protection mission of the region suddenly, under the orders of the U.S. Navy Commander, fired a missile at an Iranian passenger plane departing from Bandar Abbas to Dubai. The Iranian airliner, belonging to Iran Air, was destroyed, crashing into the Persian Gulf along with all crew and passengers, resulting in their deaths. During this time, the people of Iran, once again, condemned this military action with marches and powerful slogans, denouncing the inhumane actions of the United States, especially during Ronald Reagan's presidency. In this period, the U.S. officially came to the aid of Saddam Hussein's forces, dispatching and deploying a naval fleet to the Persian Gulf. One of the notorious and tragic events during this time was the downing of the Iranian passenger plane. Simultaneously, the Iraqi Ba'athist regime, in its psychological warfare, alleged the use of chemical weapons in Iran, in major cities, attempting to diminish the defensive capabilities and power of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Meanwhile, the U.S. openly supported Saddam Hussein's forces and, in July 1988, claiming that it was a mistake. It's worth noting that, during this time, the great leader and founder of the

Islamic Republic of Iran, Imam Khomeini, passed away on the June 3, 1989. Imam Khomeini's departure marked the beginning of a new era for the Islamic Republic, and millions of mourners gathered in deep sorrow. Immediately after the ascension of the founder of the Islamic Republic, the Assembly of Experts convened, and by unanimous vote, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei was selected as the Supreme Leader due to his specific qualities outlined in Article 109 of the Constitution, including political, social, cultural insight, wisdom, courage, and managerial abilities necessary for guiding the Islamic nation. Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, in his first message, declared that he would meticulously follow the path and goals of Imam Khomeini, and in order, the people of Iran, who had formed the Islamic Republic and wholeheartedly protected it, after the passing of Imam Khomeini, reaffirmed their allegiance through pledging allegiance to Ayatollah Khamenei for the continuity and preservation of the revolution."

The situation during the imposed war

After the dismantling of opposition parties and disruptive groups in year 1983, and with the escape of these subversive groups from the country, presidential elections were held again in 1984. Ayatollah Seyyed Ali

Khamenei assumed the presidency, and Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani became the Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis). Meanwhile, the imposed war between Iran and Iraq continued vigorously on the western and southern fronts, the country faced significant economic challenges, experiencing a recession in industrial production and food supplies. Most privately-owned industrial factories were confiscated by the Revolutionary Council due to the emigration of their owners abroad, and the majority of managers in private companies were selected from government officials. During this time, the production levels and products were limited. Only essential industries, such as cement production for use in the war fronts, and a limited number of power plants and refineries to meet the country's electricity and fuel needs, were operational. From the late 1984 to the mid-1989, power shortages and interruptions were a common issue in the country. Moreover, a considerable number of capitalists, wealthy individuals, and owners of large industries, especially those with non-religious beliefs, had emigrated or were in the process of emigrating from Iran. Many of them left due to the war conditions and the unstable economic situation, which hindered their economic activities. Additionally, since the early 1980s and during the imposed war, numerous singers and

musicians from the country migrated to European countries or the United States because, according to the laws of the Islamic Revolutionary Council, engaging in such artistic activities was prohibited. Most of the years in the 1980s were tense for Iran politically, economically, and culturally, marked by ongoing tension and occasional city bombings. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that, due to the war and the challenging economic circumstances, many artists and musicians found no opportunity for their artistic activities within Iran. The economic situation was dire, and there was a lack of any economic activity in the private sector, including the import and export of goods. Only the Ministry of Commerce and the Agricultural Jihad Organization had the authorization for importing essential food items and distributing them through government distribution centers. This situation persisted for several years during the 1980s.

Year1984, on the left is Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, the head of the government, and on the

Right is Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, the head of the Islamic Council.

Chapter 5

Domestic and foreign policies after the end of the imposed war

The economic dimensions of Iran before the revolution were predominantly reliant on the export of a single product, crude oil. This approach, based on selling oil and following Western development criteria without considering the historical, cultural, and social aspects of the country, remained steadfast. Consequently, the country's capital was mainly allocated to non-foundational and non-productive programs, instead of infrastructure and construction activities, as well as neglecting non-oil production and exports. Despite numerous economic challenges inherited from the pre-revolution era, as well as significant economic issues

arising from the imposed war, economic sanctions, and disruptions, the Islamic Revolution managed to increase the production of essential goods domestically and even export some of them. It's essential to explore the scientific and technological dimensions of modern technical advancements. Another effective effort during the post-revolution era was the continuous development of heavy industries and foundational initiatives in this field. There was progressive development in defense industries, oil, petrochemicals, iron melting, steel production, electricity generation, as well as the construction of large dams and the expansion or reconstruction of the country's roads. These endeavors played a crucial role in the growth and prosperity of other sectors of the country's economy during this period.

It should not go unnoticed that in the early years of President Hashemi Rafsanjani's presidency, there were shifts in Iran-U.S. relations as part of his overall strategy outlined in 1989. According to this strategy, Mr. Rafsanjani emphasized that Iran's foreign policy is not based on enmity. In practice, foreign investment in Iran increased during this period. However, the relations between Iran and the U.S. remained tense due to events such as the occupation of the U.S. embassy and U.S. financial assistance to the Iraqi regime during Mr.

Hashemi's presidency. Also in the same period when the American attack on Iraq for the liberation of Kuwait, noises were heard from inside Iran to help Saddam Hussein. Even the third-term parliament explicitly spoke about the necessity of supporting Saddam Hussein. However, the overall approach of the government and the leadership of the revolution was different. Iran declared neutrality on this matter, and during that time, Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani's government aimed to improve its trade relations with the West and had lucrative oil contracts with American companies. Until 1994, the U.S. itself became Iran's fifth-largest exporter, and American oil companies became the third-largest importers and primary buyers of Iranian crude oil. However, this dual policy of the U.S., which led to America's significant success as a major exporter to Iran, provoked objections from European leaders. Consequently, these European protests prompted former U.S. President Clinton to officially abandon this policy in the spring of 1995. He adopted an all-encompassing policy of imposing economic and trade sanctions on Iran. It is worth noting that, under President Rafsanjani's administration, efforts were also made to expand sciences and culture and to develop universities in Iran. The establishment of the Islamic Azad University, initially in Tehran and later in all cities, offering a wide range of technical, medical,

and humanities courses at the undergraduate and graduate levels, was one of these efforts. From year1989 to 1997, coinciding with the first and second terms of President Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran was in a state of peace with Iraq. During this period, Iran's political and economic relations were relatively good with most European and Asian countries, except for the governments of the United States and Israel. Starting from August 1990, the exchange of prisoners of war between Iran and Iraq gradually took place, and after the identification of Iranian prisoners by the United Nations Security Council's peace committee, they were released after eight years of imposed war, gradually returning to Iran. At the same time, with the famous contract of 568, the government of Iraq was found guilty of starting the forced war and should pay war compensation to Iran. Additionally, with the well-coordinated efforts of Iran's representative at the United Nations Security Council, extensive actions were taken to condemn Saddam Hussein globally. Eventually, Saddam Hussein, the then President of Iraq, was found and captured by Iraqis after hiding in a cave in his birthplace city of Tikrit. Following his arrest, he was convicted of war crimes by the International Criminal Court in The Hague and sentenced to execution. He was ultimately executed in a public square. But in Iran, despite the destruction of

many cities during the imposed war, particularly in the western and southern regions, including cities like Abadan, Khorramshahr, and Ahvaz, the government began reconstruction efforts in these areas. Over the course of about eight years, significant construction and development activities took place in these cities, as well as in the oil and petrochemical industries, defense industries, cement production, and power plant projects. Collaboration and consultation with both domestic and foreign contractors intensified during this period. Simultaneously, the IRGC forces were actively involved in demining operations in the war-torn areas, especially in regions where Iraqi Ba'athist forces had laid landmines during the imposed war. In mid May1997 Mr. Rafsanjani's presidential term came to an end, and on the May 23, 1997 the seventh presidential elections were held. In these elections, Mr. Mohammad Khatami won the presidency. The results of this election were shocking and decisive, both in terms of power struggle between the ruling factions – one faction managed to defeat its rival convincingly – and in terms of comparing the programs. People endorsed his political, cultural, and economic programs, and therefore, they voted for the advocate of those programs. Some believed that the extensive and unprecedented participation was due to the government's propaganda encouraging people to vote.

However, this could not be the reason because firstly, in all the past elections, whether in the parliamentary elections or in the presidential elections, there were all such advertisements. leading to a doubled voter turnout compared to the previous election. In reality, the creating factor and cause behind this remarkable enthusiasm was the "Yes" vote for a faction that was, in essence, a resounding "No" to the monopolistic faction. The massive voter turnout created a significant gap, nearly three times more votes for Mr.Khatami compared to the total of the three other candidates and a government in such a way that these elections were placed among the historical "referendum" style candidate selections in the country's history. During the first four-year term of the presidency, Mr. Khatami continued the construction, development, and initiation of projects in the oil, gas, and petrochemical industries, as well as gas power plants, combined-cycle power plants, and defense industries. He also continued the implementation of the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant and uranium enrichment without noise. One of the most significant foreign policy initiatives of President Mohammad Khatami was the launch of the Dialogue Among Civilizations, which received more attention from European countries, the United States, the European Union, and other countries worldwide. So that

in the 1997s, the country's football federation, which had begun its activities, achieved a historic victory in the Asian Cup Finals against the Australian national football team during the summer of 1997, and parallel to the taking control of the affairs of the country by Mr. Khatami's government. At that time, people across the country poured into the streets to celebrate this national victory. During the 1997s, due to the growth of imports and exports, the exchange rate of the dollar had reached around 300 tomans in the early 1997s and had risen to about 500 tomans by the late 1997s. Additionally, the tourism and foreign tourism industries began their activities during the 1997s and continued to operate until the late 1997s.With the assumption of office by Mohammad Khatami’s government, economic and political relations entered a new phase. considering that in the year 1996, following the ruling of the Mykonos court, which identified some Iranian officials as criminals in the Mykonos restaurant assassinations, and with most European countries recalling their ambassadors from Iran, economic relations between the European Union, the West, and Iran had entered a new stage, until an article about direct negotiations with the West was prepared by Mohajerani, the parliamentary deputy during the government of Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani, and published in the daily newspaper

Ettela'at." This suggestion created extensive controversy, opposition, and ultimately concluded with the Leader of the Islamic Revolution defending Mohajerani's character, bringing the issue to an end. However, Khatami's "Dialogue Among Civilizations" in the United Nations, which was welcomed by most countries of the world, despite facing opposition, gained widespread international support, to some extent breaking the diplomatic ice between Iran and the United States. On the economic and political front, the government of Mohammad Khatami continued the construction and development in the country. But it didn't take longtime, unfortunately, due to the incident of September 11, 2001, the dialogue of civilizations plan was influenced by the crusading idea of George Bush the president of United States at that time and ideas of the American Republicans. And especially that, US deployed naval forces to the Persian Gulf region. Despite Iran's extensive economic cooperation in Afghanistan, it found itself targeted in the regional hostility axis. The Khatami government quickly condemned the September 11, 2001 events, and with the U.S. military invasion in Afghanistan, Iran distanced itself from regional developments. After the departure of the former Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the American army, with the cooperation of NATO, began to attack Afghanistan under

the pretext of political reasons and occupied the land of Afghanistan. After the election of Mohammad Khatami as the President of Iran in 1997, the then President of the United States, Bill Clinton, considered Khatami's election as a sign of hope. However, he reiterated his previous stance that normalization of relations between Iran and the United States would not occur unless Iran condemned and rejected terrorism, expressed opposition, and refrained from disrupting the Middle East peace process. In year1998, both Mohammad Khatami and Madeleine Albright, the U.S. Secretary of State at the time, expressed hopeful and warm statements regarding relations with the other party. During an interview with CNN in January 1998, Khatami referred to cultural exchanges between Iran and the U.S. to break down the walls of mistrust and emphasized the existing high level of distrust between the two countries. He pointed out that this distrust stemmed from the incorrect behavior of the U.S. government. Despite this, he rejected the necessity of government-to-government dialogue but proposed the "Dialogue Among Civilizations" initiative to identify and understand each other's nations, promoting cultural exchange between Iran and the U.S. In 1998, Bill Clinton sent a confidential letter containing friendly messages through the representative of the Saudi Crown Prince to Mohammad

Khatami. However, this confidential letter was exposed by influential right-wing and conservative groups who were basically, in favor of expanding economic and oil relations with England. Due to their strong opposition to establishing relations with the U.S. and, more importantly, their disagreement with Mohammad Khatami's foreign policies, especially because this right-wing group was vehemently opposed to the U.S., the revelation of the confidential letter led to a wave of opposition and political propaganda against President Khatami's government. Meanwhile, the U.S. Secretary of State, in April 1998, praised the new situation in Iran-U.S. relations in a report to Congress on U.S. foreign policy. in April 1999, the then U.S. President Bill Clinton, announced sometime later to satisfy Iran's demand during a speech in the White House, that Iranians have the right to be angry about what the United States did to their country or culture about 100 to 150 years ago. Following these favorable remarks by Clinton and Madeleine Albright towards Iran, the U.S. government reduced economic sanctions on Iran and granted permission for the sale of essential food, medical supplies, and drugs to Iran. Approximately three months later, the U.S. Department of State, in an effort to ease tensions between Iran and the United States, added the khalgh Mojahedin of Iran (MEK) to the list of designated

foreign terrorist organizations. In early 1999, the spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State officially announced that the U.S. government was ready to establish a consulate in Tehran and facilitate the issuance of visas for Iranians. They expressed a desire for cooperation from the Iranian government in this regard. However, Iran did not respond favorably to any of the U.S. initiatives aimed at breaking down the walls of mistrust. The arrest and trial of several Jews in Shiraz further escalated the political crisis in Iran's relations with the West. In April 2000, Madeleine Albright officially, while sending a New Year's greeting message to Iranians, acknowledged the role of the United States in the coup of August 18, 1953, which led to the overthrow of Prime Minister Dr. Mossadegh, and expressed regret and sorrow about it. She also mentioned the U.S. support for Iraq's invasion of Iran in 1979. A significant and tragic event unfolded, On September 11, 2001, targeting the economic, military, and political heart of the United States in New York and Washington. The Twin Towers of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were attacked, resulting in the loss of about six thousand lives from various nationalities. President George W. Bush, at that time, referred it as the beginning of a new Muslim crusade against Christians. Notably, during this historical period, there was apparent

coordination between the United States and Europe in providing encouragement to Iran to abandon its nuclear enrichment program. one of the significant domestic policies implemented during the leadership of President Mohammad Khatami was the nationwide replacement of old identification documents and the issuance of national identity cards. This initiative, inspired by the programs of European countries, was carried out by the National Registration Administration of the country, continuing with the diplomatic relations and foreign policy of Iran's then-President in the early 2001s, there is a reference to an interview with an American newspaper. In November 2001, Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, in his first interview with an American newspaper, declared that “Osama bin Laden's interpretation of Islam does not align with the majority of Muslims worldwide. He also directly refuted the accusation of the United States regarding Iran's support for terrorism, stating that this accusation is one of the injustices perpetrated by the U.S. against Iran. In March 2002, George Bush, the U.S. President, conveyed his (Iranian) New Year's message to Iranians, congratulating them and appreciating the participation of over a million Iranian-Americans in condemning terrorism and their valuable role in preserving Iran's heritage. However, at the late march of 2002, a

significant shift in Iran's foreign policy towards the West was observed. According to a report published in the Financial Times, leaders of Iran's reformists began movements to approach the United States and initiate negotiations and improve relations with America. The debate on negotiations with the United States intensified, and there was a noticeable movement towards improving and resolving differences between, by issuing a notice, the Tehran Province General Justice declared it a crime to advertise and provide information regarding negotiations with America according to the law of the press and considering the prohibition of negotiations with America by the Supreme Leader, and following the mentioned movements, George Bush, in June of the same year, issued a statement claiming that an unchosen group, the true rulers of Iran, does not listen to the voice of the people. Simultaneously, Dr. Hassan Rouhani, the then-Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, responded to this statement, emphasizing that it should not be thought of as favoring one group (reformists) against another (fundamentalist). Seyyed Mohammad Khatami also reacted, stating that all branches of the government in Iran, from leadership to other government officials, are based on the election and the votes of the people. However, by placing the name of Iran in the axis of regional evils by George Bush, he

heightened the pressure on Iran after the occupation of Iraq, then nuclear sites in Natanz and Arak came under serious scrutiny. Additionally, during this period, the khalgh Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK) published materials regarding Iran's nuclear program, and as a result, the U.S. focused on the nuclear issue, and for this reason, America accused Iran by sending troops to Iran's western and eastern neighbors and by paying the heavy cost of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2002. which Iran is violating its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2002, alleging that Iran was attempting to produce nuclear weapons. Iran, in response, denied these accusations, stating that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was the only legitimate authority to address nuclear issues. In this context, negotiations between Dr. Hassan Rouhani, the then-Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and the foreign ministers of three European countries, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, took place in Tehran. These negotiations led to the United States cautiously expressing consent and satisfaction with the diplomatic process. In Iran, officials and various experts evaluated the signing of the protocol and the voluntary suspension of nuclear activities as a step toward disarmament.

Following the voluntary suspension of Iran's nuclear activities, in November 2006, Mohamed ElBaradei, the then-President of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), approved the suspension based on the resolution passed by the European Union and the United States, which criticized Iran's nuclear program. Shortly after, the U.S. claimed that Iran was constructing new nuclear facilities in the region of Lavizan, and its intervention and influence in the Iranian nuclear dossier were undeniable. During this crucial period, the U.S. asserted its position to influence the Iranian nuclear issue. Many influential figures in U.S. foreign policy declared that the Paris Agreement was not a definitive solution to Western concerns about Iran's nuclear program. In March 2006, George Bush's visit to Europe brought the positions of Europe and the U.S. closer. Threats were made, suggesting that if Iran resumed enrichment, its nuclear case would be referred to the Security Council. As a result, a new round of negotiations in the spring of 2005 showed limited progress, and tensions increased on both sides, particularly before the presidential elections in Iran.

Seyyed Mohammad Khatami

Between the years 2001 and 2005, during the second term of President Mohammad Khatami, Iran experienced relative political stability, following a policy of moderation and the establishment of economic relations with European countries. The economic situation in Iran showed some signs of improvement during this period, with a moderate level of inflation growth. In terms of industrial progress, projects in the oil, petrochemical, and power sectors were underway, including the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant and the installation of uranium enrichment centrifuges for use in the Isfahan nuclear power plant.

However, with the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as the President of ninth government, who belonged to the fundamentalist group and had extreme political and Islamic beliefs, the economic situation in Iran took a downturn.

Political Programs of the 9th and 10th Governments

Ahmadinejad, who had been among the students of the Imami line and had participated in the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in November 1979, and held various governmental positions, including the governor of Ardabil Province and later Tehran's mayor during Khatami's second term of Presidential. Ahmadinejad's presidency was marked by inefficiency, and during his tenure as Tehran's mayor, he did not contribute significantly to urban development. However, when he assumed the presidency, Ahmadinejad embarked on costly provincial tours, focusing more on making empty promises and grandiose statements than addressing development issues. As it was reported during the Presidential election in May 23, 2005, with the distribution of potatoes among the people of all the villages and small towns of Iran, he was able to get more votes in the elections of the same year. After two years of the disorderly administration of the government,

Ahmadinejad's foreign visits were characterized by political speeches against U.S. and Israeli policies, reinforcing his opposition to those countries intensified their political opposition against Iran. of course in April 2001s, the U.S. military had already occupied Iraq, and widespread human rights abuses were being committed by U.S. forces in various Iraqi cities. Another instance of Ahmadinejad's flawed diplomacy was during one of his speeches at Columbia University in the United States, where he had been invited by the university president. In that speech, he practically opposed the policies of the United States, criticizing the political reports and news of that time. He spoke against some of the anti-people policies of the United States, particularly related to the ongoing massacres by U.S. military forces in Iraq. Following this speech, Ahmadinejad faced criticism from the U.S. Congress, leading to the removal of Columbia University's president. Concurrently, with the request of active U.S. senators, the issue of economic sanctions against Iran, which had been on the agenda for years, gained momentum. The European Union also supported these U.S. sanctions against Iran. Consequently, Iran faced challenges in importing raw materials for factories, purchasing and transporting equipment and machinery for ongoing projects in power plants, oil facilities, petrochemical plants, steel production, and other

industries from European and American companies. Most financial transactions between Iranian banks and foreign banks were also severed due to the economic sanctions. It's worth mentioning that in the years 2003 and 2004, due to the repeated visits by the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the uranium enrichment process in Iran had been temporarily suspended, alleviating some of the economic pressure. However Iran was benefited from oil exports to Asian countries such as South Korea, India, Malaysia and some African countries, not only crude oil export faced sanctions, but also Iran's export of petrochemicals and Iranians shipping company traffic were also subjected to severe sanctions by the European Union and the United States.

In late May 2009, Ahmadinejad won the presidential election for a second term, though he allegedly employed deceitful tactics and made vague promises to secure the mandate for his tenth government. During this time, reformist candidates like Engineer Mousavi and Ayatollah Karrubi opposed the election, leading to internal turmoil. Some young individuals and supporters of the reformists took to the streets, protesting the vote counting process. The situation turned chaotic, and clashes ensued with anti-riot forces. This resulted in

casualties, arrests, and the imprisonment of numerous reformist activists and also journalists. during these events, some detainees in Kahrizak detention center reportedly faced abuse and ethical misconduct by certain officials. Notably, there was a case involving the death of an individual named Palizdar in Kahrizak detention center, allegedly orchestrated under the orders of the then Attorney General Saeed Mortazavi. Despite complaints from Palizdar's family, the case remained unresolved in Tehran's courts. Subsequently, Mortazavi was removed from his previous position and appointed as the head of the Social Security Organization by the president. Throughout the year 2009 unrest situation, even prominent figures like Engineer Mousavi and Ayatollah Karrubi, both reformists, faced house arrest and were denied permission for political activities. The tenth government, led by Ahmadinejad, was accused of disseminating false information through state media, presenting distorted social and economic statistics to the Iranian people.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

Chapter 6

Rotation of power in the country's election seat

The tenth round of elections for the Islamic Consultative Assembly, along with the fifth round of elections for the Assembly of Experts, took place on the 26th of February 2016. Various political groups and factions prepared themselves for another round of competition, with evidence indicating that reformists and fundamentalists were the main players in this competition, as has been the case in previous elections. Nevertheless, throughout the history of parliamentary elections, alongside the main political factions, other tendencies also played a significant role in determining the final outcome, contributing to the victory of one of

the two main political wings of the country. in the tenth parliamentary elections, also, the movements that were known as moderate supporters had such a situation. The moderates, were determined to break the monopoly of competition between the two main factions in this round. During this period, an extensive coalition of reformists and supporters of the government secured victory for 30 candidates from Tehran in the elections. Similar reformist candidates also won majorities in other provinces and cities, reaching the tenth parliament. It is worth noting that in the elections for the ninth and tenth parliaments, extremist fundamentalists groups, who were supporters of Ahmadinejad's government, had mostly won the majority of votes in Tehran and other cities (considering that 70% of the population did not participate in the elections for the ninth and tenth parliaments in Tehran and other centers). Regarding the method of determining the qualification of some election candidates, there are unsaid things that the spokesman of the Guardian Council stated in August 2016.

Unsaid words of the Guardian Council spokesman from the elections of 2009 and 2013:

The spokesperson for the Guardian Council has brought up new perspectives in an interview with the "News Reporters Club." He has discussed recent

developments, from disqualifying candidates in the 2013 elections to expressing opinions about the state of election laws. In the interview, it is mentioned that, in the elections of 2013, the Guardian Council had twice asked Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani to withdraw from the elections by Hassan Rouhani and Ali Larijani. Because the decision of this council to reject the authority of the Chairman of the Expediency Assessment Council was final. The spokesperson emphasizes that no pressure could force the Guardian Council to reconsider its decision on disqualifying of Rahim Mashaei. He also attributes the decision to the lack of political eligibility in Mashaei. In another part of his statements, the spokesperson addresses the issue of election laws and the necessity of reforming them. He stresses that certain aspects, such as the qualification process for candidates, need to be amended. Additionally, he considers the buying and selling of votes in elections as an occasional and straightforward occurrence. Earlier, Ayatollah Jannati had also referred to this matter, and following these statements, the spokesperson's remarks could signal serious consideration for amending election laws.

The occurrence of vote buying is simple-

The spokesperson for the Guardian Council, stating that "the election law has some inherent flaws" and "needs surgical intervention," emphasized the need for reform, saying, "When we see that the law is not effective or neglected, we must amend it." He added, " The history that we are facing regarding the election law is not much better than our other laws and perhaps most of the problems have come to my attention in the past election period. " From one perspective, candidates feel their rights have been violated, and from another, monitoring or executive bodies cannot enforce laws effectively, which is not good for our electoral system. Kadkhodai identified issues such as "methods of qualifying candidates," "candidates' advertising," "vote buying and selling," and "problems with the party law" as main problems that need reassessment and reform in the election law. He mentioned that solutions, such as voter registration, could be implemented to prevent vote buying and selling. He also stressed, "I can say that unfortunately, vote buying and selling, like other electoral violations, exists in our country, and vote buying and selling, like other electoral violations, easily occurs and is widespread in our country." The speaker's criticism of the qualification method-The spokesperson for the Guardian Council addressed the issue of the qualification verification process, stating, "In Articles 28 and 29 of the Election Law, the obligation to adhere

to Islam and the Islamic system is mentioned. It must be clarified where the boundaries of adherence to Islam lie and what specific cases it includes. The reality is that the criteria available to the Guardian Council for qualification verification are not complete and effective."Kadkhodai also discussed the possibility of holding electronic elections to prevent some of the issues that have arisen in the election process, stating, "Electronic elections can help to prevent vote buying and selling, but according to our current facilities, can electronic elections be held on a large scale or not? This is a question that must be answered correctly and explicitly." Candidates who protested in year 2009, were barely qualified –

Abbasali Kadkhodai mentioned the year 2009, elections, stating, "The protesting candidates of these elections had a 'hard time' getting their qualifications confirmed, and 'of course, there were serious opponents in the Guardian Council as well.' There were serious discussions in the Guardian Council about the qualifications of some candidates, but ultimately, their qualifications for participation in the elections were approved." Regarding the possibility of the Guardian Council filing complaints against protesting candidates in the year 2009, Kadkhodai stated, "Our usual approach in the Guardian Council has not been to file complaints. We may issue warnings, but so far, we haven't

complained about any media or individual. However, it can be raised as a legal matter, and our effort has been to maintain good relations with all groups. Meanwhile, in places where election violations occur, we act according to the law."

The Guardian Council's message to Hashemi Rafsanjani in year 2013

In another part of this interview, this member, a jurist of the Guardian Council, raised new points about the year 2013 elections and the non-confirmation of the qualifications of Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani and Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei. Regarding the review of the qualifications of the head of the Expediency Council, he said, "At present, a specific reason cannot be cited for the rejection of his qualifications," and added, "Each of the members voted to disqualify him for some reason, and the number of votes Ayatollah Hashemi had, was not sufficient." Kadkhodai further added, "What I can say without mentioning names is that various individuals believed that perhaps it would be in the interest to confirm Ayatollah Hashemi's qualifications, but the members of the Guardian Council believed that Ayatollah Hashemi had not obtained the necessary votes. Therefore, we announce the result of the votes obtained." He explained, "Usually, when the Guardian Council feels

that there are not sufficient reasons and votes for a person's qualification in the elections for the parliament or the Assembly of Experts, it requests the person to withdraw to maintain their respect. If the person is willing to withdraw, the Council no longer pursues their case." On one hand, this matter is not only related to Ayatollah Hashemi. unfortunately or fortunately, at that time, the Guardian Council entrusted me with the mission, and I was responsible for communicating with the candidates. During that time, some withdrew, while others did not accept, and the election process continued until the end. Regarding Ayatollah Hashemi, we requested his withdrawal twice, but when the response was negative, the Council decided to announce its opinion. Kadkhodai continued to mention that Hojjat al-Islam Hassan Rouhani and Ali Larijani served as intermediaries for the Council in announcing the request for Ayatollah Hashemi's withdrawal. The jurist member of the Guardian Council also explained the review of the qualifications of Rahim Mashaei: "A set of reports indicated his violations, all of which are documented in his file at the Guardian Council. Ultimately, these issues led to the rejection of his qualifications." Regarding pressure from the then-president for confirming Mashaei's qualifications, he stated that there was no contact either with the Guardian Council or with him

personally during that period. He emphasized that even if there had been any contact, it would not have affected the process of rejecting qualifications. If there had been pressure from the president or any other individual on the Guardian Council regarding Mr. Mashaei, it would not have been effective. In the meantime, Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani passed away on January 8, 2017, due to a heart attack.

The diagram below shows the life stages and political activities of Ayatollah



Hashemi Rafsanjani

A look at, a part of the record of the first period of the Rouhani government (the 11th government)

1. Ending the shadow of war, sanctions, and isolation from the country.

2. Recognition of Iran's nuclear program, withdrawal from the Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, and the nullification of six Security Council resolutions without military engagement, closing the PMD (Possible Military Dimensions) file at the agency.

3. Lifting sanctions on oil, transportation, automotive, insurance, shipping, and banking.

4. Elimination of Iranophobia, a 50% growth in the entry of foreign tourists, and Iran being selected as one of the top tourist destinations in reputable foreign publications.

5. Improvement by 27 steps in the Business Environment Index according to the World Bank report.

6. Improvement by 14 steps in the Financial and Administrative Corruption Index in the report of Transparency International, with measures such as engaging with the FATF working group, combating money laundering, and reforming the banking system.

7. Reduction of inflation from 40% to 8% and an increase in economic growth from negative 7% to

positive 5% according to official domestic and international statistics (Central Bank, Statistical Center, International Monetary Fund, World Bank).

8. Achieving a positive trade balance and surpassing non-oil exports over imports according to official customs statistics for the first time in the last 80 years.

9. 20% growth in exports in the first year of the government.

10. Reduction of bank interest rates, stability in the foreign exchange market, and control of liquidity growth.

11. Decrease in the volume of commodity smuggling from $25 billion to $15 billion.

12. Attraction of over $12 billion in foreign investment following the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action).

13. Allocation of more than 7 million packages of goods to low-income groups.

14. Implementation of the Health reform plan and universal health insurance.

15. Improvement of 9 levels in the global environmental ranking.

16. Initiating the revival of lakes and wetlands such as Urmia, Hamoun, Bakhtegan, and Hoor-al-Azim.

17. Revocation of the previous government's decision to sell Pardisan Park.

18. More than doubling the number of clean and healthy days in metropolises with actions such as eliminating Petrochemical carcinogenic gasoline.

19. Desert reclamation operations on an area of 59,000 hectares and afforestation operations on an area of 90,000 hectares.

20. Approval of plans to combat violence, extremism, dust storms, etc., with Iran's initiative at the United Nations General Assembly.

21. Revival of the Planning and Budget Organization, revival of the Administrative and Recruitment Organization, revival of the Supreme Environmental Council, and the establishment of the National Environmental Fund.

22. A 60% increase in petrochemical exports and a 60% growth in automobile production.

23. Doubling of oil exports and regaining Iran's share in OPEC.

24. Adding 300 million cubic meters per day to the gas production capacity and petrochemical products in the joint gas field with Qatar.

25. Initiating of the renovation of the worn-out air and rail fleet after decades of sanctions and completing the Mehr Housing Project.

26. Gas and water supply to rural, deprived, and border areas, including Sistan and Baluchestan Province.

27. Development of ports and attracting investment in deprived areas, including the development of Chabahar port.

28. Doubling wheat production and achieving self-sufficiency in its production after 12 years.

29. Achieving 90% self-sufficiency in providing food and self-sufficiency in gasoline and diesel production.

30. Resistance against pressures for filtering social networks and messaging apps (Telegram, Instagram, WhatsApp, etc.).

31. Increase in bandwidth, launch of 3G and 4G internet, a 20 million increase in mobile internet users, and a 30 million increase in high-speed internet users.

32. Doubling the military budget of the country.

33. Reopening of cinemas and approximately a fivefold increase in cinema sales.

34. Establishment of party houses, reopening of political, civil, and student organizations.

35. Facilitation of licensing for the media and the signing of the Charter of Citizens' Rights.

36. Appointment of ambassadors and governors from among women and Sunni Muslims for the first time after the revolution.

37. Teaching Kurdish and Turkish languages at universities and schools as an academic major for the first time in the country's higher education history.

38. Acknowledgment of apologies by the President and ministers to the people for shortcomings and deficiencies, resignation or dismissal of officials without red lines in the matter of unconventional rights, and the President's gratitude to whistleblowing media.

39. Return of all 23 billion tomans of unconventional salaries to the treasury (with the approval of the Supreme Audit Court and the Attorney General of the country).

The Election of the Speaker of the Parliament in 2017

In April 2017, the presidium elections were held for the Speaker of the Parliament and its successors, resulting in the selection of Ali Larijani as the Speaker of the Parliament with 268 Votes of the Omid faction, as well as Provincial representatives and independent members. He received 204 positive votes and the efforts

of the Stability Group were unsuccessful. Ali Motahari and Masoud Pezeshkian were re-elected as parliament deputies. The details of the votes for the Speaker and the two Vice Speakers of the Parliament are as follows: As the vote counting continued, Masoud Pezeshkian obtained 179 votes, and Ali Motahari received 163 votes. Accordingly, Pezeshkian became the First Vice Speaker, and Motahari became the Second Vice Speaker of the Parliament.

The significant victory of the Omid faction in the year 2017, Parliament presiding board elections: which among the 253 votes cast in these elections, Haji Babaie and Ghavami, with 107 and 67 votes respectively, relinquished the competition to the Omid faction candidates. The margin of their votes indicates a significant defeat for the Provincial and Independent faction against the Omid faction.

The Presidential Election of the Second Term of the Rouhani Government (The Twelfth Government)

Six candidates were identified for the 12th presidential election scheduled for May 19, 2017. The country's election headquarters announced the names of candidates who had been approved by the Guardian

Council for the 12th presidential election. The candidates are as follows:

1. Hassan Rouhani.
2. Seyyed Ebrahim Raeisi Sadati.
3. Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.
4. Eshaq Jahangiri Koshayi.
5. Seyyed Mostafa Agha Mirsalim.
6. Seyyed Mostafa Hashemi Taba.

A comment from a sociology expert on the concerns of the fundamentalist team of Ghalibaf /Raeisi about the presidential debates is outlined as follows:

Reasons for Mohammad Reza Jalaipour's concern about Rouhani's debates:

1. Weakness in expression and Raeisi's debating skills.

2. Rouhani's skill in live debates and effective ironies against Ghalibaf.

3. Jahangiri's command of statistical details and the complementary role which he played for Rouhani.

4. The role of debates in shaping the electoral movement and increasing participation, which benefited Rouhani.

5. Fear of the exposure of credible documents on live television.

6. Prevention of Rouhani's voice reaching to urban fringe dwellers and low-income groups.

Finally, in the twelfth presidential election on the May 19, 2017, Dr. Hassan Rouhani won with approximately 24 million people's votes and 57% of the total votes. The following charts illustrate this victory statistically. It's worth mentioning that, before the last legal day of presidential campaign advertising, Jahangiri's withdrawal favored Rouhani, while Ghalibaf's withdrawal favored Raeisi.

In the final announcement by the Guardian Council, the results of the presidential election were as follows:

- Total votes cast: 41,220,131
- Hassan Rouhani: 23,549,616 votes (57%)
- Ebrahim Raeisi: 15,786,449 votes (38.5%)
- Mostafa Mirsalim: 478,215 votes
- Mostafa Hashemi Taba: 215,450 votes

As a result, Hassan Rouhani secured victory with 57% of the votes, becoming the president for the twelfth term.

In the twelfth presidential election, the highest voter turnout among provinces was in Yazd, with over 93%, followed by Mazandaran with 91% participation. The lowest turnout was recorded in South Khorasan and Qom.

Dr. Hassan Rouhani

Margins of the twelfth presidential election

1- Despite the claims made by Ebrahim Raeisi and some of his close associates regarding the election results, the Guardian Council confirmed the accuracy of the elections.

2- Raeisi's recent accusations were not limited to today and yesterday. During the electoral competition, he had already raised many of these issues.

3- After accusing the government of using public facilities in the elections, Raeisi had stated, "I have not used the right of guardianship of Astan Quds Razavi so far, and I will not use it until the end of my life."

4- This was while on March 28, 2017, and in the midst of his candidacy as a fundamentalist figure, he distributed hundreds of tons of "blessed flour" among the deprived people of Khuzestan. This was just one case of the violations that had been reported in the media.

What did the election candidates do with themselves and their factions?

Ahmed Gholami, the chief editor, stated: Regardless of the election results, the Reformists, especially Hassan Rouhani, emerged victorious in this arena, where Raeisi and the fundamentalist suffered defeat. Their defeat,

apart from the vote count, it was the result of their conversation. The fundamentalist, instead of adhering to their principles, resorted to any means to achieve victory. It's not gratifying for a movement that could always engage in debate and political antagonism to be devoid of meaning in this way. The fundamentalist's defeat was influenced by Ghalibaf's positions in the debates. His harshness and slanderous rhetoric, flavored with baseless accusations, backfired. A man who had no defensible record resorted to relying on his position to the extent that even his few supporters were cautious about how this debate would end. Ghalibaf's actions left his supporters disillusioned, and it's unlikely that anyone will take him seriously anymore. Mustafa Mirsalim is the other side of the Ghalibaf coin. A man who single-handedly managed to disappoint people from the spectrum of Mutalfa, which is a historical faction. He had a misguided understanding of his position. If Mirsalim has forgotten his unsuccessful term in the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, intellectuals and elites in society will never forget that bitter period. The debates and speeches by Hassan Rouhani during the recent election campaign created a different image of him; an image that the people could believe in and rely on. This achievement is not insignificant. Thus, Hassan Rouhani was already the winner of this arena before the vote

count. The Reformists and the people now have another face alongside them who can pursue their demands through him. The twelfth presidential election has opened a bright horizon for Iran's national and internation In this period also On May 21, 2017, the Tehran City Council elections were held. In a press conference, Eisa Farhadi, the Tehran Governor, announced the preliminary results based on the counting of votes from 2523 out of a total of 3957 ballot boxes in Tehran. According to Farhadi's announcement, 21 members from the Omid-e Tehran (Hope of Tehran) list secured positions in the Tehran City Council.

Under the skin of criticism of the president.

No one thought that less than 10 days after the end of the unrest, which resulted in the killing of at least 25 citizens and security forces, and the detention of nearly 500 people in Tehran and other cities, the top news of the country would be dominated by media debates, clerics, and judicial officials responding to the disputed remarks of the president. While the President's office officially emphasized in a statement that attributing the phrase ("Even the Imam Mahdi (AJ) is subject to criticism") to the President is an outright lie, some still criticize Hassan Rouhani. Two days after the unrest,

Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi tweeted, "They say people can criticize even the infallible Imam, and they can question and not obey him anywhere. These statements were made not behind the Qaf Mountains, but in the capital of the Islamic Republic of Iran! Despite this, how much more should Imam Mahdi endure?!" In another tweet, he wrote, "If (Imam Mahdi) wants to draw his sword, immediately they will say: violence from anyone is condemned. Put aside prejudices and engage in logical discussion and dialogue!" As reported by ISNA, a few days later, Hadi Sadeghi, the cultural deputy of the judiciary, also stated, "One cannot criticize or question the infallibles, and this act is neither logically nor religiously permissible, and this issue is clear and accepted by all believers as disbelief." Meanwhile, the Kayhan newspaper, in separate editorials on those days, called for the "repentance" of the President. During these discussions, some observers and analysts have found a few points worth contemplating. Firstly, the country witnessed public protests in the first two weeks of late December 2017& January 2018. From the 28th of December 2017, protest gatherings began in Mashhad city and spread to some cities and provincial centers within a week. The first gathering under the title "No to Inflation" took place, and as seen in images and videos, the protesters, while expressing their economic demands

in the initial minutes, also raised harsh slogans against Rouhani. However, shortly afterward, slogans against other officials and government institutions were voiced. Although in some cities, economic slogans were raised in subsequent gatherings, the volume of subversive slogans in some of these gatherings was not comparable to the economic and livelihood slogans. So much so that in the slogans of the days leading to the January 3, 2018, fewer slogans were raised about Rouhani and the government. Although some figures and officials tried to downplay the slogans raised in the protests to the government and economic situation, Hassan Rouhani, as the President who has sworn to defend the rights of every individual, repeatedly emphasized that the people's demands were not only "economic." In a meeting with senior officials of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance, he considered the desire of the people to be limited only to the economy as a "wrong address" and "insult to the people" and emphasized, "Our young generation has one more word, and that is: I also understand and I have something to say and you should listen to me. People explicitly declare that they have something to say, and we must listen to the people's words and act beyond that, and if the majority of the country is with the young generation, it means that we must listen to the majority and act accordingly." Referring to the efforts and

pressures to the filtering and restrict on social media networks imposed on the government, he said, "Some people are not happy with the virtual space. Some say that people should only watch state television. Of course, we believe that, state television should reflect the voice of the nation, not the voice of a particular faction." In the same session, he talked about the necessity of criticism of officials and institutions by the people, a statement that was distorted and attacked by Ezatollah Zarghami, the former head of state television, and of course some others preferred not to see the official explanation of the President's office and increase the severity of the attack.

Could an onslaught that focuses on a distorted part of the president's statements, attributed to him to overshadow the majority of Rouhani's explicit and transparent statements about hearing the voice of the people be following this misconception? As Seyyed Reza Taqavi, the former head of the Policy Council of Friday Prayer Leaders, said in his farewell session, protesters attacked the offices of 15 Friday prayer leaders in various cities, and as seen in many videos of gatherings, a significant portion of the protesters' slogans were directed at some individuals from the clergy and religious institutions. Few doubted that alongside the people's protests, some went beyond and, with slogans

like "Iranian Republic" or slogans with the content of the absence of clerics (religious individuals) in responsibilities, sought turmoil and disruption and, in their imagination, a change in the Islamic Republic system. However, can one claim that the people who criticized the economic situation do not find fault with the performance or approach of some clerics? In the past few months, clerics such as Ayatollah Bayat Zanjani, Ayatollah Hossein Mousavi Tabrizi, Seyed Mehdi Tabatabai, Masih Mohajeri, and others have expressed concern about the reduction of clerical influence, which, according to them, it is influenced by the performance and approach of some clerics or Friday prayer leaders. Even Seyed Reza Taqavi referred to the decrease in the number of participants in Friday prayers; during the recent presidential elections held in May 2017, people's criticisms of the policies of some senior clerics in Mashhad were evident in the results of the presidential and city council elections. This is while in the recent presidential elections held some months ago, despite the deceptive promises of economic subsidies, titled "Multiple Increase Subsidies," bonuses, and dividing society into 4% and 96% by the Fundamentalist rivals of Rouhani, the majority of the people voted for Hassan Rouhani to show that their only concern is not the economy. On the other hand, even those who had

economic concerns found Hassan Rouhani's economic plans more acceptable than the plans presented by his rivals. The question now arises: Can everyone who even expressed their protest against the economic situation with harsh slogans against Hassan Rouhani be considered as "the people," while others who chanted slogans against non-governmental institutions be labeled as "disruptors"?

Another notable point is the difference in the approach and discourse on religious matters between the current president and the former president. During Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency, there were frequent speeches and discussions on religious and ideological topics. One such instance was Ahmadinejad's comments during a meeting with Ayatollah Javadi Amoli about the "halo of light." In a video of that encounter, Ahmadinejad the head of the ninth government mentions an experience after his first appearance at the UN General Assembly, where a divine light surrounded him during a speech, and everyone in the audience was captivated. During that period, Mohammad Reza Rahimi, who later became the first vice president under Ahmadinejad, made a statement that reflected a belief held by a Syrian Muslim. According to Rahimi, this Syrian Muslim believed that if there were to be a prophet

after Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), it would be Ahmadinejad. On the other hand, Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, instead of confronting such expressions, stated that when the president is appointed by the Supreme Leader, the sanctity associated with that position extends to him. This perspective implies that obedience to the president is akin to obedience to God. Additionally, Mohammad Nasser Saghay Biriya, a trusted student of Ayatollah Misbah Yazdi and adviser of Ahmadinejad in religious matters, emphasized that the people were fond of Ahmadinejad's slogans and actions. he even mentioned an incident where Ahmadinejad claimed that Hindu women in Shanghai had touched the president's car window to seek blessings. his history raises questions among observers, how can Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi criticize such sentiments during Ahmadinejad's era when he and his followers were part of the group that held similar beliefs and perceptions? The inconsistency in reactions and statements from religious figures during different political eras adds complexity to the analysis of their positions and motivations. In contrast, the current president, Hassan Rouhani, has not emphasized such mystical experiences or religious narratives in his public discourse. This shift in tone may impact the reactions of senior clerics to these expressions. A more fundamental question is whether those who today express their

criticism due to the edited remarks attributed to Hassan Rouhani, consider him a representative of the people, in contrast to the sanctifications of the previous government, and to put it differently, the use of sanctities for Ahmadinejad. In the midst of this, it may not be unfair to revisit the statements of Hassan Rouhani during those times. In year 2007, after the death of Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Tavasoli, during a session of the Expediency Discernment Council, Rouhani criticized certain superstitious beliefs and cultural practices associated with religion. one of Ayatollah Tavasoli 's anger in the last moments was the question of superstition. What kind of game is this that, we have assumed people are so naive? I am afraid that tomorrow they will make the seal of Imam Zaman and show it to the people. If necessary, we will tell people all the details in this session, he criticized some behaviors and superstitious beliefs, questioning issues such as placing a prayer rug in front of oneself during prayers, or putting food out for the Imam Mahdi, or claims about decision-making in important sessions with the presence of the "Agha" (the most respectful term for the Imam Mahdi). These statements indicate Rouhani's emphasis on critically examining certain superstitious beliefs in society. He aimed to shed light on and criticize these beliefs to promote a more rational and non-exaggerated

approach to religion. However, these remarks may have influenced shifts and fluctuations in the perspectives and thoughts of Islamic society, and their analysis requires consideration of specific social backgrounds and conditions. During the year 2017 presidential election campaign, Rouhani criticized the distribution of items associated with the Holy Shrine of Imam Reza in Mashhad, stating, "We were asking for the blessings of Imam Reza (AS) for healing, not for votes." Addressing to his rival Seyyed Ebrahim Raiesi, (presidential candidate) he pleaded, "I ask you to leave Imam Reza (AS) for the people and not politicize Imam Reza (AS) for your party and faction." A brief review of these instances, which stirred the country for weeks at various times, clearly shows that Hassan Rouhani, even when higher-ranking clerics than him closed their eyes to the sanctifications of the previous government or used Imam Zaman (AS) and Imam Reza (AS) for their electoral goals, had concerns about religion and its distortion. Certainly, Hassan Rouhani's statements and views in the religious sphere, always expressed transparently and explicitly, are subject to criticism both as a cleric and as a president. However, the crucial question here is whether the most important issue in the country these days is addressing the edited remarks of Rouhani or listening to the protest voice that, for a week, engaged

intelligence, security, supervisory, and executive institutions. This ongoing unrest not only continues to send aftershocks but, according to many people, rather, many believe that there is a fire under the ashes. It needs to be addressed for the general public, including young people and adolescents whose concerns about social and cultural issues often exceed their economic worries.

Those who distorted Rouhani's words were politically motivated

In January 20, 2018, while some political and religious figures continued to comment on the President's remarks among the Ministry of Economy managers, Hassan Rouhani, in explaining the necessity of criticism in the present time, had referred to criticizing social and political issues during the time of the lives of the innocents had been cited. However, critics reject this and say that such an approach is not acceptable. Among them, figures like Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi challenged the President's statements, despite having expressed similar sentiments themselves.

The work of bold margins from the impeachment meeting of the Minister of Labor and Social Welfare in August 2018.he question now arises: Can everyone who even expressed their protest against the economic

situation with harsh slogans against Hassan Rouhani be considered as "the people," while others who chanted slogans against non-governmental institutions be labeled as "disruptors"?

The file on public perceptions is awaiting the determination of charges. Ali Rabiei has been staying at home for a few days, and negotiations have begun to introduce a new candidate for the Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Welfare. Rabiei's impeachment has concluded, and now unanswered questions remain among the public. What will be the fate of all the accusations and allegations raised in the open session of Baharestan (place of the parliament) in August 2018? The protests against the sidelines of that session are not limited to experts, political activists, and the media; even the representatives themselves are serious critics of the actions of some of their colleagues. The fact that representatives, from behind the podium, speak against each other and against some officials in other institutions, issues have escalated, expected to be investigated. What if those claims are proven more than anywhere else; it is the parliament that comes under scrutiny and must be accountable. even if is not proven, these representatives have to answer why they compromised the dignity and credibility of their

colleagues or some government officials to achieve a political goal. Most importantly, what has this wave of revelations done to the wounded public trust?

The ISNA news agency, in a report on the matter, wrote: "The remarks and behaviors that took place on the day of Ali Rabiei's impeachment had not only internal dimensions but also external dimensions. Foreign radios and televisions, based on the topics raised during the impeachment day, described this session as evidence of deepening rifts between the government and the parliament and the emergence of a split between the branches of the Islamic Republic's government." The media emphasized the same allegations raised in the parliament, stating: "You made accusations, you called for impeachment, now bring evidence. Hamid Reza Haji Babaie, the head of the fundamentalist faction of the parliament, said: 'If these talks are lies, those who raised them should be punished. If they are true, the presiding board and the parliament should step in and announce to the people, as the parliament's dignity is higher than that of a minister and the entire cabinet, so this dignity should not be tarnished by supporters or opponents of a minister or anyone else. Individuals must base their statements on documents, whether the minister has been successful or not, and whether his actions have been legal

or illegal.' "Previously, Mohammad Qasim Osmani, a member of the Planning and Budget Commission who happened to be one of the signatories of the impeachment motion against Rabiei, wrote in a note for the "Iran" media: "What happened in this session was not the impeachment of the Minister of Labor but the impeachment of the system itself." According to him, "the main issue is where the cost was paid in terms of the system's dignity for the dismissal of Mr. Rabiei, and what turned into the price of this dismissal was nothing but lowering the level of public trust. Tayebeh Siavoshi, a representative from Tehran, also told the "Iran" media: 'In a situation where our country is in a critical position due to protests existing at the grassroots level, and at the same time, the public space is filled with right and manipulated media attacks, either to reduce the credibility of the system by highlighting its corruptions and inefficiencies, the events in the parliament were nothing but compliance with this trend. We witness to what extent the statistics of the country's corruptions and problems are mixed with foreign media lies and fed back to society to pump up distrust. What happened in the parliament in August 2018 was nothing but completing this project. Now the public is waiting for the clarification of these accusations. Above the judicial system or any other institution or media, Baharestan

itself must accept this responsibility and find a convincing answer to the more pronounced controversies than the text of the August 8, 2018, parliamentary session."

What change is going to be achieved by changing the government cabinet?

This is the opinion of one of the experts regarding the change of government cabinet:

Firstly, the average capacity and managerial capability of the country, which, based on selective criteria, allows entry into the country's management structure, are not significantly higher than the existing capabilities. Over the past forty years, a consistently maintained list of approximately two hundred individuals, whether fundamentalist or reformist, holds over 95% of the top management positions in the country. The major change in the country's management structure is merely a reshuffling of positions (albeit unrelated), and rarely does a new individual get added to the aforementioned list. Therefore, changing the government cabinet does not bring about much change in the country's management. Secondly, and more importantly than the above, assuming it's impossible, let's assume that Mr. Rouhani has chosen the most

capable individuals to replace the previous ministers, and they will be present at their workplace from tomorrow. What can the new and fresh-minded ministers do to get out of the country's problems?

Downsizing the Government:

Are they reducing the size of the government, striving for a more streamlined structure while maintaining efficiency in service delivery?

1. Reforming Corrupt and Inefficient Structures:

• Are they working to reform corrupt and inefficient structures, aiming to enhance management and transparency?

2. Economic Competitiveness:

• Are they promoting a more competitive economy for increased efficiency?

3. Improving the Business Environment:

• Are they enhancing indicators for improving the business environment, fostering entrepreneurship, and reducing trade obstacles?

4. Setting Aside Economic Ideologies:

• Are they putting aside ideological considerations in the economic domain, focusing instead on pragmatic and evidence-based solutions?

5. Utilizing Social Sciences:

• Are they leveraging insights from social sciences to understand the complexities of issues and find effective solutions?

6. Reducing Powerful Institutions and Organizations:

• Are they taking steps to diminish the influence of powerful institutions and organizations that may not primarily have economic objectives?

7. Critiquing Major Political, Economic, and Social Orientations:

• If some major political, economic, or social orientations are seen as obstacles to solving the country's problems, are they openly willing to critique and analyze their drawbacks?

8. Negotiating with Foreign Counterparts:

• Can they effectively represent the country's interests in international negotiations and convey a unified voice to foreign counterparts?

These questions highlight various aspects of governance and policy that contribute to the overall functioning and effectiveness of a government.

Unfortunately, we know that the answers to all the above questions and similar ones are negative. This is because they fundamentally do not have much authority in these areas. Without changing the structures and the directions that have brought the country to its current state, it is not possible to exit this situation, even if the government composition is the most efficient possible. The presence of capable managers is a necessary but not sufficient condition for development and problem-solving. For example, it does not matter whether the driver is skilled or not if the destination is Tabriz but you are heading towards Zahedan. Additionally, it is important to note that even if the structures and appropriate directions are in place, the system of selecting competent and clean managers is crucial. Inappropriate structures, wrong directions, idealistic goal-setting, costly and unattainable priorities are the main causes of the country's problems. Otherwise, changing a few ministers while the other factors remain unchanged will not lead to any positive change. Changing structures and directions does not mean overthrowing. The Communist rulers of China, after thirty years of

experiencing major failures like the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, and by observing the unsuccessful experience of the former Soviet Union, realized that their plan was not working. Instead of stubbornly insisting on continuing the wrong path of the past, they changed strategies with insight and courage. They became dozens of times more capable, secure, and prosperous than before. However, even with fundamental changes in structures and directions, Mao's image still appears on all their banknotes.

Elections of the 11th Term of the Islamic Council (year 2020).

The 11th round of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Iranian Parliament) elections took place on February 21, 2020, concurrently with the midterm elections for the fifth term of the Assembly of Experts in the provinces of Tehran, Khorasan Razavi, North Khorasan, Fars, and Qom. Candidates who unable to secure at least 20% of the votes in their electoral district had to compete in the runoff elections for the Islamic Consultative Assembly, held on September 11, 2020. In this round, a participation rate of 20% marked the lowest in the history of the eleventh round of parliamentary elections. The registration for the 11th round of the Islamic Consultative Assembly elections concluded with nearly

14,000 candidates registering nationwide. In this report, we will delve into some statistical details about the candidates participating in this election and the presence of notable political figures. according to the political correspondent of the Tasnim News Agency, the registration deadline for the 11th round of the Islamic Consultative Assembly elections concluded on December 7, 2019, based on the directive of the Minister of Interior. Seyed Esmaeil Mousavi, the then spokesperson for the Central Election Headquarters, provided the final statistics of the candidates participating in this round of elections in a press conference held after the formal registration process with the media. Mousavi stated that in this round, 13,896 candidates successfully completed the final registration for the Islamic Consultative Assembly elections. This figure reflects a 15% increase in registrations compared to the previous round.

The spokesperson for the Central Election Headquarters continued: Out of the total candidates who successfully completed the final registration in this round of elections, 1,605 were women, and 12,291 were men, with a ratio of 12% for women and 88% for men. Mousavi also provided details about the education levels of the participants in the 11th round of parliamentary elections, stating that out of the candidates, 601 (4%)

have religious seminary education, 14% have doctoral degrees, 77% have master's degrees, and the rest have bachelor's degrees or lower. He further mentioned that 37% of the candidates are under 40 years old. Regarding the experience of the candidates, Mousavi stated that 26% were veterans, 4% had previous parliamentary experience, and 23% had served in past parliamentary sessions. The spokesperson for the Central Election Headquarters also provided statistics on the candidates in major electoral districts, stating that, based on estimates, Tehran had 3,138 candidates, Isfahan 1,099, Khorasan Razavi 980, Khuzestan 800, and Fars province 739. In addition, the Deputy of Political and Social Affairs at the time, Nizam Malekshahi, after the end of the registration process, stated that in Tehran's electoral district, 2,840 people registered, of which 17% were female candidates, and 83% were male participants. The registration for this round saw a 15% increase compared to the previous period. Notable events included the non-registration of Ali Larijani after 12 years as the Speaker of Parliament and the last-minute registration of Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. Other figures, such as Mohammad Reza Aref from the Reformist camp, did not register for this round, despite leading the Omid Faction in the tenth parliament. The diverse political spectrum participating in the elections reflects a broad interest in

the parliamentary process in Iran. One interesting aspect of the one-week registration for this round of elections was the participation of almost all political factions in the parliamentary race. Various political groups, ranging from the Freedom Movement to radical and moderate Reformists, Fundamentalists, and supporters of Ahmadinejad, registered their candidates. This broad spectrum of participation could be seen as an assurance from all political factions in Iran regarding the electoral process, and, in a way, an early victory in the elections. The majority of registrants, almost unanimously, expressed their main goal as changing the current situation and reforming the performance of both the parliament and the current government. Now, it remains to be seen whether the future parliament can fulfill the most significant demands of the candidates. All of these developments occurred while some Reformists, due to their controversial track records, especially their support for the government, refrained from registering as candidates in the elections. Notably, some prominent figures, such as Mohammad Reza Aref, the head of the Omid Faction, Mohammad Javad Fattahi, Abdolreza Hashemzaei, Parvaneh Salahshouri, Ali Nobakht Haghighi, Fatemeh Hosseini, and Kazem Jalali, did not register for this round.

Announcement of the election results of the 11th Parliament

The final results of the vote count for the 11th Parliament elections have been published in the media. Media outlets reported that the parliament in this round will be dominated by fundamentalists. In this election, it was announced that five out of the 30 upcoming representatives from Tehran will be women. Additionally, for the first time, a female candidate has gained votes in the electoral district of Marivan and Sarvabad in Kurdistan province. Fars News Agency reported that the participation rate was close to 42% for fundamentalists and the military supporters of the government in the 11th parliamentary elections. This indicates a 19% decrease in public participation compared to four years ago. Fars News Agency also mentioned that around 1.9 million Tehran residents went to the polls, although the Tehran Province Governor had stated that the number of eligible voters was 9.6 million. Domestic media outlets have released the final results of the vote count in Tehran and other provinces, at the same time, the Ministry of Interior, which is responsible for announcing the participation rate of the people, was silent in this regard.

Hamidreza Jalaipour, a reformist political activist, wrote in a note on his personal Telegram channel, referring to the lowest voter turnout rate after the revolution: "Those who made it to the parliament are supported by a small minority of citizens. For example, most of those who made it to the 11th Parliament from Tehran have received votes from less than 7% of eligible Tehran voters." Ammar Maleki, a pro-republic political activist, also tweeted: "In the history books of the Islamic Republic, it will be written: the beginning of April,1,1979, with 75% "yes" votes - the February 21,2020, with about 75% "no" votes. According to the published tables, all parliamentary seats from Tehran are in the hands of fundamentalists. The former mayor of Tehran, who had twice failed in presidential elections, became the first representative, and in the second place, the name of Mostafa Mirsalim, another unsuccessful candidate in the 2017 presidential elections, was seen. Except for Tehran and representatives of religious minorities, the entry of 191 fundamentalists, 16 reformists, and 34 independent representatives to the parliament has been confirmed, and the fate of some seats will be determined in the second round. Masoud Pezeshkian, the Minister of Health in Khatami's government and the current Vice Speaker of the Parliament, was one of the few reformists who had advanced to the next round.

In the vote count, he was leading in Tabriz, and four other representatives from this city were also fundamentalists. In Qom, Amirabadi, Zolnoor, and Zakani, three prominent fundamentalists figures, enter the next parliament. The list of other cities was filled with male names, and the women's names are rarely seen. Among the women entering the 11th parliament, Shiva Ghasemipour from Marivan and Sarvabad became the first woman from Kurdistan to enter the parliament after the revolution. The 10th parliament had 17 female representatives, of which 11 were reformists. If a woman is confirmed and officially announced in the second round, the 11th parliament will be, in the best case scenario, had 13 female representatives with a fundamentalists majority."

Elections of the 11th Parliament; Fundamentalists were in the leading and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf was at the top.

The preliminary results from Tehran indicated the domination of fundamentalists candidates in securing parliamentary seats. The former commander of the Revolutionary Guards and former mayor of Tehran, - the Central cadre of the Motalefeh Coalition and the Secretary General of the Stability Front, claimed the top three positions. Fars News Agency reported a national

voter turnout rate of 40% in the parliamentary elections. After 48 hours since the start of voting in Iran, the Ministry of Interior finally announced the participation rate in the elections for the Islamic Consultative Assembly. According to the Minister of Interior, 42.57% of eligible voters participated in this election. This figure represents the lowest voter turnout in the parliamentary elections in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Earlier, the Supreme Leader of Iran, referring to what he called foreign propaganda machines, had stated: “In the last two days, using the pretext of an illness and a virus, their media did not miss the slightest opportunity to discourage people from participating in the parliamentary elections.” The Supreme Leader of Iran, who had previously described the parliamentary elections as the "desirable brilliance of the Iranian nation in the great test of the parliament," earlier referred to the elections in East Azerbaijan Province as "public jihad" and a "national celebration." After the Supreme Leader's remarks, the Fars News Agency, affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards, had initially stated on its Twitter account that the participation rate in the eleventh parliamentary elections was "around 42%." However, Fars News Agency later reported a "19% decrease in participation" in the elections for the Islamic Consultative Assembly compared to the previous round.

The amount of participation in the elections of different periods of the Iranian parliament:

The highest rate of participation was equal to 71% and related to the fifth Parliament. According to Tasnim News Agency, the Supreme Leader of Iran, in the opening speech of his lesson outside jurisprudence, stated, "Elections in the Islamic Republic demonstrate that religion is the complete embodiment of comprehensive democracy, and holding 37 elections over 41 years reflects the unique attention of the Islamic system to people's sovereignty." Abdulreza Rahmani Fazli, the Minister of the Interior at the time, had previously told reporters about the reasons for the 42.57% participation, saying, "We had both the entry of the coronavirus and political conditions and issues such as the Ukrainian plane crash, events in November and December 2019 [related to protests] under these circumstances; this level of people's presence and participation in the elections is entirely acceptable." According to the official results, the majority of seats in the eleventh parliament had been won by fundamentalists. The conduct of these elections was accompanied by the widespread disqualification of candidates close to the reformist camp by the Guardian Council, the constitutional oversight body. Ali Sari, a representative from Ahvaz in the tenth parliament,

reacted to the election results in Tehran on Twitter and wrote: "Follow the eleventh parliament of the Islamic Republic from the early minutes; perhaps you reconciled with the ballot box for the year 2022 election." Additionally, Ezzatollah Zarghami, the former head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), criticized not announcing the participation rate of the elections for the Islamic Consultative Assembly on Friday February 21, 2020, the day of voting through a tweet. He wrote, "Electrify the entire election is just an offer! At least announce the final participation figure, which is immediately identifiable through the number of consumed tariffs after the end of voting. Apparently, the notification virus has spread from the plane crash to the election results. Let's not delegate public opinion nourishment to others." It should be noted that the head of the IRIB in Iran is appointed by the Supreme Leader.

The votes of the capital in the portfolio of the former commander of the IRGC Air Force

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the top candidate on the Unity of fundamentalists list, by winning more than 1 million and 265 thousand votes, he became the first candidate in Tehran's electoral district. Mr. Ghalibaf, with a background as the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Air Force, the chief of the

police force, and the mayor of Tehran, secured a significant number of votes.

Following Mr. Ghalibaf, Mostafa Agha-Mirsalim, Morteza Aghatehrani, and Elias Naderan, three prominent fundamentalists figures, received the highest number of votes in the capital. According to the Ministry of Interior, the participation in the Tehran electoral district was 1,841,891 people, equivalent to 25.4 percent. Anoushirvan Mohseni-Bandpei, the governor of Tehran, had previously stated that 9.6 million people were eligible to vote in Tehran, and 21.6 million tariffs (voting papers) were distributed in the province. The Minister of Interior, Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli, had mentioned, "The highest participation was in Kohgiluyeh and Boyerahmad province with 71 percent, and the lowest was in Tehran province with 26.2 percent." In Iran, a total of 57,918,159 people were eligible to vote. Of this number, 48 percent of the participants in the eleventh parliamentary elections were women, and 52 percent were men .Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli, the then-Minister of Interior, stated, "After the announcement of the results by governorates, those who object can send their objections to the executive boards. The boards will address these objections within 7 days, and then the Guardian Council will handle it in the next 7 days." The

second round of voting will be held in 11 electoral districts. The second round of this voting was scheduled to be held on April 17, 2020, to determine the fate of the remaining electoral districts. The eleventh parliamentary elections took place on February 21, 2020, with voting at 55,000 polling stations across Iran in 208 electoral districts to elect 290 representatives to the Parliament. A total of 5,232 candidates, who had been approved for eligibility, participated in this election to compete for parliamentary seats.

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Speaker of Parliament

In recent periods (the 90s, decade, Iranian Calendar), the term "Speaker of Parliament is only the spokesperson for the parliament" has been raised by some representatives. Despite these statements, in the Constitution, the Speaker of Parliament is assigned a distinct and different position compared to other representatives, including the deputy speakers.

How Much Power the Speaker of Parliament Have in Iran?

In the sixth term of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis), some members of the Participatory Front Party declared that the Speaker of Parliament is merely the spokesperson for the parliament. However, during this term, representatives did not attempt to reduce the powers of the Speaker of Parliament. In the presidency of Ali Larijani, critics accused him of "autocracy," and they spoke about efforts to impeach the Speaker and members of the presiding board, but these threats were not implemented. Now, Mahmoud Ahmadi Beghash, the elected representative of the eleventh parliament and the governor of North Khorasan province during the administration of the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad government, has announced the preparation of a plan to reduce the power of the parliament speaker. Mohammad Mohajeri, a media

activist, wrote that supporters of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and members of the Stability Front are trying to "diminish the role of Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf to elevate their own power." However, it is unclear to what extent these threats to reduce the powers of the parliament speaker will be implemented. Nevertheless, what are the powers of the Speaker of Parliament according to the law?

Principles No. 85 and No.138 of the Constitution:

Part of the powers given to the Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis) is included in the Constitution, and changing it under current circumstances is impossible. These powers mostly pertain to the parliament's relations with other branches of government and are not directly related to the disputed powers of the Speaker, as perceived by the representatives. One of the significant powers granted to the Speaker, which has been a subject of debate in some governments, is outlined in Articles 85 and 138 of the Constitution. According to these constitutional articles, the approval of government bills and the councils under the supervision of the government, which have legislative aspects, must be confirmed by the Speaker of the Parliament. The implementation of this principle has led

to jurisdictional conflicts between the government and the parliament, particularly during the administration of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Another power of the Speaker of the Parliament is the promulgation of laws. If the President ignores the laws passed by the parliament, which have received approval from the Guardian Council, the Speaker of the Parliament will promulgate them. During the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Ali Larijani, the Speaker of the Parliament at that time, utilized this power in several instances, promulgating laws that Mr. Ahmadinejad had refrained from promulgating due to his opposition to them.

Membership in several "supra-councils"- The Speaker of the Parliament's membership in the Supreme National Security Council, the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, and the Expediency Discernment Council differentiates his position from other representatives and deputy speakers. The Speaker of the Parliament is also one of the members of the Temporary Presidential Council, which is formed in the event of the president's resignation and operates until the appointment of a successor. Authority in the Parliament- While the Speaker is primarily recognized for presiding over public sessions of the parliament, they also have

other powers. One of these powers includes overseeing all administrative and organizational affairs of the parliament. In the parliament's regulations, specific powers are designated for the presiding board, in which the Speaker plays a role. One notable responsibility is the approval of the annual budget of the parliament. The Speaker also holds authority in managing institutions under the parliament's purview, including the Center for Parliamentary Research.

Extralegal powers

Apart from the powers stipulated by law for the Speaker of Parliament, the heads of the branches of power, during Ayatollah Khomeini's leadership and also at times during Ayatollah Khamenei's leadership, had extra-legal powers. In addition to legal powers, the personal influence of the Parliament speakers varied due to different circumstances. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, due to his close relationship with Ayatollah Khomeini, wielded more power as the Speaker than heads of other branches. Mehdi Karroubi, although a significant figure in Iranian politics, did not have as much influence as Hashemi Rafsanjani during his tenure as Speaker and later as the head of the sixth parliament. Gholamali Haddad-Adel, despite his familial relationship with the

Supreme Leader, couldn't project a powerful image during his presidency over one parliamentary term. Ali Larijani, with 12 years of experience, held the longest tenure as the head of the parliament and aimed to play a role similar to Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, transforming into an independent and influential political figure. Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, currently elected as the Speaker of the Parliament in conditions resembling the seventh parliament and Haddad-Adel's presidency, had faced rumors during the year 2005 presidential election that he called himself "Reza Khan Islami," which was later denied. Regardless of these rumors, he has consistently tried to present himself as a "capable manager" and faced various groups and factions in the eleventh parliament which trying to diminish his power.

Chapter 7

Security-military and political events

Shooting in the Islamic Council (Parliament)

On June 7, 2017 (17 Khordad 1396), armed individuals entered the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis) while firing shots. According to one of the representatives, there were four armed individuals, and they entered the parliament premises by shooting. Their goal seemed to be to engage with the security forces, as they continued shooting at them, resulting in three injuries. A member of the parliament confirmed the incident, stating that these individuals were present in the representatives' offices and were surrounded.

However, the situation was under control. During that time, the exit of representatives from the parliament hall and the departure of reporters were restricted. On the same day, a news reporter from the Broadcasting Corporation reported from the parliament's location:

"There were 4 assailants who fled towards the representatives' offices, and in this incident, 4 people were injured. None of the assailants have been arrested so far. The exit doors for reporters were closed, and all assailants headed towards the upper floors and representatives' rooms. Based on the observations of the ISNA reporter, an armed individual or individuals also fired shots towards the reporters' location outside the parliament, leading reporters to be directed inside the parliament hall. The doors to the parliament chamber were closed, preventing reporters from leaving. However, no representative was injured, and the armed individuals confined themselves in the representatives' offices. In this regard, Ranjbarzadeh, a member of the presiding board of the parliament, stated that the armed individuals had confined themselves in the representatives' offices, and the security and protection systems of the parliament were working to apprehend them. No representatives were injured; all representatives were in the parliament chamber, and the

parliament was continuing its legislative agenda as usual. There were no reports of any fatalities, but some individuals were injured. On the same day, under these circumstances, Ali Larijani, accompanied by some representatives, entered the parliament chamber and, after a short pause, took his position as the head of the parliament. Following the terrorist incident on that day, different reports from representatives were heard, but the parliament continued its work, and representatives were constantly moving and gathering in the parliament chamber."

Details Related to the Killing of Terrorists in the Parliament

Terrorist 1: Moments after the Special Forces of the Revolutionary Guards entered the parliament building, a team of these forces successfully infiltrated the upper floors of the parliament building and eliminated one of the terrorists. Terrorist 2: The Special Forces quickly managed to reach the upper floors themselves and, in a surprising moment, killed another terrorist before he could detonate his suicide vest. Terrorists 3 and 4: Meanwhile, the other two terrorists, realizing the presence of security forces and the death of another group member, detonated their suicide vests before the Special Forces could reach them, leading to their demise.

The Public Relations of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis) issued the following statement regarding the terrorist incident on June 7, 2017:

"Four terrorists carried out a blind operation, this morning around 10 AM, entering the public entrances of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis) with firearms. They attempted to attack a group of people who had come to meet their representatives in the House of Nation. However, they were confronted by the decisive action of the protective forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the police force. Ultimately, all four terrorists were killed. it is worth mentioning that the terrorists were unable to enter the immediate vicinity of the parliament compound, and the open session of the Majlis continued as usual during the engagement. In this terrorist incident, 12 individuals among the visitors to the Majlis and parliamentary staff lost their lives, and 42 others were injured. This blind and cowardly act failed to achieve its sinister goals and only further exposed the guilt of terrorists and their overt and covert supporters."

Special Forces of the Revolutionary Guards

The plan below shows the entrance of the terrorists into the parliament.



on the same day (June 7, 2017), simultaneous with the terrorist acts in the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis), terrorist activities also took place in the Imam Khomeini Shrine. In this regard, an eyewitness account of the terrorist incident in the Imam Khomeini Shrine is as follows: "Seyed Mohammad Kermani," a reciter in the gathering at the Imam Khomeini Shrine, told Fars news agency in an interview: "After the conclusion of the gathering, we were exiting through the western gate of the shrine when several armed individuals began shooting towards the people. One of the shooters, holding a grenade, intended to enter the interior of the shrine but was apprehended by the people and security forces. After the shooting, the people attacked the entrance gates, and security forces closed the doors of the shrine, trapping the people inside. The terrorists had suicide vests, and one of them detonated himself."

Imam Khomeini Shrine

The picture below shows the operation of the terrorists

The incident of shooting in Iranian Parliament and the world media

With nearly an hour passing since the first reports of the shooting incidents in the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran and the Imam Khomeini Shrine, reputable foreign media outlets also provided coverage of this event through instant updates. Reuters, The Guardian, Al Jazeera, BBC, CNN, Independent, USA Today, Daily Express, Russia Today, and The Washington Post were among the news outlets and networks that covered the latest developments in this incident in Iran moment by moment. Some of these foreign news websites relied on Iranian news agencies to publish news related to the shooting incident in Iran. Here is a brief description of the two terrorist incidents on June 7, 2017 according to the Police Information Center (NAJA):

On the morning of June 7, 2017, terrorists attempted to enter the shrine of Imam Khomeini and the shrine's police station. However, they were unsuccessful due to the precise shooting of Police snipers. One of the terrorists detonated himself after being shot, causing no harm to others. Another terrorist, who had fired at the people, was shot in the head and brought under control before detonating himself. Subsequently, explosive

materials were discovered and confiscated from this individual. During these events, a police officer was injured, but his overall condition was reported to be favorable. security forces were present at the scene, and the situation was fully under control. In addition, the agents of the Ansar Corps which were responsible for guarding and protecting the shrine of Imam Khomeini, were also stationed in the area. The police force, including the special police unit known as "Noupo," was actively involved in responding to the incidents. The police officers were stationed in the area, and the boundaries leading to the Islamic Consultative Assembly were fully controlled.

The reflection of the terrorist attack in Tehran in the world's major news agencies

Major world news agencies reacted to the terrorist attack in Iran in their headlines. BBC News, for example, published the headline: "Iran's parliament and Khomeini shrine under attack by gunmen." Reuters also addressed the incident in its top news: "7 killed in twin attacks on Iran parliament and Khomeini tomb." CNN had a headline that read, "Twin attacks in Tehran, at Khomeini shrine and parliament."

Global reactions to the terrorist incident in Tehran:

- The German Foreign Minister, in a joint press conference with his Saudi counterpart, condemned the terrorist attack in Tehran.
- The President of the European Parliament expressed solidarity with the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament and the people of Iran.
- The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the terrorist attacks in Tehran.
- The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the terrorist attacks in Tehran.
- The Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the terrorist attacks in Tehran and offered condolences to the families of the victims.
- Palestinian Resistance Committees condemned the terrorist actions of ISIS in Tehran.
- The Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in response to the terrorist attacks in Tehran, addressed the Iranians: "Accept our heartfelt condolences."
- The President of Iraq, the Ministry of Interior of Italy, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan also condemned the terrorist attacks in Tehran.

- Oman also condemned the terrorist attacks in Tehran and expressed condolences to the families of the victims.

- The United Arab Emirates condemned the terrorist actions in Tehran.

- In a mission meeting in Japan, members of the United Nations observed a one-minute silence in memory of those killed in the terrorist incident in the Iranian parliament, offering condolences to the families of the victims.

- President Rouhani, in response to the blind and cowardly terrorist acts in Tehran, stated: In a message, the President emphasized that the Iranian people, rooted in the culture of Ashura, will once again prove that they will defeat any hostile plots and conspiracies with greater unity and coherence, supported by their robust security structure. Dr. Hassan Rouhani, extending condolences to the families who lost their loved ones during the divine feast, expressed: The country's forces, security agencies, and institutions, through unity and coordination, will not rest until all dimensions of these heartless terrorist acts and their supporters, both known and hidden, are exposed.

The condolence message of Hojjat al-Islam Shahidi, the representative of a jurist (Wali Faqih), the vice president and head of the Martyrs Foundation and Veterans Affairs following the terrorist incident in the shrine of Imam Khomeini (RA) and the Islamic Council, made the following comments:

The text condemns the heinous and brutal acts of atheist Takfiri and terrorist groups against the revered shrine of Imam Khomeini and the people around the Iranian Parliament. It describes these groups as demonic and supporters of evil who have historically displayed their vile nature. The message suggests that these groups, motivated by their hatred, are trying to disrupt the strength and security of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Despite their savage actions, the message expresses confidence that, with divine assistance and under the guidance of the Supreme Leader, these hostile forces will face defeat. The sender of the message extends condolences to the Iranian nation for the loss of innocent lives and wishes for the quick recovery of the injured. It also emphasizes the readiness of the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs, along with other relevant executive bodies, to take any necessary action in response to these terrorist attacks.

Mohammad Reza Aref's message following the terrorist incident at the shrine of Imam Khomeini and the Iranian Parliament is as follows:

"The barbaric terrorist act at the holy shrine of Imam Khomeini (RA) and the Iranian Parliament once again shows that the blind-hearted terrorists are seeking an opportunity to create insecurity in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Today, thanks to the sacrifices of our dear martyrs, dear Iran remains stable and secure in a tumultuous region, while the arrogant powers and their allies wish to undermine this stability. How brazenly the reactionary leaders of the region accuse the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is itself a victim of terrorism, supporting terrorist acts, while they themselves support and breed terrorists. certainly, today's terrorist act will be met with a resolute and regretful response from the Islamic Republic of Iran. The key to our success over the past 38 years has been the unity and solidarity of all sections of the people and officials. Now, alongside active diplomacy in the region and the vigilance of security and military forces, we can confront any provocative actions to undermine security within the country. I extend my condolences to the esteemed families of the martyrs of this terrorist incident and wish a speedy recovery for the wounded. I appreciate the efforts of security, military, and law enforcement forces in confronting terrorists and

eliminating them. I hope, with the efforts of medical teams and the prayers of the noble people of our country, the wounded from this terrorist incident will soon achieve full recovery during these blessed days."

Supplementary announcement of the Ministry of Intelligence

Director General of Anti-Terrorism at the Ministry of Intelligence stated: Around noon on Wednesday, June 7, 2017, following the tightening of the security perimeter by the protective and security forces at the Iranian Parliament, one of the terrorists detonated himself. Earlier, the Director General of Anti-Terrorism at the Ministry of Intelligence had reported the entry of several terrorist teams into Tehran. One team was arrested before any action, and another team was confronted in the Imam Khomeini shrine. The intelligence official added: On Wednesday morning, several terrorist teams carried out operations in Tehran. The members of one team were arrested before taking any action. Two other teams attacked the Imam Khomeini shrine and the Parliament building. Due to our vigilance of the agents of Imam Khomeini's Holy Shrine, a suicide bomber was shot before taking action and another suicide bomber detonated himself. According to the intelligence official, another team targeted the Baharestan Square, shooting

at people and one of the administrative buildings of the Parliament. The targeted team was surrounded by security forces.

Release of the behind-the-scenes video of the terrorists who remained in the parliament building

Hours after the terrorist attack on June 7, 2017 in Tehran, the "Amaq" base affiliated with ISIS released a short video from inside the Iranian parliament building. In this video, the second terrorist, while shooting, repeats the words of Abu Mohammad Adnani's speech. "What the armed terrorist uttered is a famous phrase by Abu Muhammad Adnani, one of the leaders of ISIS, who said: " Translation of phrase: (Do you think we are leaving? Do you believe we are finished? Never. We, with the permission of Allah, endure until the Day of Judgment, and our last one will fight against the Antichrist). Psychoanalytic analysis of the terrorist's words indicates that, firstly, the members of ISIS have realized the decline of their group and their own demise, and they are boosting their morale by creating emotional phrases for themselves. Secondly, the news a few months ago about the likely death of Sheikh Adnani was probably correct, and therefore, ISIS members consider it essential to keep his memory alive. Who was Sheikh Adnani? Abu Muhammad Adnani was the official

spokesperson and one of the senior leaders of ISIS. Reports about his death were published in the same year. He was previously known as the leader of the group in Syria and the head of its foreign operations. After Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, he was considered the second senior leader. Adnani had been active for al-Qaeda in Iraq before joining ISIS, and he was imprisoned in Iraqi prisons from 2005 to 2010. In August 2016, sources close to ISIS reported his death, and the recent video could be evidence supporting his demise.

Ministry of Intelligence statement:

The terrorist team in the Tehran incident was under the command of Abu Ayesha. It is announced to the noble people of Iran that, based on intelligence observations, the complete identities of the terrorist elements involved in the Tehran incident (at the sacred shrine of Imam Khomeini and the Parliament) and their associated cores have been identified. Accordingly, the operational team of ISIS members who participated in the terrorist operations at the sacred shrine and the Parliament consisted of 5 individuals with a history affiliated with Wahhabi and Takfiri groups. After joining the ISIS terrorist group, they left the country and were involved in the crimes of this terrorist group in Mosul

and Raqqa. These individuals, who entered the country in August 2016, and they intended to carry out terrorist operations in religious cities were under the command of Abu Ayesha, one of the high-ranking commanders of ISIS. After the complete destruction of the network and dealing blows to the key figures, including the elimination of Abu Ayesha, they had gone into hiding outside the country. A crucial point in the terrorist incident on June 7, 2017 is the prompt actions of the security and law enforcement forces, who quickly contained the situation and neutralized the terrorists. Nevertheless, if there hadn't been prior preparedness and the immediate presence and strong response of the security forces, the terrorists could have caused more casualties among our compatriots. The valuable security that exists in the country is a result of national cohesion and the strength of our security and intelligence forces, which must be preserved and reinforced. People must be aware that maintaining national unity is always a top priority for the country and the system. In such circumstances, the emergence of this unity is more crucial than ever. An important point to consider in this atmosphere is the vigilance against certain elements attempting to exploit these events for divisive purposes.

Terrorist attack on the armed forces parade in Ahvaz

On September 22, 2018, during the military parade in Ahvaz, unidentified individuals opened fire on the military forces and people. Armed attackers targeted the participants and the public during the parade commemorating the beginning of the Sacred Defense Week in the area of the 92nd Armored Division in Ahvaz. Preliminary reports suggest that some individuals were killed or injured in this attack. according to eyewitnesses, the assailants conducted the shooting from behind a designated area for officials, leading attendees to take precautions by lying on the ground. The attackers were dressed in military uniforms. The exact number of casualties was not available at the moment. The shooting lasted for about 10 minutes, and until the time of reporting, the sound of ambulance sirens heading toward the scene was audible. Additionally, according to the Mashregh news agency, an informed source stated that two of the armed attackers have been killed, one wounded, and another captured by security forces. In this attack, two individuals with firearms intended to shoot at the people and the designated area but were neutralized by the armed forces.

The picture below shows the terrorist attack on the armed forces parade in Ahvaz

The downing of an American drone by the Revolutionary Guards on June 20, 2019

On June 20, 2019, a spy drone flying over Iranian airspace was shot down by the air defense of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The surveillance drone, named Global Hawk, belonged to the United States Navy and was targeted in the Mount Mubarak region of Hormozgan province. The IRGC successfully intercepted and brought down the drone in defense of Iranian airspace.

According to the public relations statement of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the early hours of June 20, 2019, a spy drone named Global Hawk, belonging to the United States Navy, was targeted and shot down by the air defense of the IRGC. The incident occurred after the drone violated the Iranian airspace in the region near Mount Mubarak in Hormozgan province. Despite U.S. claimed that the drone was flying over international waters, Iranian authorities confirmed that the drone was shot down over Iranian territory. In the early hours after the news were announced, various speculations were made about the type and model of the drone. Some announced the model of this drone as MQ-4C Triton, while the Iranian authorities considered this drone to be RQ-4 Global Hawk, and finally, in a statement, Centcom (United States Central Command) confirmed the claim of the Iranian authorities and named the model of the drone as RQ-4A Global Hawk.

According to Majid Takht-Ravanchi, Iran's ambassador and permanent representative to the United Nations, Iran had issued radio warnings to the American drone before targeting it, highlighting the drone's disregard for those warnings. The deputy commander of Khatham al-Anbia Air Defense Base also stated in an interview on Friday that American aircraft had

repeatedly entered Iranian airspace in the region without heeding warnings. He mentioned that the failure of the United States to comply with international laws led to the decision to shoot down the drone after numerous warnings. despite the U.S. claims that the drone was flying over international waters, Iran has contested this and emphasized its adherence to international regulations regarding airspace violations. New York Times reported, citing a senior White House official, that there were doubts among U.S. officials about whether the drone had entirely stayed outside of Iranian airspace during its flight. The Deputy Operations of the Air Defense Force of the Army, at the time, provided details about the incident in an interview on September 7, 2019. He explained that the American drone was under constant surveillance by Iran's integrated air defense system from the moment it began its flight. The drone had deactivated its identification system, which enables aircraft to introduce themselves to radar systems and specify their type, altitude, and whether they are friendly or hostile. Despite being monitored and behavior analyzed throughout its more than three-hour flight, the drone did not respond to warnings issued along its route, urging it to correct its behavior and adhere to international norms.

The Origin and Route of the Flight

On the evening of Thursday, June 20, 2019, Mohammad Javad Zarif claimed in a tweet that "at 00:14 [midnight], an American drone, in stealth mode, departed from the UAE [United Arab Emirates] and violated Iran's airspace." He also stated that the drone was targeted at 04:05 at the geographical coordinates 25°59'43" N, 57°02'25" E, near Mount Mubarak. Tasnim News Agency, on the same night, introduced the origin of the drone's movement by publishing a video from Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE. Subsequently, Fars News Agency released a video of the flight path of the American drone, indicating that it took off from Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE, traveled towards Chabahar, violated the Iranian airspace on its return path, and was shot down. The head of the Armed Forces Geographical Organization mentioned the discovery of drone parts in Iranian waters, stating that the American drone had penetrated 7 kilometers, equivalent to 4 nautical miles, into Iranian waters.in response to Iran's claims, the United States asserted that the American drone was flying at coordinates 25°57'42" N and 56°50'22" E, which is part of international waters, not Iranian waters. On June 25, 2019 Nikolai Patrushev, the Secretary of Russia's Security Council, announced that, according to

information obtained by the Russian military, the drone had been destroyed within Iran's airspace.

Details of the incident

Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force announced on Friday, June 21, 2019, on the sidelines of unveiling the wreckage of the downed American drone, that on Thursday, June 20, 2019, an American drone took off at 0:14 AM from Al Dhafra Air Base near Abu Dhabi, UAE, and entered Iranian territorial waters around 4:00 AM after a long flight. According to the commander, the drone had communication systems that transmitted information to its central stations during contact. Iranian forces issued warnings to the drone twice at 2:05 AM and twice at 3:55 AM, with the last warning coming from the Khatam al-Anbia air defense base at 3:55 AM. However, the drone did not respond to any of the warnings, because the drone did not leave Iran's territorial waters it was targeted and shot down at 4:05 AM. The drone was reportedly flying at an altitude above 50,000 feet when it entered Iran's maritime borders.

According to the commander of the Iranian Air Force, along with the downed American drone, a Boeing P-8 Poseidon aircraft belonging to the United States Navy,

with 35 passengers on board, was also present. The P-8 Poseidon had violated Iran's borders, but Iranian forces refrained from targeting it. The reason for not targeting the P-8 plane and shooting down the American drone was described as "warning to American terrorist forces." The following day, Pentagon confirmed the presence of the P-8 aircraft with 38 passengers, along with the drone. The Boeing P-8 Poseidon typically accommodates 9 crew members and is capable of carrying torpedoes and cruise missiles. Donald Trump, on June 22, 2019, described the Iranian decision not to shoot down the manned U.S. military aircraft as "very wise" and expressed gratitude for their intelligent choice.

A picture of the wreckage of the downed drone

American drone

After the accident

On Thursday, June 20, 2019, Iran's permanent representative to the United Nations sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, informing them of what it deemed "the United States' illegal and dangerous act of aggression against Iran's territorial integrity." The letter stated that Tehran, after issuing the necessary radio warnings to the American drone, which were ignored, took action to shoot down the drone based on Article 51 of the UN Charter, which articulates the right of self-defense for nations. On Thursday evening of the same day, Seyed Abbas Araghchi, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs,

expressed Iran's "strong protest" to the United States through the Swiss ambassador in Tehran, who represents U.S. interests in Iran. Araghchi stated that "undeniable evidence" exists regarding the presence of this drone in Iranian airspace, and even parts of the drone's wreckage have been recovered in Iranian territorial waters. On Friday, June 21, 2019, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also summoned the Swiss ambassador in Tehran and provided further details of the incident.

US cyberattack on IRGC weapons system

According to media reports on June 20, 2019 the United States launched cyberattacks against the weapon systems of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) following the downing of an American drone. According to The Washington Post, due to the U.S. cyberattack, the computer systems controlling the missile launch equipment of the IRGC were disabled. According to the Associated Press the attacks were reported to have been carried out under the command of President Donald Trump. The New York Times acknowledged in an article that, this cyberattack was in retaliation for the downing of the American drone and the incidents involving attacks on oil tankers in the

Oman sea (which the United States considers, Iran to be the cause of it), although doubts exist about its actual effectiveness. Iranian authorities described the U.S. cyberattacks as unsuccessful. Mohammad Javad Azari Jahromi, the Minister of Communications at that time in Iran, referred to the thwarted cyberattacks as unsuccessful. The spokesperson for the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Iranian Parliament also dismissed the U.S. claims of a successful cyberattack on IRGC military facilities as "baseless" and perceived it as an attempt to neutralize Iran's success in downing the American drone.

The reaction of the Iranian authorities

The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly condemned the violation of its airspace by the U.S. drone. Mohammad Javad Zarif, in a Twitter message addressing the breach of Iran's airspace by the American drone, stated that parts of the drone were found in Iranian territorial waters where it was targeted. Khosravi, the spokesperson for the Supreme National Security Council, emphasized the inherent mission of the armed forces in defending the country's airspace borders. He stated that Iran would file a formal complaint with the United Nations against the United

States for the military trespass into Iranian airspace. President Hassan Rouhani praised the downing of the American drone on Tuesday, June 25, 2019, calling it highly valuable and noting the use of a completely Iranian-made system. He expressed gratitude to all those involved in developing this domestic industry at the Ministry of Defense and those in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps who effectively utilized this tool.

The reaction of the American authorities

The initial report of the downing of the drone in Hormozgan Province by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was followed by the U.S. military denying any operations in Iranian airspace. Subsequently, President Donald Trump, on his Twitter account, stated that "Iran had made a very big mistake." The New York Times reported that, Trump initially ordered a limited strike on some targets in Iran, he issued in the morning of Friday, June 28, 2019 including missile and radar sites. However, in the early stages of the operation, the order to cancel the attack was issued. The details about whether the attack was canceled entirely or merely delayed remained unclear, and precise information about the complete outcome was not fully disclosed.

The reason for canceling the attack

Trump cited the potential death of about 150 people, as reported by military generals, and the disproportionate response to the unmanned drone being shot down as reasons for canceling the strike. Reports suggested that Trump's decision contradicted the advice of his national security advisors, such as John Bolton, Mike Pompeo, and Gina Haspel, who recommended carrying out the attack. One of the individuals strongly advising against attacking Iran was Tucker Carlson, a favorite Fox News host of Trump. The New York Times reported, citing a senior White House official, that there were doubts among U.S. officials about whether the drone had actually been outside Iranian airspace throughout its entire route.

Former U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, in an interview with the German newspaper Spiegel, commented on Trump's claim that he canceled the attack, 10 minutes before it started due to the potential killing of 150 Iranians. Panetta said, "If what happened is true, we are facing a state of inefficiency. I can't imagine that the Department of Defense had a plan for attacking specific targets and did not specify the casualties resulting from targeting those positions." He also added, "When I was at the Department of Defense,

we always anticipated that if you target sites, such as missile sites or facilities or other targets in Iran, Iran would definitely respond with missile attacks on our military bases in the Gulf (Persian Gulf) or Israel. They have an effective missile system."

Attack on the Iranian oil tanker

On October 11, 2019, the Iranian oil tanker "Sabiti," owned by the National Iranian Oil Company, came under attack with two unidentified missiles approximately 60 miles off the coast of Jeddah in the Red Sea. Fortunately, none of the crew members were physically harmed during this attack. However, a certain amount of crude oil leaked into the Red Sea waters as a result.

The attack on the Iranian oil tanker "Sabiti" in the Red Sea, struck by two missiles, has prompted domestic media to investigate the underlying factors of this incident. According to the news group IRNA, speculation about the perpetrators of the attack on this oil tanker has begun. The United States and the Israeli regime have been mentioned as primary suspects, although the question of which party carried out the attack remains in a cloud of ambiguity and is still under investigation. Ali Shamkhani, the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, responded to the issue by stating that a

special committee has been formed to investigate the attack on the Sabiti vessel, which was targeted by two missiles near the shores of Saudi Arabia in the Red Sea. The committee is reviewing available video footage and gathered information, and its report was presented to the relevant authorities for decision-making.

حمله به نفتکش ایرانی سابیتی در دریای سرخ

Investigating the attackers of the Iranian oil tanker

The spokesperson for the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Iranian Parliament, in an interview with ILNA news agency, stated: "We will conduct a thorough investigation into the damaged oil tanker. We have no compliments with terrorists; we have enemies and adversaries who do not want the region to be peaceful." The Islamic Republic of Iran is monitoring and pursuing to identify the individuals and factors behind this terrorist attack. According to the Entekhab.ir (professional news site), Abdulbari Atwan, a famous Arab analyst, commented: "The simultaneity of the attack on the Iranian oil tanker carrying one million barrels of oil towards Syria, with the announcement by the U.S. Department of Defense about deploying thousands of soldiers and todd missile systems to Saudi Arabia, does not seem coincidental. Following the attacks on the oil facilities in Baghigh and Khurais in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf or the Red Sea is entering a new phase of tensions." He continued: "The attack on the Iranian oil tanker 'Sabiti' near the city of Jeddah in Saudi Arabia was a unique type of attack, as, until now, no Iranian oil tanker had been targeted in recent months. Especially considering that during the attacks on the tankers at the Al Fujairah Port in the UAE, even the

slightest hint of blame pointed towards Iran. The National Iranian Oil Company, the owner of this oil tanker, denied that these missiles were fired from Saudi Arabia, raising numerous questions about the responsible party for this attack. There are speculations that Israeli submarines, in response to a clear threat, may have fired two missiles towards the Iranian oil tanker; this caused a changing the route of the tanker and its return to the Persian Gulf. in the past years, Israel has been involved in hundreds of covert missile and air attacks, and it would not be surprising if they expanded the scope of their attacks to the Red Sea and even the Persian Gulf."

Note of the spokesperson of the Iranian government

According to the newspaper "Arman-e Melli," the spokesperson for the then government and assistant for presidential social communications wrote an article titled "Adventure against the Iranian Oil Tanker." In the piece, he stated, "In a time when our region more than ever needs tranquility and peace to heal the wounds of long-standing fratricide, there are individuals, groups, and governments whose survival depends on invading others and benefiting from war, neglecting the smallest opportunities for reconciliation and peace and not hesitating to grasp any chance to intensify destruction." He continued, "The latest of these malicious acts was the attack on an Iranian oil tanker in the Red Sea, which appears to have suspicious elements behind it, once again employing their efforts for another tension. The social communication assistant of the president emphasized in this article: with awareness of this issue, the Islamic Republic of Iran, refraining from hastiness, is carefully examining the incident and discovering its realities. Undoubtedly, an appropriate response will be taken against the architects of this cowardly attack, but until all dimensions of this conspiracy become clear, we will wait." Rabiei, the spokesman of the then government in the conclusion, raised the question, "Are those who

baselessly accused Iran of disrupting free shipping in the Persian Gulf and being involved in the attack on Aramco facilities without any credible evidence now willing to defend the principles of freedom of navigation in international waters and condemn such attacks on Iranian ships?"

Investigating the attackers of the Iranian oil tanker

According to the Tasnim News Agency, a member of the Energy Commission of the Iranian Parliament considered the recent attack on an Iranian oil tanker in the Red Sea as a desperate action and emphasized that such actions have no negative impact on the will of the Iranian people. Instead, it strengthens more their resolve to defend their interests against threats. Currently, we are witnessing the intervention of regional countries, including the United States, in Middle Eastern affairs, while countries like Iran have repeatedly stated that security in the region should be established through the cooperation of regional nations. Foreign media reactions to the report by Mashregh News website include comments from western analysts, "Parn Schldrob," a western analyst, told the French news agency that the attack on the Iranian oil tanker is like fueling the crisis in the Middle East and igniting it. Another Western analyst,

Thina Margit Soltvedt, expressed concern to the French news agency, saying, "what is worrying is the consequences that arise. The debate about whether the tanker was carrying oil and putting pressure on the oil market is not the concern, but rather the worry about the occurrence of further attacks." However, the Zionist website Debka claims that there are two possibilities: either two missiles were launched from the coast of Saudi Arabia or a Saudi missile launcher, showing Riyadh's reaction to the last September 14th Aramco attack for the first time. The second possibility is that a third party that has a missile presence in the Red Sea fired the missiles. If it is the work of Saudi Arabia, it will escalate the situation and lead to a missile exchange between Iran and Saudi Arabia. However, if it is the work of a third party, Tehran will hold Israel responsible for the attack. Analysts and observers, referring to the attack on an Iranian oil tanker near Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in the Red Sea, have provided their insights into the incident. Analysts and observers analyzed the attack on the Iranian oil tanker near Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in the Red Sea. according to the Mehr News Agency's international news group, the Public Relations and International Affairs of the National Iranian Tanker Company announced that the Iranian oil tanker Sabiti was damaged in its hull at 5 and 5:20 am on Friday, October

11, 2019, in 60 miles from the port of Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The incident is believed to be caused by the impact of two missiles. The damage occurred in the reservoirs 1 and 2 on the right side of the ship's hull, creating damage with dimensions ranging from half a meter to one and a half meters. The origin of these attacks has not been determined yet and is under examination and monitoring by security and expert authorities. Fortunately, the ship did not catch fire, and all crew members are in good and safe condition. The ship is stable with the efforts of the crew and guidance from experts in the emergency room of the National Iranian Tanker Company.

Iran's reaction

Statement by the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the Targeting of the Iranian Oil Tanker "Sabiti" in the Red Sea

"The investigations conducted by the National Iranian Tanker Company show that the Iranian ship was targeted and damaged twice at an interval of about half an hour from a location near the corridor of its passage from the eastern Red Sea. Fortunately, the crew of the tanker was not harmed and the vessel is in a stable

condition. In the past few months, there have been other acts of sabotage against Iranian tankers in the Red Sea, and investigations are underway to determine the perpetrators of these acts. All the responsibilities resulting from this action, including the severe environmental pollution created in the region, are the responsibility of the agents of this dangerous adventure. The investigation into the details and perpetrators of this dangerous act is ongoing and will be announced once the results are obtained." Ali Shamkhani, the representative of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution and Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, said in reference to the missile attack on the Iranian oil tanker in the Red Sea on Friday October 11, 2019: "Maritime piracy and mischief in international waterways that are carried out with the aim of making maritime traffic unsafe will not go unanswered." A special committee has been formed to investigate the attack on the Iranian tanker "Sabiti", which was hit by two missiles near the coast of Saudi Arabia in the Red Sea. The committee's report will be submitted to the relevant authorities for decision-making soon. The investigation has been conducted by reviewing video footage and gathering intelligence evidence, and the main leads in this dangerous adventure have been obtained. Shamkhani also referred to other acts of sabotage carried out against

the Iranian oil tankers "Happiness" and "Helm" in the Red Sea in recent months. He stressed that making international waterways unsafe will have worrying consequences for the global economy and that the responsibility for the consequences will lie with the planners, perpetrators and supporters of such provocative actions.

The Story of the Saudis

The spokesperson of the Saudi Border Guard, in his first reaction to the incident involving the Iranian oil tanker in the Red Sea near the coast of Jeddah, claimed that the Saudi Border Guard had intended to provide assistance, but the Iranian oil tanker had turned off its GPS and ignored calls.

The Saudi official claimed that at 11:47 a.m. local time on Friday October 11, 2019, an email was received from the Jeddah Coastal Station containing a message from the captain of the Iranian-flagged oil tanker Sabiti. The message stated that the tanker's bow had been damaged and that oil was leaking into the sea. The Saudi Border Guard claimed that it began analyzing the information to provide assistance, but it was discovered that the tanker had continued on its course and moved 67 nautical miles away from the Jeddah coast. The tanker also turned off

its automatic tracking system and did not respond to calls. The Saudi Border Guard stressed that it emphasizes maintaining maritime security and complying with international agreements and laws in this regard. The Saudi Border Guard continued to claim that "at 3:50 p.m., the tanker's location was updated and it was found to be 79 nautical miles southwest of the Jeddah coast and 64 nautical miles from the nearest shore. It was moving at a speed of 9.7 knots at a heading of 152 degrees."



Saudi B.G report on incident involving the Iranian oil tanker in the Red Sea

Story of the plane crash of Ukrainian flight number 752 on January 8, 2020.

The downing of Ukraine International Airlines Flight No.752 on January 8th, 2020, stands as one of the most devastating and heartbreaking events in recent Iranian history. The incident, which occurred amidst a political crisis between Iran and the United States, claimed the lives of 176 innocent people. This aircraft, carrying 176 passengers, took off from the runway of Imam Khomeini Airport on January 8th, 2020. After 6 minutes, in a heartbreaking incident, all 176 passengers and crew members of this aircraft lost their lives.

The Boeing 737 passenger plane of Ukraine International Airlines, crashed shortly after taking off from Imam Khomeini Airport in Tehran on the early morning of Wednesday, January 8, 2020. All 176 passengers on board lost their lives. While various officials, including the head of Iran's Civil Aviation Organization, had repeatedly stated that, technical issues as the cause of the aviation accident, one day after the incident, Canadian authorities raised the possibility that, the plane was hit by a surface-to-air missile, specifically a Tor-M1 missile manufactured by Russia. This claim emerged despite the head of the national airline deeming a missile strike scientifically impossible and stating that

multiple other flights were flying in the Iranian airspace at the same altitude of eight thousand feet, and the matter of the missile hitting this plane cannot be true. According to the announcement of the Aviation Organization, the Boeing 737-800 with the registration mark UR-PSR and flight number 752 flew from Imam Khomeini Airport in Tehran to Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, at 6:12 AM on Wednesday January 8, 2020. The plane lost contact with air traffic control at 6:18 AM and crashed near Saba city in Tehran province. The aircraft had 167 passengers and 9 crew members, all of whom lost their lives. The passengers held passports from various countries, including 146 passengers had Iranian passports, 10 Afghan passports, 5 Canadian passports, 4 Swedish passports and 2 Ukrainian passports. All 9 members of the flight crew were citizens of Ukraine. Many Iranian passengers had dual citizenship, and 146 individuals had entered the country with Iranian passports, according to official statements.

We will not give the black box to America

The black box is the first component that gains significance after any aviation accident. The manufacturer of the aircraft, Boeing, or the United States government, is responsible for reopening it, but Iranian

officials announced that they would not hand over the recovered black box at the crash site to the manufacturer and would undertake the investigation themselves. According to their statement, "If there is a need for information and technical assistance in this regard, it will seek help from countries with the necessary technology." Although the head of the Civil Aviation Organization had stated that "the black boxes of the plane, including the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR), have been found by search and rescue teams and are in the possession of the crash investigation team. Both devices have suffered damage due to the accident and fire. While the memory section of both devices exists, visible physical damage has occurred on them." Abedzadeh stated, "Iran has no sensitivity about the black box, and the interests of all countries involved in the incident are to retrieve the information to clarify the details of the incident." Ali Abedzadeh simultaneously announced that the preliminary report on the plane crash had been sent to Ukraine as the country of registration, the United States as the manufacturer, and Sweden and Canada as the requesting countries, should be noted that some of the victims of this incident were citizens of Canada and Sweden. According to the head of the Civil Aviation Organization, "The Ukrainian plane climbed to an

altitude of eight thousand feet after taking off from the runway, and after that, the aircraft's information was removed from the radar screen. It rapidly lost altitude and crashed into the ground. Before the incident, no radio messages from the pilot regarding the abnormal situation of the aircraft had been received." Abedzadeh stated, "The crash path of the plane indicates that the aircraft was initially moving westward out of the airport. After encountering a problem, it turned to the right and had a trajectory to return to the airport at the time of the crash." These statements were made while Reuters, citing the Secretary of the Ukrainian Security Council, reported that "Ukrainian inspectors are searching for potential pieces of a Russian missile at the crash site of the Ukrainian plane in Iran." He made these remarks following the publication of a photo on the internet. Oleksiy Danilov wrote on his Facebook page: "Ukraine is exploring various possible reasons for the crash of this plane, including the possibility of a missile attack, collision, engine explosion, or terrorist act."

America is with Ukraine

Simultaneously, the US Secretary of State also expressed condolences for the aviation incident in a tweet, extending sympathies to the survivors and the

people of Iran. According to him, "The US government is monitoring this incident and is ready to assist Ukraine in the investigations surrounding it." Following this, the head of the National Aviation Organization asked all relevant countries to introduce their representatives for the investigation into the Ukrainian plane crash near Tehran. In response to this request, the authorities in Iran invited Volodymyr Zelensky, the President of Ukraine, in a phone call with the Prime Minister of Britain, to have representatives from the UK join the investigative team regarding the recent aviation incident involving the Ukrainian airline. Boris Johnson also supported and emphasized this idea, stating that the best British experts should be involved in the investigations to examine this tragedy. simultaneously, Justin Trudeau, the Prime Minister of Canada, expressed solidarity with the survivors of the victims and announced that in the coming days, efforts would be made to clarify the causes of this incident.

Images of the crash of the Boeing 737 passenger plane of Ukraine Airlines

Missile hit according to satellite observation

As these statements became more heated, CBS and Newsweek reported, citing unnamed US sources, that, in their view, the Ukrainian plane was downed by a missile.

Simultaneously, Reuters also reported, citing several US officials, that, in their opinion, this plane was shot down with an Iranian missile. The basis for these reports was also attributed to US satellite surveillance. US media, quoting their intelligence sources, wrote that, in their opinion, the downing of the plane was a result of Iran's air defense system "mistakenly" and "accidentally" targeting it. Although the US Department of Defense has not yet provided an explanation, two senior Pentagon officials have reported that Iran's air defense system mistakenly fired two missiles at this passenger plane, leading to its explosion. The Guardian also reported that, besides Canada, the United States has shared its evidence about the plane crash with British authorities.

President's assurance to Ukraine

After all this news, President Hassan Rouhani of Iran and President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine had a telephone conversation. In this conversation, both sides emphasized mutual cooperation in the investigations into the cause of the plane crash. Rouhani assured his Ukrainian counterpart: "I order the formation of a joint team of experts from both countries to investigate the precise cause of this incident." Following this conversation, the President of Ukraine, in a statement,

called for access to new reports on the plane crash. He said, "Our country seeks to discover the truth; therefore, we are in talks with our international partners. If you have any documents or evidence that can help us in our investigations, please send them to us."

Photo release of the warhead attributed to the missile

Another point that was circulating on social media regarding this incident was a photo of a missile debris, that warhead was attributed to the Tor anti-aircraft missile at the scene of the accident. Following the publication of this photo, Hassan Rezaeifar, the head of the commission investigating aviation accidents in Iran, rejected the possibility of the Ukrainian plane being shot down by a defensive missile, stating to IRNA, "We reject this photo because it was first published on one of the foreign sites and a tweet." Rezaeifar refuted the claims by U.S. officials suggesting the accidental downing of the Ukrainian plane and said, "Iran is ready to present its evidence in the presence of all media." According to him, "Foreign media are trying to create an attack against Iran."

The reaction of the spokesman of the Iranian government

Following these statements, Ali Rabiei, the spokesman for the Iranian government, also commented: "Today, in a completely calculated and well-known psychological operation, news of the alleged impact of two missiles on the Ukrainian plane has been reflected in the media, quoting an informed source from the Pentagon who requested not to reveal his name. In the future, when it becomes clear, this claim is a baseless lie, no one will take responsibility for this big lie." However, the Prime Minister of Canada had stated, "Various sources of information have it that the plane was shot down by an Iranian missile. It may have been unintentional. It is important that a comprehensive international investigation be carried out at the scene of the incident." According to Trudeau Prime Minister of Canada the Iranian authorities have shown awareness of the sensitivity of this issue so far.

Countries that canceled their flights after the crash of this plane

Following the incident and speculations about the plane's crash due to a missile strike, a flight from Frankfurt to Tehran was returned. Lufthansa airline

announced, "As a precautionary measure, our flight to Tehran has returned to Frankfurt. Our security assessment of the Iranian airspace and Tehran airport has changed. The Friday flight of this company was also canceled." The airline also stated, "All flights to Tehran for the next 10 days have been canceled."

The UK Foreign Office had also advised its citizens to "avoid air travel to Iran, or travel within Iran." Austrian Airlines had announced the cancellation of its flights to Tehran "for security reasons" for the next two days. The Swedish Transport Agency stated that "all flights from Iran to Sweden have been canceled indefinitely due to what they consider uncertainty about the Ukrainian plane crash incident." The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government had issued a red alert to its citizens against traveling to Iran due to regional circumstances. One of the latest statements regarding the Ukrainian plane crash in the skies of Tehran was made by the German Foreign Minister, who said, "Iran should not sweep the reasons for the crash of the Ukrainian plane near Tehran under the carpet." According to Heiko Maas, "This will make the atmosphere of distrust in the region and beyond even more ominous." These remarks came while Abbas Mousavi, the spokesperson for the Iranian Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, had referred to reports of the plane being shot down by Iranian anti-aircraft missiles as "suspicious maneuvering" and stated, "The Islamic Republic of Iran has initiated an investigation into the cause of the plane crash according to international standards and ICAO regulations."

The martyrdom of Haj Qassem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC Quds Force, on January 3, 2020

In the bitter incident of the terrorist attack, General Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, was martyred in a U.S. drone strike at Baghdad Airport on the early morning of Friday, January 3, 2020. The U.S. president declared that he personally ordered the attack. In this event, General Qasem Soleimani along with Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis one of the leaders of the Hashd al-Shaabi group and 10 others of his companions, attained the status of martyrdom. This matter had extensive repercussions in Iran, to the extent that people across the country took to the streets to condemn this terrorist act. The crowds were so massive that some people from Kermani compatriots lost their lives due to the congestion. The assassination of General Qasem

Soleimani is considered one of the bitterest events of the year 2020."

General Qasem Soleimani

In year 2000, Qasem Soleimani was appointed as the commander of the Quds Force by Ayatollah Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Following the emergence of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, Soleimani, as the commander of the Quds Force, played a crucial role by being present in these regions and organizing popular forces to combat this group. In year 2010, he successfully achieved the rank of major general. On the evening of Friday, January 3, 2020, in a missile attack by American helicopters on two vehicles near Baghdad Airport, General Qasem Soleimani, the

commander of the Quds Force, and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the deputy of Hashd al-Shaabi the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), along with several members of the PMF, were targeted in this attack and martyred.

Qasem Soleimani became a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in year 1980 after the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Simultaneously with the onset of the Iran-Iraq War, he trained several groups in Kerman city and sent them to the war front lines. During a period, he served as the commander of the IRGC in West Azerbaijan. In year 1981, with the appointment by Mohsen Rezaee, the then-commander of the IRGC, Soleimani was assigned as the commander of the 41st Tharallah division. During the Iraq-Iran War, he played a significant role as a commander in operations such as Operation of Wal-Fajr 8, Karbala-4, and Karbala-5. Operation of Karbala-5 was considered one of Iran's most important operations during same war, leading to the weakening of the political and military position of the Iraqi Ba'athist army and stabilizing the situation in favor of Iranian military forces. After the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War in year 1988, Soleimani returned to Kerman and became involved in fighting against bandits operating from the eastern borders of Iran. Before his appointment as the commander of the Quds Force,

Soleimani was engaged in combating drug trafficking networks on the Iran-Afghanistan borders. On the February 2011, he was promoted to the rank of major general (the highest military rank in Iran) by Ayatollah Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran. In year 2000, Qasem Soleimani was appointed as the commander of the Quds Force by Ayatollah Khamenei. According to reports from the Israeli Intelligence Special Center, the Quds Force was established in year 1990 to increase Iran's extraterritorial activities, and Soleimani became its second commander after Ahmad Vahidi. According to this report, Qasem Soleimani played a key role in strengthening Iran's influence in the Middle East, particularly during the regional unrest known as the Islamic Awakening (Arab Spring).

Confirmation of his martyrdom by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

On the morning of Friday, January 3, 2020, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) confirmed the news of the martyrdom of Major General Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force. In their statement, the IRGC announced that the distinguished commander of Islam, Haj Qasem Soleimani, after a lifetime of struggle achieved martyrdom in the early

morning hours due to a helicopter attack by American forces.

Immediately after confirming the news of Soleimani's martyrdom, Mohsen Rezaee, the Secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council and former commander of the IRGC during the Iran-Iraq War, tweeted: "The martyr, field marshal Qasem Soleimani, has joined his martyr brothers, but we will take harsh revenge against America."

Reflecting the martyrdom of Sardar Soleimani in foreign media

The official Iraqi television reported on the morning of Friday, January 3, 2020, Major General Haj Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the deputy of the Hashd al-Shaabi (PMF), were martyred in the US airstrike near Baghdad International Airport. BBC News also reported on the same day that, the Iraqi government confirmed an airstrike in the vicinity of Baghdad airport. Simultaneously, Reuters, citing the PMF, reported that a senior member of this paramilitary group, along with "two important guests," were killed in an airstrike at Baghdad airport. In the early morning hours of Friday

January 3, 2020, the Iraqi government initially reported that three Katyusha rockets had landed near the cargo area of Baghdad airport, causing injuries to several civilians and damaging at least two vehicles. However, an hour later, Reuters, citing a Facebook page associated with the Hashd al-Shaabi (PMF), reported that this paramilitary group announced the death of its public relations officer and recruitment official in an airstrike, BBC added: However, the Iraqi state television reported on the morning of Friday, January 3, 2020, that during this airstrike to two convoys of Hashd al-Shaabi vehicles at Baghdad Airport, Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), along with several leaders of the (PMF), were killed. Iran has not yet reacted to this news. The report also claimed that Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the deputy of the PMF, was also killed in this airstrike, leaving a total of 5 dead and 9 injured. Sky News Arabia, citing Iraqi sources, also reported the martyrdom of Qasem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. It's worth noting that the events surrounding the airstrike near Baghdad airport marked a significant escalation in tensions between the United States and Iran, as Qasem Soleimani was a highly influential figure in Iran and the region. The Persian-language website of Independent also reported: Just a few hours after Mark Esper, the US

Secretary of Defense, claimed that Iranian proxy forces in Iraq are likely to carry out more attacks, Reuters reported three Katyusha rockets hitting Baghdad International Airport. Al Jazeera's report suggests that Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force, lost his life during these attacks, but some news sources confirmed this information in an interview with Independent Net Farsi. The media added that Qasem Soleimani had been traveling to Iraq frequently in recent months. According to a Washington Post reporter in Iraq, citing his sources, Hashd al-Shaabi officials and their companions were killed during a drone attack on their vehicles leaving Baghdad Airport. Following the martyrdom of Sardar Qasem Soleimani, Supreme Leader of the Revolution, three days of public mourning were announced in the country. Following the martyrdom of Commander Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Quds Force, who was killed in a terrorist operation alongside other comrades, including Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the deputy head of the PMF in Iraq, the Supreme Leader issued a decree appointing Sardar Ismail Qaani as the new commander of the Quds Force.

Funeral of martyr Qassem Soleimani

The body of martyr Qasem Soleimani and other comrades, who were martyred in the terrorist incident at Baghdad International Airport, were mourned in a series of magnificent ceremonies and millions-strong ceremonies on the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th of January 2020, in cities such as Kazmain, Karbala, Najaf, Ahvaz, Mashhad, Tehran, Qom, and Kerman. On the January 6, 2020, a funeral prayer was performed by the Supreme Leader for the martyr Soleimani and other martyrs at Tehran University. The funeral procession in Tehran became the largest funeral ceremony since the funeral of Imam Khomeini (RA), with millions of people attending. The body of martyr Qasem Soleimani was finally laid to rest on Tuesday, 7th of January 2020, in the Martyrs' Cemetery in the city of Kerman.

Funeral Ceremony of Martyr Qasem Soleimani

According to Al-Alam, the Islamic world's media outlet, while the U.S. expected the martyrdom of Hajj Qasem Soleimani to leave the axis of resistance leaderless and defeated, the developments over these hundred days have shown that the Qasem Soleimani's school of thought enduring, and its future is hopeful. Analysis in the absence of Haj Qasem, what shows itself more than anything else is the presence of his strategic vision in place of the axis of resistance and its careful follow-up in this axis. the current representation of the "point-target" perspective of Sardar Soleimani is seen in the hands of Palestinian fighters as "point-target missiles." With the loss of Martyr Soleimani, a new concept called "hard revenge" emerged within the axis of resistance, a concept that has become a factor pressuring the U.S. to narrow down its military forces and equipment from its previous spread to a more concentrated focus in a few areas in Iraq. In these new circumstances, one no longer hears talk about the necessity of the fall of the legal system in Syria. No one mentions the superiority of the Saudi coalition in Yemen or the possibility of victory for the Saudi-Emirati occupiers in the distant future. Trump's deal, which was proudly unveiled after the martyrdom of Sardar Soleimani, has turned into a paper exercise. Hezbollah in Lebanon is more powerful than ever, and, most

importantly, the narrative is strengthening that instead of the new American system, there is a decades-old, formidable resistance against America that has emerged as a serious rival to the new American system in the region and is growing stronger day by day.

Missile attack on Ain al-Asad base on January 8, 2020

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Aerospace Force, in response to the assassination of Haj Qasem Soleimani, launched a number of ballistic missiles at the Ain al-Assad base in Iraq, which is an American military base. During the Iranian missile attack on the US military base, which is officially referred to as the Operation of Martyr Soleimani, functional and combat equipment of the US Army was destroyed."

In heavy ballistic missile attacks by the Aerospace Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the American base Ain al-Asad in Iraq, which is the location of American forces was hit.

Pars Today- The Islamic Republic of Iran, in line with its promise to exact revenge on the United States for the cowardly assassination of General Soleimani and his companions in Baghdad, on the morning of Wednesday, January 8, 2020 targeted the Ain al-Asad American base in Iraq with missile attacks.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Aerospace Force, in response to the assassination of Haj Qassem Soleimani, launched a number of ballistic missiles at the Ain al-Assad base in Iraq, which is an American military base. During this missile attack, known officially as

"Operation Martyr Soleimani," operational and military equipment of the U.S. Army at the base was destroyed.Top of Form

According to the Mashreq News Agency: In the early hours of Wednesday morning, January 8, 2020, and just hours before the burial of the body of Major General Martyr Soleimani, heavy ballistic missile attacks by the Aerospace Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps were carried out on the Ain al-Asad base in Iraq, which, where the US forces were stationed. The Ain al-Asad base is the largest and most well-equipped US base. The Al-Taji base in Erbil was also targeted by Iranian missiles. Local and American reporters reported that dozens of American terrorists were killed and wounded in the attacks.



The Ain al-Asad base is located 108 kilometers west of Ramadi. In year 2003, US Marines occupied the base and remained there until 2011. At the end of year 2014, under the pretext of fighting ISIS, the base was once again taken over by American military personnel present in the international anti-ISIS coalition. American troops and equipment have been stationed there ever since.

Confirmation of the news by the IRGC

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps announced in a statement that the Aerospace Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had carried out heavy missile attacks on the American base Ain al-Asad in revenge for the cowardly assassination of Major General Martyr Haj Qasem Soleimani and his companions.

Grieving Islamic nation- Great and martyr-nurturing nation of Iran

The time has come for the fulfillment of the true promise, and by the permission of God Almighty, early this morning, in response to the criminal and terrorist operations of the American aggressor forces and in revenge for the cowardly assassination and oppressed martyrdom of the heroic and dedicated commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard

Corps, the proud Major General Martyr Haj Qasem Soleimani and his companions, the brave fighters of the IRGC Aerospace Force in a successful operation called Operation of Martyr Soleimani with the sacred code Ya Zahra (S) by firing dozens of ground-to-ground missiles, the occupied air base of the terrorist and aggressor US Army called "Ain al-Asad" was destroyed, the details of which will be announced to the noble people of Iran and the free people of the world of Islam.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps congratulates the Islamic Ummah (community) on this great victory and announces to the devoted people of Islamic Iran:

1. We warn the great Satan, the cruel and arrogant regime of America, that any further mischief, aggression, or any other movement will be met with a more painful and striking response.

2. We caution the allied governments of America that have placed their bases at the disposal of the terrorist army of this country, that any land involved in any hostile and aggressive actions against the Islamic Republic of Iran will become a target, regardless of the method.

3. We do not consider the Zionist regime separate from the criminal regime of America in these crimes.

4. We advise the American people to prevent further harm by calling on their soldiers to leave the region and not allow the lives of their country's military personnel to be endangered further due to the increasing animosity of the anti-people regime ruling the United States.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps announced on January 8, 2020

More than 80 American terrorists were killed in the missile attack on Ain al-Asad. An informed source within the IRGC revealed extensive casualties among Americans in the Iranian missile attack. According to precise reports from our sources in the region, at least 80 American soldiers have been killed, and around 200 have been wounded, with the wounded soldiers immediately evacuated from the base by helicopters. The Ain al-Asad base was a strategic hub for the United States, supporting Drone (UAVs). The source mentioned that 20 critical points of this base were hit by 15 missiles, resulting in the destruction of a significant number of drones and helicopters. Despite the complete readiness of the Americans, their air defenses failed to show any response. The informed source added that 104 sensitive

points in American positions in the region have been identified, and in the event of any further American mistakes, they will be targeted and destroyed.

Iran's intention was to kill American soldier

General Mark Milley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Army, stated on Thursday, January 9, 2020, that Iran's missile attacks were aimed at killing U.S. military personnel and causing significant damage to the Ain al-Asad base. The highest-ranking U.S. military official added that it is still unclear whether Iran will launch further attacks. Milley told reporters, "Based on what I've seen and know, I believe, the purpose of the attacks was to inflict structural damage, destroy vehicles, equipment, aircraft, and kill military

personnel. This is my personal assessment." Despite the initial denial by the Trump administration that, “this attack did not cause any casualties” now gradually, news in this field is published. The news outlet "Defense One" confirmed on Friday, January 17, 2020, that, at least 11 U.S. military personnel were injured and transported to medical facilities in Kuwait and Germany. On Friday, January 17, 2020, the U.S. military acknowledged that, as a result of the attacks, 11 personnel have been treated for concussions. Captain Bill Erin, a spokesperson for U.S. Central Command, stated in a release: "These soldiers were transported to Landstool Regional Medical Center in Germany and rest have been sent to "Arifjan" camp in Kuwait for further evaluations and screenings. He claimed that no American soldiers were killed in the attack on Wednesday, January 8, 2020 on the "Ain al-Asad" airbase in Iraq." However, some soldiers have been treated for symptoms of concussions due to the blast, and their conditions are still being assessed.

The strange thing is that the US military and the Pentagon have claimed that they have only recently learned about this. "US President Donald Trump, US Defense Secretary Mark Esper and other US officials have repeatedly claimed in the past few days that the Iranian missile attack on the Ain al-Assad base has

caused no casualties or injuries. Trump deliberately tried to deny the issue of casualties of American forces in this attack in order to preserve the prestige of the United States, which was the first time since World War II that a military base of the United States was attacked by the armed forces of another country. Another reason for Trump to downplay the results of the Iranian missile attack on the US base in Iraq was to avoid confrontation with Iran, which would have very dangerous consequences for Washington and its regional in response to Iran's missile attack on US military bases, in response to Iran's missile attack on US military bases, Trump tried to downplay Iran's retaliatory action while repeating his anti-Iranian claims. He claimed that "no Americans were harmed and only minor damage was done to our military bases." The US president has shown that his claims are nothing but empty words and that he fundamentally lacks the courage to engage in a large-scale military confrontation with Iran. Before the missile attack, he had threatened to target 52 sites in Iran in response to any Iranian military action. Now, Trump, who is known for his lies, has been exposed once again in one of his biggest lies, bringing new shame to his administration and the Pentagon. From the outset, US officials have pursued a policy of secrecy and censorship of information about the results of Iran's missile attack

on Ain al-Assad. In the early hours after Iran's missile retaliation, Trump tweeted: "Don't worry!" Other US military and security officials, including Defense Secretary Mark Esper and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Mark Milley, repeated the claim that no American troops were harmed in the Iranian attack at news conferences. A week after the Iranian missile operation, the Washington Post reported that "at least two American troops were thrown out of a high-rise tower window and dozens more were knocked unconscious as a result of the missile strikes." This incident has damaged the credibility of the US government and raised questions about its ability to protect its troops. It has also increased tensions between the US and Iran and made it more difficult to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict. U.S. media outlets are gradually leaking information related to the casualties of the missile attack on Ain al-Asad, and it's possible that this trend will continue. However, even at this point, acknowledging the injury of 11 U.S. military personnel contradicts President Trump's explicit statements that all U.S. forces at Ain al-Asad are in good health. This issue has generated significant reactions both domestically and internationally. Some family members of U.S. military personnel have expressed concerns to news networks like CNN about being uninformed about the status of their loved ones stationed

at Ain al-Asad. This indicates that the Trump administration is deliberately trying to maintain its prestige by continuing a policy of maximum secrecy regarding the casualties resulting from the Iranian missile attack on Ain al-Asad.

Injured from the missile attack on the Ain al-Asad base on the way to Baghdad

A military spokesperson in Iraq announced that American planes were transferring the wounded from Ain al-Asad airbase to Baghdad in the early morning hours of Wednesday, January 8, 2020. Iraqi television immediately reported this news without specifying the military spokesperson's name on Wednesday, January 8, 2020. The spokesperson stated that after the missile attack by the IRGC on Ain al-Asad military base, American planes quickly entered into operation to transfer the wounded to Baghdad, the capital of Iraq. Without providing further details, the military spokesperson continued, stating that the operation to transfer the wounded began immediately after the landing of the missiles and the base explosion and was still ongoing. In response to the terrorist attack on Friday, January 3, 2020, which led to the martyrdom of Commander Qasem Soleimani, the Public Relations of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) reported

on Wednesday, January 8, 2020 that dozens of ballistic missiles were launched towards Ain al-Asad base in Al-Anbar province of Iraq. According to the statement from the IRGC's Public Relations, dozens of ground-to-ground missiles hit the American base, causing devastating explosions. The explosions at Ain al-Asad base have been described as formidable. Sardar Major General Qasem Soleimani, the Commander of the Quds Force, and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the Deputy Chairman of People's Forces Organization (PMF) in Iraq, along with 8 others, were martyred on the early morning of Friday, January 3, 2020, on the road to Baghdad Airport. This targeted killing was ordered by Donald Trump, the President of the United States, and carried out using drones from the Department of Defense (Pentagon).

Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, head of the research organization of the Ministry of Defense, was assassinated in the street.

Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, head of the Iranian Defense Ministry's Research and Innovation Organization, was assassinated on Friday afternoon, November 27, 2020, on a street near Tehran. Iran's foreign minister and military officials have accused Israel, and security officials have promised "revenge." Iranian news agencies reported that at 2:30 p.m. Tehran time, "armed terrorist

elements" attacked Mr. Fakhrizadeh's car. Images released show that both sides of Absard (cold road) Boulevard near Firuzkuh Road were blocked with several rows of cars.

Fakhrizadeh's assassination place near Firuzkoh road

Details of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh's martyrdom

Based on reports from Iranian media, the assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was carried out using a remote-controlled automatic machine gun mounted on a Nissan van parked 150 meters away from Fakhrizadeh's car. The attack resulted in the death of Fakhrizadeh and in this incident, 11 security guards were with Fakhrizadeh, and the explosion of the Nissan was due to the destruction of the same guards. it is reported that the machine gun was equipped with an intelligent satellite system that had been programmed to focus on Fakhrizadeh on the day of the attack. The system also utilized artificial intelligence to ensure precision. Notably, the attack did not harm Fakhrizadeh's wife or bodyguards, as the perpetrators used a highly precise automatic weapon to avoid civilian casualties. Iranian defense and security reporters have compared him to the famous Iranian commander on the other side of the border, calling him the "Qasem Soleimani of the defense industry" and the "pride of Iran." Previously, Israeli media had reported that Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was also supposed to be assassinated in 2009 along with other Iranian nuclear scientists and experts, but due to considerations, including the disclosure of some measures, he was not assassinated.

Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi was born in the city of Qom in year1957, he studied at the Isfahan University of Technology and Shahid Beheshti University, where he received a doctorate in nuclear physics. He, along with Fereydoon Abbasi Davani head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran at Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's government, were among the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders who later joined Iran's nuclear program. Fakhrizadeh before entering the nuclear field, he was a member of the IRGC. according to some individuals close to the IRGC, he played a role in launching Iran's missile program with the cooperation of North Korea and Libya. It is said that he traveled to North Korea with Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam, the late IRGC commander. He was recognized as one of the key figures in Iran's nuclear program, and Western officials repeatedly accused him of pursuing the development of nuclear weapons. His assassination significantly heightened tensions in the region, and its consequences continue to unfold. According to some reports, Shahram Amiri, an Iranian nuclear physics expert, was also one of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh's colleagues.

The story of Shahram Amiri, from the noisy return to the unannounced execution

Shahram Amiri was born in Kermanshah in November 8, 1978 and he was a researcher and expert in medical radioisotopes at Malek Ashtar University, which affiliated with the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Support. He disappeared during his pilgrimage to Umrah in Saudi Arabia in May 2009. Approximately 13 months later, after several contradictory videos were released featuring him, he visited to the office of the protector of Iran's interests in the United States on July 3, 2010. Two days later, he returned to Iran and was welcomed by Iranian authorities, including Hassan Qashqavi the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After entering Iran, Amiri was arrested, and according to his family's claim, after spending 20 months in detention, he was sentenced to 10 years in prison and 5 years in exile to Khash city following a trial. Finally, Shahram Amiri was executed on 3rd of August ٢٠١٦ in Tehran. A report published by the American television network ABC in April 2010 claimed that Shahram Amiri had worked in the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and sought asylum in the United States. However, Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, had previously stated that he did not know Shahram Amiri, and Amiri had no connection

with the Atomic Energy Organization. Initially, in July 2009, Hassan Qashqavi, the spokesman of the Iranian Foreign Ministry at the time, announced that Shahram Amiri was merely a young trader engaged in economic activities. In year 2009, the Iranian government announced that, the United States with the cooperation of the Saudi Arabian government, had abducted an Iranian nuclear scientist who was in Saudi Arabia to perform Hajj ceremonies. In March 2010, the United States claimed that Shahram Amiri had sought refuge in the West. Manouchehr Mottaki, the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time of Iran, initially denied Amiri's connection to Iran's nuclear program and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. Since the disappearance of Amiri in Saudi Arabia, Iran had emphasized his abduction by the United States security services and consistently held the United States responsible for ensuring Amiri's safety. To clarify the situation of their citizen, Iran had summoned Swiss embassy officials in Tehran, who acted as the custodians of U.S. interests, at least twice. About two months before the assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, Amiri's name brought up in a session of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, the political branch of the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization. However, even before that, the Prime Minister of Israel had mentioned his name. During the National Council of

Resistance session, it was announced that two sites named as, 'Sorkheh Hesar' in Tehran and 'Maryvan' in Abadeh, were involved in 'nuclear weapon production.' These sites were allegedly under the control of the organization called 'Sepand,' affiliated with the Defense Research and Innovation Organization. The political branch of the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization had also declared in year 2013 that the nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic's military section had been transferred to Sepand, led by Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi.

Claim of the National Council of Resistance of Iran: The Iranian government is building a new underground nuclear facility

Iran has rejected the claims made by the "National Resistance Council" regarding covert nuclear activities. This organization had previously stated in year 2018 that Fakhrizadeh had traveled to North Korea in year 2013 to participate in the country's third nuclear test. The location of Mr. Fakhrizadeh's assassination was close to some of Iran's nuclear and military sites. In year 2018, the Israeli Prime Minister had also mentioned his name, saying, "Remember that name."

Netanyahu announced: We have obtained thousands of pages of secret information from Iran's nuclear program.

Benjamin Netanyahu, in his statements on April 30, 2018, mentioned about 55,000 pages and 55,000 digital files of information related to Iran's military nuclear program, including a project called "Amad" for the production of nuclear weapons. He named Fakhrizadeh as one of the operators of this project. Two months before this statement, the Israeli Prime Minister, in an article in the Javan newspaper affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards, titled "Amad, the Code Name for Accusations Against Iran's Missile Program," wrote: "It can be guessed that in the new round of pressures, these documents will be used as a precedent for Iran's efforts to equip ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads." This article somewhat indicated that the actions under the supervision of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, according to Israel, were simultaneous in the missile and nuclear fields and the effort to "equip ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads." In year 2019, the U.S. Department of State expressed concerns about the renewed activities of Iranian nuclear scientists, who, according to the department, were involved in the program for the "production of nuclear weapons" before year 2004. This ministry had announced that these individuals had been

employed in other organizations, with Mohsen Fakhrizadeh leading them. The Wall Street Journal also reported that Mohsen Fakhrizadeh had resumed his activities by establishing a nuclear research center in Iran.

Accusation of Secret Nuclear Activities; More Pressure on Iran.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Mohsen Fakhrizadeh had established a research center called the "Defense Research and Innovation Organization" on Mojdeh Street in northern Tehran. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh's name was among the Iranian officials sanctioned in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737. The UN Security Council, in Resolution 1737, mentioned facilities under the name "7th of Tir" and stated that these facilities are affiliated with Iran's Defense Industries Organization and are directly related to the nuclear program. The Institute for Science and International Security also noted that the "7th of Tir" company, located near Isfahan, is mainly engaged in missile production. Previously, it manufactured sensitive centrifuge components for uranium enrichment, and there were indications that it may still be involved in such production, although the IAEA reports do not definitively confirm the

continuation of these activities. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was one of the key figures in Iran's nuclear program, which International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had requested interviews with individuals involved in the program, including Fakhrizadeh, but Iran rejected these requests. Nevertheless, some Fundamentalist media outlets claimed that IAEA officials had met with Iranian nuclear scientists. Ali-Asghar Soltanieh, Iran's former representative to the IAEA, had stated, "by publicizing the names of Iranian scientists and experts, the IAEA agency has put them at risk of assassination." Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, despite being mentioned in foreign media, did not have a public presence in Iran's media space, and his image was only published in a meeting with the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic.

An Overview of Iran's Basic Challenges in Recent Decades

Nearly 42 years have passed since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran, (until the year of writing this book). Despite challenges, public participation in elections has been a significant support for the stability of the system. Unfortunately, today this country is facing major challenges simultaneously. Ignoring these challenges may lead to intensified problems and a loss of hope, resulting in protests in the future. Part of these problems stems from the decisions made by the country's management during this period. Therefore, without a shift in ideological frameworks and political and economic structures, a way out of the current crisis is inconceivable. The country's population has increased by 2.37 times, but during the same period, the average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth has only been 1.82 times. The per capita production has declined, and the overall welfare level has decreased. Instead of streamlining economic growth, the focus has shifted towards population growth, self-sufficiency, and anti-foreign sentiments. Emphasizing population growth over economic growth has led to serious challenges in the job market, with imbalances resulting in a decrease in average wages and the spread of poverty. The approach has deviated from economic growth, and challenges in

the job market have emerged due to the prioritization of population growth over economic growth. This has led to serious challenges in the job market, with imbalances resulting in a decrease in average wages and the spread of poverty.

The End

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